[Cite as Artisan & Truckers Cas. Co. v. United Ohio Ins. Co., 2019-Ohio-3.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ROSS COUNTY
ARTISAN & TRUCKERS CASUALTY CO. :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 18CA3639
v. :
DECISION AND
UNITED OHIO INSURANCE CO. : JUDGMENT ENTRY
Defendant-Appellant. :
APPEARANCES:
Josh L. Schoenberger and Susan S. R. Petro, Williams & Schoenberger Co. LLC, Columbus,
Ohio, for appellant.
Richard M. Garner and Jeffery S. Maynard, Collins, Roche, Utley & Garner, Dublin, Ohio, for
appellee.
Hoover, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, United Ohio Insurance Company (“United”) appeals the
judgment of the Ross County Court of Common Pleas, which granted declaratory judgment in
favor of plaintiff-appellee, Artisan and Truckers Casualty Company (“Progressive”). In this case,
Progressive sought a declaratory judgment that its insurance policy was in excess of United’s
policy in the matter of Sabrina Stiffler, Administratrix of the Estate of Christopher Stiffler,
Deceased, et al. v. Stevens Enterprises of Ohio, LLC, et al., Jackson County, Ohio Court of
Common Pleas, Case Number 15 PI 0014 (“Underlying Litigation”). There, United and
Progressive agreed to split the $1,350,000.00 indemnity payment—with each paying
$675,000.00—but reserved the right to seek contribution from each other for amounts paid in
excess of their respective policies. The trial court ultimately found that United’s policy provided
Ross App. No. 18CA3639 2
primary coverage for the liability claims while Progressive’s policy provided excess coverage.
Since both policies had a limit of $1 million, United was responsible for $1 million of the
$1,350,000.00; and Progressive was responsible for the remainder. Therefore, the trial court
ordered United to reimburse Progressive the amount of $325,000.00 plus statutory interest at a
rate of 3% per annum beginning September 28, 2016.
{¶2} On appeal, United contends that its policy and Progressive’s policy provided pro-
rata coverage with respect to the Underlying Litigation and that both parties were responsible for
a proportionate share of the indemnity payment. According to United, the trial court improperly
construed Progressive’s policy instead of applying the language as written. Progressive argues
that the trial court’s ruling was consistent with the intent of the parties to the Progressive policy
and consistent with common industry practice.
{¶3} For the reasons that follow, we find that Progressive’s policy provided excess
coverage in the Underlying Litigation. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶4} Both parties have agreed to the following stipulated facts:
1. [Progressive] is licensed and authorized to offer and sell insurance in the
State of Ohio.
2. [United] is licensed and authorized to offer and sell insurance in the State
of Ohio.
3. August 15, 2014, Progressive issued Policy No. 03241868-0 to David D.
Stevens/Stevens Enterprises (“Stevens”), effective for the policy period of August
15, 2014 to August 15, 2015 (“Progressive Policy”). * * *
Ross App. No. 18CA3639 3
4. Pursuant to the Progressive Policy, a 1999 International 900 Tractor, VIN
2HSFTASR8XC041697 (“Tractor”)1 and a 1986 Strick Trailer, VIN
1512E9483GE278283 (“Trailer”) were included on the Auto Coverage Schedule
of the Progressive Policy.
5. The next day, August 16, 2014, United issued Policy No. CPP 0017890 to
Stevens, effective for the policy period of August 16, 2014 to August 16, 2015
(“United Policy”). * * *
6. Pursuant to the United Policy, the Tractor was included on the Schedule of
Covered Autos of the United Policy.2 The Trailer was not included on the United
Policy’s Schedule of Covered Autos.
7. At all times pertinent to this case, the Tractor and Trailer were owned by
[Stevens].
8. On November 11, 2014, the Tractor and Trailer, while being driven by
James Ostrander (“Ostrander”) in the course and scope of his employment for
Stevens, was involved in an automobile accident that allegedly caused the death
of Christopher Stiffler (“Stiffler”) in Ross County, Ohio (“Accident”).
9. Stiffler’s legal representative filed Sabrina Stiffler, Administratrix of the
Estate of Christopher Stiffler, Deceased, et al. v. Stevens Enterprises of Ohio,
LLC, et al., No. 15 PI 0014, in the Court of Common Pleas for Jackson County,
Ohio against Stevens and Ostrander seeking damages arising from the Accident
(“Underlying Litigation”).
