UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 18-4352
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MARCUS FRANKLIN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior District Judge. (3:05-cr-000192-REP-1)
Submitted: December 15, 2018 Decided: December 20, 2018
Before MOTZ, AGEE, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant, Appellate Attorney,
Alexandria, Virginia, Carolyn V. Grady, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF
THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Stephen
David Schiller, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Marcus Franklin appeals the district court’s order revoking his supervised release
and sentencing him to 24 months in prison. Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), claiming that the sentence is plainly
unreasonable but stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal. Although
Franklin was advised of his right to file a pro se brief, he has not filed such a brief. We
affirm.
“We will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is
not plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Franklin’s sentence does not exceed the applicable
statutory maximum. The remaining question is whether the sentence is plainly
unreasonable.
“When reviewing whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we must
first determine whether it is unreasonable at all.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d
544, 546 (4th Cir. 2010). “In making this determination, we follow generally the
procedural and substantive considerations that we employ in our review of original
sentences, . . . with some necessary modifications to take into account the unique nature
of supervised release revocation sentences.” United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 207
(4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Only if we find a sentence to be
procedurally or substantively unreasonable will we consider whether it is “plainly” so.
Id. at 208.
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“A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately
explains the chosen sentence after considering the . . . Chapter Seven policy statements
and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) [2012] factors.” Id. at 207. “[A] revocation
sentence is substantively reasonable if the court sufficiently state[s] a proper basis for its
conclusion that the defendant should receive the sentence imposed.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). “A court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a
revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a post-conviction sentence, but it still
must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence imposed.” United States v.
Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547 (internal quotation marks omitted).
We conclude that Franklin’s sentence is procedurally and substantively
reasonable. The court correctly identified his policy statement range, considered the
relevant statutory factors and gave sufficiently detailed reasons for selecting a sentence
above that range. Among other things, Franklin had proven on several occasions to be
unable to abide by the terms of supervision. The court was concerned about his repeated
breach of the court’s trust, his need for drug treatment and the need for deterrence.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and
have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm. This court requires
that counsel inform Franklin, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Franklin requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy of the
motion was served on Franklin.
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We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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