In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
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No. 02-18-00237-CV
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IN THE INTEREST OF H.B., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 158th District Court
Denton County, Texas
Trial Court No. 14-09721-431
Before Pittman, J.; Sudderth, C.J.; and Kerr, J.
Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Z.B. (Father) appeals the trial court’s judgment terminating his
parent-child relationship with his daughter H.B. After a jury trial, the jury found that
termination of the relationship was in H.B.’s best interest and that Father:
• knowingly placed or knowingly allowed . . . [H.B.] to remain in
conditions or surroundings which endangered [her] physical or
emotional well-being . . . [;]
• engaged in conduct or knowingly placed [H.B.] with persons who
engaged in conduct which endangered [her] physical or emotional
well-being . . . [; and]
• failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that
specifically established the actions necessary for [him] to obtain
[H.B.’s] return . . . , [when she had] been in the temporary
managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and
Protective Services [TDFPS] for not less than nine months as a
result of [her] removal from [Father] for abuse or neglect.
See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (2) (West Supp. 2018). The
trial court approved the findings and incorporated them into the order terminating
Father’s parental rights.
Father’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed an Anders brief stating that
after thoroughly reviewing the record, he believes that any appeal by Father would be
frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967);
see also In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d 774, 776–77 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.)
(holding that Anders procedures apply in parental termination cases). Father’s
appellate counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders by presenting a professional
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evaluation of the record and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds of
error to be advanced on appeal. See In re D.D., 279 S.W.3d 849, 850 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2009, pet. denied). Although given the opportunity, Father did not file a
response to the Anders brief. TDFPS, Appellee, also filed no responsive brief.
As the reviewing appellate court, we must conduct an independent evaluation
of the record to decide whether Father’s appellate counsel correctly determined that
the appeal is frivolous. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App.
1991); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d 618, 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.). Having
carefully reviewed the record and the Anders brief, we agree with Father’s appellate
counsel that the appeal is frivolous and without merit. See K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d at 619.
We find nothing in the record that arguably might support the appeal. See D.D.,
279 S.W.3d at 850. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Father’s appellate counsel requests that we refer this matter back to the trial
court “at the appropriate time” to consider “a request . . . to withdraw from further
representation.” As his appellate counsel recognizes, Father must have counsel until
his appeals are exhausted: “[A]ppointed counsel’s obligations can be satisfied by filing
a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” In re P.M.,
520 S.W.3d 24, 27–28 (Tex. 2016); see In re C.J., 501 S.W.3d 254, 255 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 2016, pets. denied). We therefore deny appellate counsel’s request. See
P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27.
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Per Curiam
Delivered: December 20, 2018
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