1
The Progressive Policy refers to this vehicle as a “1999 Intl 990,” and (OP 8, Exhibit A at 3).
2
The United Policy refers to this vehicle as a “1999 International 9900 Tractor.” (OP 8, Exhibit
B at 4).
Ross App. No. 18CA3639 4
10. Stevens and Ostrander sought coverage under both the Progressive Policy
and the United Policy for the claims asserted against each of them in the
Underlying Litigation.
11. The claims against Stevens and Ostrander in the Underlying Litigation
were resolved through a confidential settlement agreement * * * (“Settlement
Agreement”).
12. Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, Progressive and United each paid
$675,000 to settle the claims against Stevens and Ostrander in the Underlying
Litigation—for a total of $1,350,000.00. However, Progressive and United
reserved the right to seek contribution from each other for any amounts either
paid that were believed to be in excess of what their respective policies required.
(Joint Stipulation of Facts).
{¶5} On November 4, 2016, Progressive filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment in
the Ross County Court of Common Pleas, which asked the court to: (1) declare that the
Progressive Policy was in excess to the United Policy relative to coverage for claims for
indemnity with respect to the Underlying Litigation; and (2) award Progressive damages in the
amount of $325,000 plus interest from the date of settlement. (OP 1). In support of its argument,
Progressive attached a copy of the Progressive Policy, which includes an “Automatic
Termination” provision and an “Other Insurance” provision.
{¶6} The Automatic Termination provision states:
If you obtain other insurance on an insured auto, any similar insurance provided
by this policy will terminate as to that insured auto on the effective date of the
other insurance.
Ross App. No. 18CA3639 5
(Emphasis sic.) (OP 8, Exhibit A at 26).
{¶7} Additionally, the Other Insurance provision provides:
For any insured auto that is specifically described on the declarations page, this
policy provides primary coverage. For an insured auto which is not specifically
described on the declarations page, coverage under this policy will be in excess
over any and all other valid and collectible insurance, whether primary, excess or
contingent. However, if the insured auto which is specifically described on the
declarations page is a trailer, this policy will be primary only if the trailer is
attached to an insured auto that is a power unit you own and is specifically
described on the declarations page, and excess in all other circumstances.
(Emphasis sic.) (Id. at 24).
{¶8} The Progressive Policy also contains a General Definitions provision, which
states in relevant part:
4. “Declarations” or “declarations page” means the document prepared by us
listing your policy information, which may include the types of coverage you
have elected, the limit for each coverage, the cost for each coverage, the
specifically described autos covered by this policy, and the types of coverage for
each specifically described auto.
5. “Insured auto” or “your insured auto” means:
a. Any auto specifically described on the declarations page * * *.
***
15. “Trailer” includes a semi-trailer and any piece of equipment used to
convert a semi-trailer to a full trailer while it is attached to the semi-trailer.
Ross App. No. 18CA3639 6
***
17. “You” * * * refer[s] to the named insured shown on the declarations page.
(Emphasis deleted.) (Id. at 14-16).
{¶9} Ultimately, the trial court found that the United Policy provided primary coverage
for the liability claims while the Progressive Policy provided excess coverage. Since both
policies had a liability limit of $1 million, United was responsible for $1 million of the
$1,350,000.00 indemnity payment in the Underlying Litigation; and Progressive was responsible
for the remainder. (OP 8, Exhibit A at 2 & Exhibit B at 3). Therefore, the trial court granted
declaratory judgment in favor of Progressive and ordered United to reimburse Progressive the
amount of $325,000.00 plus statutory interest at a rate of 3% per annum beginning September
28, 2016, the date of the settlement.
{¶10} United timely appealed.
II. Assignments of Error
{¶11} On appeal, United assigns the following errors for our review:
First Assignment of Error:
The trial court erred in holding that the Progressive Policy provides excess
liability coverage for the Underlying Litigation.
Second Assignment of Error:
The trial court erred in construing the Progressive Policy’s language rather than
applying it as written.
Third Assignment of Error:
The trial court erred in holding that United is required to pay $325,000.00 in
contribution plus interest to Progressive.
