NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 18-1033
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ERIC ZIEGLER,
Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(District Court No. 1-17-cr-00287-001)
District Judge: Honorable Joseph H. Rodriguez
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
November 9, 2018
(Opinion filed: January 4, 2019)
Before: AMBRO, SCIRICA and RENDELL, Circuit Judges
O P I N I ON*
RENDELL, Circuit Judge:
Appellant, Eric Ziegler, pled guilty to two counts of receiving and possessing child
pornography. For his crimes, he was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment and
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.
supervised released for life. He claims that his sentence was procedurally and
substantively unreasonable. Finding no error, we will affirm the District Court’s order.
I
In early 2015, agents with the Federal Bureau of Investigation discovered an
internet account of an individual in Williamsport, New Jersey that was frequenting a
known child pornography message board. The agents identified the owner of the account
as Appellant, Eric Ziegler. Based on the account activity, the agents obtained a search
warrant for Ziegler’s house and conducted a search. Ziegler cooperated with the agents
conducting the search.
The search yielded a trove of materials containing illicit child pornography. The
agents seized 41 computer discs containing approximately 24,986 images of child
pornography and 1,167 videos of child pornography. In addition, agents discovered a
hidden video recording device in Ziegler’s first-floor bathroom. Ziegler apparently used
the device to surreptitiously record several of his daughter’s friends—all minors between
the ages of 8 and 12—while they used the restroom or changed in and out of swim-wear.
Ziegler stored these videos on his computer disks. He also took screenshots of these
videos which he also stored on his computer disks.
Ziegler pled guilty to a two-count information: one count of receiving images of
child pornography over the internet in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A) & (b)(1);
and one count of knowingly possessing images of child pornography in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) & (b)(2). This resulted in an agreed-upon offense level of 32,
2
with a corresponding Guidelines range of 121 to 151 months’ imprisonment. The
Government reserved the right to argue for an upward variance for a sentence totaling up
to 180 months’ imprisonment; and Ziegler reserved the right to argue for a downward
variance for a sentence as low as 96 months’ imprisonment.
The Probation Office recommended a much higher Guidelines range in its
presentence report. It applied a cross-reference to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2, which directed the
application of more severe penalties for causing a minor to engage in sexually explicit
conduct for the purpose of making a video depiction of that conduct. The Probation
Office urged that Ziegler’s total offense level should be 40, with a corresponding
Guidelines range of 292 to 365 months’ imprisonment.
At the sentencing hearing, both Ziegler and the Government objected to the
presentence report. The District Court sustained the parties’ objections and agreed to
sentence Ziegler in accordance with the plea agreement. The parties then made
arguments for variances as allowed by the agreement. Ziegler urged the Court to grant a
downward variance based on his mental condition. Ziegler presented testimony from Dr.
Elliott Atkins, who testified that Ziegler suffered from Asperger’s syndrome, that this
disease made it difficult for him to recognize the harmfulness of his conduct, and that his
condition could be improved with treatment. The Government urged the Court to grant
an upward variance to 180 months’ imprisonment based on Ziegler’s creating child
pornographic content and the large volume of content that he possessed. At the hearing’s
3
end, the District Court imposed a sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment followed by a
lifetime of supervised release. This appeal followed.
II
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We review the substantive reasonableness
of a sentence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir.
2009). We also review procedural errors, such as failure to consider factors under 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a), for abuse of discretion. United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 217 (3d
Cir. 2008).
III
Ziegler raises several claims on appeal: first, he argues that the sentence was
substantively unreasonable; second, he argues that the Court erred procedurally by not
considering Dr. Atkins’ expert report; and third, he argues that the Court erred in granting
an upward variance by relying on uncharged conduct and “as punishment for [his]
diagnosis of pedophilia,” Br. 13.
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
(2005), district courts engage in a three-step process when imposing a criminal sentence:
(1) calculate the Guidelines range; (2) rule on any motions for departure from the
Guidelines range; and (3) consider all relevant factors under § 3553(a) and determine the
appropriate sentence. See Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567. We review his substantive claim for
4
“reasonableness,” the “touchstone” of which “is whether the record as a whole reflects
rational and meaningful consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”
United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007). Section 3553(a) requires courts
to consider: “(1) the nature and circumstance of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant and (2) the need for the sentence imposed to deter future
criminal conduct, protect the public, and provide the defendant with necessary training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment.” United States v. Loy, 191 F.3d 360, 370
(3d Cir. 1999) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). Ziegler, as the party challenging the
sentence, “has the burden of demonstrating unreasonableness.” United States v. Tomko,
562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009).
We are mindful of several principles while reviewing these claims. First, “[a]
sentencing court does not have to discuss and make findings as to each of the § 3553(a)
factors if the record makes clear the court took the factors into account in sentencing.”
