NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 7, 2019*
Decided January 15, 2019
Before
DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
No. 18‐1302
GEORGE REED, Appeal from the United States
Plaintiff‐Appellant, District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin.
v.
No. 17‐CV‐1722
KRISTEN VASQUEZ, et al.,
Defendants‐Appellees. William C. Griesbach,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
George Reed, a Wisconsin inmate suffering from plantar fasciitis, sued prison
officials for their deliberate indifference to his foot pain. He alleged that they ignored a
podiatrist’s recommendation to provide supportive shoes from a nonstandard prison
vendor. The district court screened his complaint and dismissed it for failure to state a
claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Because documents that Reed attached to his complaint
show that prison officials offered him the opportunity to buy supportive shoes through
* We agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
No. 18‐1302 Page 2
the prison’s usual vendors, the officials did not disregard Reed’s condition, and we
affirm.
We draw the following facts from Reed’s complaint and its attachments, Carmody
v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 747 F.3d 470, 471 (7th Cir. 2014), which include treatment
notes, grievances, and Reed’s correspondence with prison officials. While incarcerated
at Racine Correctional Institution, Reed visited Dr. Matthew Larsen, a podiatrist at an
off‐site clinic, for treatment of his plantar fasciitis, a painful condition that left his feet
infected and swollen. In his treatment notes, Dr. Larsen “recommended that [Reed] get
better, more supportive shoe gear than what is offered from [the prison’s] current
vendors.” Another physician’s report from the same date recommended that Reed
receive a “night splint” and “more supportive shoe gear [from] outside … vendors” like
“New Balance or Brooks with Superfeet insoles or Lyncos.” (The physician’s signature
on this report was illegible, but Reed insists it was signed by “Dr. Greg,” a prison
doctor.) Reed later submitted a written request to the prison’s health‐services unit
requesting permission to purchase shoes from an outside vendor.
Health‐services personnel Laura Frazier and Kristine Vasquez responded to
Reed’s submission by ordering a night splint and insoles, but they denied his request to
order shoes from an outside vendor. They informed him that supportive New Balance
shoes were available through the prison’s usual vendors, so ordering from an outside
vendor was unnecessary. But Reed insisted on ordering shoes from an outside vendor.
Through successive internal grievances, he protested that the recommendation for the
New Balance shoes had come from Dr. Greg, not Dr. Larsen, and that New Balance
shoes were insufficiently supportive.
After filing unsuccessful grievances with the Department of Corrections, Reed
brought this deliberate‐indifference suit against several prison health‐services officials.
He alleged essentially that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference by failing
to follow Dr. Larsen’s instructions to provide him with shoes from an outside vendor.
Later he moved to amend his complaint to add a new defendant, Bureau of Health
Services Director James Greer.
At screening the district court concluded that Reed’s complaint and
accompanying exhibits failed to state a deliberate‐indifference claim against any
defendant. Based on information contained in the exhibits, the court determined that
the defendants were aware of Reed’s serious foot condition but none showed disregard
for it. Reed’s correspondence with the health‐services unit showed that they offered him
the opportunity to buy New Balance shoes through a standard prison vendor based on
No. 18‐1302 Page 3
a physician’s opinion that New Balance shoes would provide him with the support he
needed. As for Reed’s motion to amend to add Greer as a defendant, the judge denied it
because Reed failed to supplement it with a copy of his proposed amended complaint.
See E.D. WIS. CIV. LOCAL R. 15(a).
On appeal Reed maintains that New Balance shoes do not provide the support he
requires and that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference by not following
Dr. Larsen’s instructions to let him order shoes from an outside vendor. By limiting him
to the prison’s current vendors, he asserts, the officials caused his condition to worsen
to the point that he contracted a foot infection requiring a cortisone injection.
The district court properly dismissed the complaint. Assuming plantar fasciitis is
a serious medical need, Reed needed to plausibly allege that officials consciously
disregarded his need for supportive shoes in order to state a claim for deliberate
indifference. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837–38 (1994); Arnett v. Webster,
658 F.3d 742, 755–56 (7th Cir. 2011). Far from alleging that officials ignored his medical
needs, Reed had, in the judge’s words, pleaded the “opposite.” His attachments show
that prison officials offered him multiple opportunities to purchase New Balance shoes,
which a physician had recommended. Reed’s argument that Dr. Greg, not Dr. Larsen,
prescribed New Balance is immaterial—prison officials are not deliberately indifferent if
they choose between two different courses of treatment as long as the patient’s medical
records support either approach. See Norfleet v. Webster, 439 F.3d 392, 396–97 (7th Cir.
2006) (finding no deliberate indifference where prison officials followed a course of
treatment that differed only “in degree” from an off‐site doctor’s recommendation).
Reed also generally challenges the denial of his motion to amend his complaint
to add Greer as a defendant. But even pro se litigants must comply with local rules,
McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993); Pearle Vision, Inc. v. Romm, 541 F.3d 751,
758 (7th Cir. 2008), so the judge appropriately dismissed Reed’s motion to amend based
on his failure to submit a proposed amended complaint with his motion. In any event,
the amendment would have been futile because the documents attached to Reed’s
complaint reflect that he cannot state a claim against the prison officials.
Because the district court dismissed Reed’s complaint for failure to state claim,
see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), he has accrued a strike on appeal in addition to the one incurred
in the district court, see Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 2000).
AFFIRMED