Ross App. No. 18CA3639 7
III. Law and Analysis
A. Standard of Review
{¶12} “[T]he interpretation of an insurance contract is a matter of law, which we review
de novo.” Comisford v. Erie Property Cas. Co., 4th Dist. Gallia No. 10CA3, 2011-Ohio-1373,
quoting Siegfried v. Farmers Ins. of Columbus, Inc., 187 Ohio App.3d 710, 933 N.E.2d 815,
2010-Ohio-1173, at ¶ 11, citing Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Guman Bros. Farm, 73 Ohio
St.3d 107, 108, 652 N.E.2d 684, 1995-Ohio-214. “In interpreting an insurance policy, the court’s
role is to give effect to the intent of the parties to the agreement. In doing so, [w]e examine the
insurance contract as a whole and presume that the intent of the parties is reflected in the
language used in the policy. We look to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used in
the policy unless another meaning is clearly apparent from the contents of the policy. When the
language of a written contract is clear, a court may look no further than the writing itself to find
the intent of the parties.” Eastley v. Volkman, Scioto App. Nos. 09CA3308 & 09CA3309, 2010-
Ohio-4771, at ¶ 50, citing Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849,
797 N.E.2d 1256, at ¶ 11 (internal quotations omitted) (alteration sic).
B. The Progressive Policy Provided Excess Coverage in the Underlying Litigation
{¶13} We address United’s first and second assignments of error in tandem.
{¶14} In its first assignment of error, United alleges that the trial court erred in finding
that the United Policy provided primary liability coverage while the Progressive Policy provided
excess coverage for the Underlying Litigation. According to United, both parties were
responsible for a proportionate share of the indemnity payment because the United Policy and
the Progressive Policy provided pro-rata coverage.
Ross App. No. 18CA3639 8
{¶15} In its second assignment of error, United alleges that the trial court improperly
construed the language of the Progressive Policy rather than applying it as written. Based on the
clear and unambiguous language of the Progressive Policy’s Other Insurance provision, United
argues that the Progressive Policy provided primary coverage for the Trailer. Once again, the
Other Insurance provision states that:
[I]f the insured auto which is specifically described on the declarations page is
a trailer, this policy will be primary only if the trailer is attached to an insured
auto that is a power unit you own and is specifically described on the
declarations page, and excess in all other circumstances.
(Emphasis sic.) (OP 8, Exhibit A at 22). Since the phrase “insured auto,” as used in the
Progressive Policy, is defined as “[a]ny auto specifically described on the declarations page,”
United argues that the Progressive Policy provided primary coverage for the Trailer since the
Tractor remained listed on the policy’s declarations page. (Id. at 3 & 14). However, United
concedes that the August 16, 2014 issuance of the United Policy covering the Tractor terminated
Progressive’s coverage of the Tractor under Progressive’s Automatic Termination provision.
(Appellant’s Brief at 7).
{¶16} In contrast, Progressive believes that the trial court properly applied the
Progressive Policy in a way that was consistent with the language of the policy and the intent of
the parties. According to Progressive, the purpose of the Other Insurance provision was to render
trailer coverage in excess unless the power unit pulling the trailer was an auto owned by the
policyholder and insured only by Progressive. This is consistent with other provisions of the
Progressive Policy, which provide that “[a]n insured auto and any trailer or trailers attached
thereto shall be deemed to be one auto with respect to our Limit of Liability.” (Emphasis
Ross App. No. 18CA3639 9
deleted.) (OP 8, Exhibit A at 20). Progressive agrees that United’s Policy, which it issued on
August 16, 2014 and which covered the Tractor, terminated Progressive’s coverage of the
Tractor under Progressive’s Automatic Termination provision. Since the Progressive Policy no
longer covered the Tractor at the time of the Accident, Progressive alleges that coverage for the
Trailer was rendered excess.
{¶17} Insurance policies cannot be read in an overly circumscribed fashion. Gomolka v.
State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 70 Ohio St.32 166, 172, 436 N.E.2d 1347 (1982). “One may not regard
only the right hand which giveth, if the left hand also taketh away. The intention of the parties
must be derived instead from the instrument as a whole, and not from detached or isolated parts
thereof.” Id., citing Stickel v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 136 Ohio St. 49, 53, 23 N.E.2d 839 (1939),
and Germania Fire Ins. Co. v. Schild, 69 Ohio St. 136, x, 68 N.E. 706 (1903). “Since courts must
examine the insurance policy as a whole to determine the parties’ intentions, it follows that
courts must also examine the policy as a whole when determining whether a word or phrase of
the policy is ambiguous.” Sauer v. Crews, 140 Ohio St.3d 314, 2014-Ohio-3655, 18N.E.3d 410,
¶ 14. Further, “[a] policy should not be read so as to extend coverage to absurd lengths or to be
inconsistent with logic or the law.” Ryan v. Hartford Co., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2000-10-210,
2001 Ohio App, LEXIS 2772, at *12 (June 25, 2001), citing Lovewell v. Physicians Ins. Co. of
Ohio, 79 Ohio St.3d 143, 148, 679 N.E.2d 1119 (1997), and West v. McNamara, 159 Ohio St.