United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quotations omitted).
Second, “[t]he court need not discuss every argument made by a litigant if an argument is
clearly without merit.” United States v. Jackson, 467 F.3d 834, 841 (3d Cir. 2006)
(quotations omitted). But “the record must show a true, considered exercise of discretion
on the part of a district court, including a recognition of, and response to, the parties’
non-frivolous arguments.” Id. “Merely reciting the § 3553(a) factors, saying that
counsel’s arguments have been considered, and then declaring a sentence, are insufficient
to withstand our reasonableness review.” Id.
5
Here, we find that the District Court gave meaningful consideration all relevant
factors under § 3553(a). Far from merely “declaring a sentence,” Jackson, 467 F.3d at
842, the District Court engaged in a detailed review of its sentence which spanned
thirteen pages of the record. See SA 60-72. It discussed the three-part process under
Booker, see SA 60, it recited the § 3553(a) factors (while acknowledging that mere
recitation is not enough), see SA 61, and then proceeded to discuss those factors in
further detail. See SA 61-72. This discussion included the seriousness of the offense,
see SA 61, the testimony of Ziegler’s family, see SA 62, his cooperation with authorities,
see id., the harm to the victims, see SA 64, the effect of the sentence on deterrence and
public safety, see SA 67-68, and his prospects for rehabilitation in prison, see id., among
other factors. Accordingly, Ziegler has not carried his burden of establishing that the
sentence was not “logical and consistent with the factors set forth in section 3553(a).”
United States v. Severino, 454 F.3d 206, 210 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation omitted).
The Court also gave meaningful consideration to Ziegler’s mental condition. Dr.
Atkins gave thorough testimony on that issue, answering questions from both parties’
counsel and from the Court. See SA 4-38. During the hearing, Dr. Atkins testified that
“[i]t’s not that [persons with Asperger’s are] more susceptible to child pornography.
Their life becomes more involved with the internet.” SA 9. The Court acknowledged the
role that medical issues play in child pornography cases. See SA 65. However, it found
that the record “lack[ed] clear evidence of a direct nexus between defendant’s Asperger’s
and the commission of this crime.” SA 66. Given Dr. Atkins’ testimony that persons
6
with Asperger’s are not “more susceptible to child pornography,” the District Court did
not abuse its discretion in reaching that conclusion.
Finally, the Court sufficiently explained its decision to grant an upward variance.
It did so because the “defendant did secretly record children in his bathroom,” which
represented a “tremendous breach of trust,” and because of “the sheer volume of the
recordings and reproductions” in his possession. SA 67. Ziegler argues that the upward
variance was unreasonable because it relied on (1) uncharged conduct, specifically
Ziegler’s role in secretly recording children, and (2) the fact that “[Ziegler] suffers from
pedophilia.” Br. 13-14. These arguments are unavailing. First, “this court has
consistently rejected the argument that only charged conduct may be grounds for a
sentencing enhancement.” United States v. Rudolph, 137 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 1998);
see also United States v. Baird, 109 F.3d 856, 863 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[C]onduct not
formally charged or not an element of the offense can be considered at sentencing.”).
Therefore, it was not unreasonable for the District Court to consider Ziegler’s
surreptitious recordings when granting the upward variance. And second, Ziegler has not
carried his burden of establishing that it was unreasonable for the Court to consider his
pedophilia. The issue of pedophilia was raised by Ziegler’s expert, Dr. Atkins. As
Ziegler notes in his brief, the Court questioned Dr. Atkins on this issue, see Br. 11-12; SA
32-35, and discussed it in its explanation of the sentence, SA 64. “The history and
characteristics of the defendant,” however, are proper factors to consider in imposing a
sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). And Ziegler has not established why this
7
consideration, which is clearly part of his “history and characteristics,” was unreasonable.
See, e.g., United States v. Pyles, 862 F.3d 82, 94 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (affirming the district
court’s consideration of defendant’s pedophilia at sentencing); United States v. Meyer,
802 F.2d 348, 352 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he potential harm posed by appellant’s pedophilia
was a proper subject of the sentencing proceeding.”).
Even with the upward variance, Ziegler’s sentence (180 months’ imprisonment)
was still approximately half of what was recommended by the Probation Office (292 to
365 months’ imprisonment). And the sentence was well short of the 20 year maximum
sentence for receipt of child pornographic materials. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1); see
also United States v. King, 454 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2006) (affirming a sentence, in part
because “[t]he seventy-two month sentence is still well below the statutory maxima of
thirty-five years”). Accordingly, Ziegler has not carried his burden of establishing that
the District Court’s grant of an upward variance constituted an abuse of discretion.
IV
For the aforementioned reasons, we will affirm the sentencing order of the District
Court.
8