187, 197, 111 N.E.2d 909 (1953).
{¶18} We recognize that the phrase “insured auto” as used in the Progressive Policy is
defined as “[a]ny auto specifically described on the declarations page.” (OP 8, Exhibit A at 14);
and if we were read the Other Insurance provision in isolation, it would appear that the Tractor
remained an “insured auto” because it was still listed on the declarations page at the time of the
Ross App. No. 18CA3639 10
Accident. However, we find that this interpretation produces an absurd result. See United Ohio
Ins. Co. v. Calvalege, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-93-36, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 6148, at *8 (Dec. 13,
1993) (“Although the language in the policy may be clear and unambiguous, it must nevertheless
be considered in light of the fact that it is part of a policy of insurance.”). “The meaning of a
contract is to be gathered from a consideration of all its parts, and no provision is to be wholly
disregarded as inconsistent with other provisions unless no other reasonable construction is
possible.” German Fire Ins. Co. v Roost, 55 Ohio St. 581, 45 N.E. 1097 (1897), paragraph one of
the syllabus. When the disputed language is considered as part of the insurance contract as a
whole, especially in light of the Automatic Termination provision, it is clear that the meaning
United urges cannot be correct.
{¶19} The purpose of the Other Insurance provision was to provide primary trailer
coverage only in circumstances where the power unit pulling the trailer was an auto owned by
the policyholder and insured by Progressive. Although the Tractor remained on the Progressive
Policy’s declarations page, both parties agree that the issuance of the United Policy on August
16, 2014 terminated Progressive’s coverage of the Tractor under Progressive’s Automatic
Termination provision. (OP 8, Exhibit A at 3; Appellant’s Brief at 7). Since the Trailer’s power
unit was no longer insured by Progressive, it logically follows from the language and intent of
the Progressive Policy that the trailer coverage was rendered in excess. See Calvalege at *9.
Therefore, we find that the United Policy provided primary liability coverage while the
Progressive Policy provided excess coverage for the Underlying Litigation.
{¶20} Accordingly, we overrule United’s first and second assignments of error.
C. Progressive Is Entitled to Reimbursement from United in the Amount of $325,000 Plus
Statutory Interest
Ross App. No. 18CA3639 11
{¶21} In its third assignment of error, United alleges that the trial court erred in holding
that United is required to pay $325,000.00 in contribution plus interest to Progressive. According
to United, the trial court should have found that United and Progressive’s policies were co-
primary and provided pro-rata coverage with respect to the Underlying Litigation. Therefore,
United argues that the parties properly split the $1,350,000.00 indemnity payment, with each
paying $675,000.00.
{¶22} However, we found that Progressive’s coverage was in excess, not co-primary.
Since both policies had a limit of $1 million, we find that United was responsible for $1 million
of the $1,350,000.00 indemnity payment; and Progressive was responsible for the remaining
$350,000.00. (OP 8, Exhibit A at 2 & Exhibit B at 3). Since Progressive paid in excess of
$350,000.00, it is entitled to reimbursement by United. Therefore, we affirm the damages award
in the amount of $325,000.00 plus statutory interest at a rate of 3% per annum beginning
September 28, 2016, the date of the Settlement Agreement.
{¶23} Accordingly, we overrule United’s third assignment of error.
IV. Conclusion
{¶24} Having overruled all three of United’s assignments of error, we therefore affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Ross App. No. 18CA3639 12
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED. Appellant shall pay the costs.
The Court finds that reasonable grounds existed for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Ross County
Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Harsha, J.:
Abele, J.:
For the Court,
By: ________________________________
Marie Hoover
Presiding Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and
the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.
Artisan & Truckers Cas. Co. v. United Ohio Ins. Co.
Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
Date filed: 2018-12-28
Citations: 2019 Ohio 3, 127 N.E.3d 333
Copy CitationsCombined Opinion