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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: P.H., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: P.L.H., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 1009 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Order Entered June 18, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-21-DP-0000041-2016
BEFORE: BOWES, J., SHOGAN, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED JANUARY 24, 2019
P.L.H. (“Mother”) appeals from the order dated May 25, 2018, and
entered on June 18, 2018, wherein the juvenile court changed the permanent
placement goal for her minor daughter, P.H., from reunification to adoption.
We affirm.
P.H. was born in October of 2006. She came to the attention of
Cumberland County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) on March 1, 2016.
At that time, CYS received a report indicating that Mother had been arrested
and incarcerated for threatening to shoot an employee of a local business.
Mother disclosed that she and P.H. had been living out of Mother’s vehicle for
the prior two weeks. She refused to provide any information regarding P.H.
beyond her first name. Mother also told P.H. to provide no additional
information to CYS. Despite Mother’s lack of cooperation, CYS located P.H.’s
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maternal grandmother, J.H., who indicated that she could not be a placement
resource because of her husband’s health.
On March 17, 2016, the juvenile court adjudicated P.H. dependent.
Thereafter, the juvenile court conducted a series of permanency review
hearings. At each permanency review hearing, the juvenile court determined
Mother’s compliance with her permanency plan to be moderate. However,
Mother’s visitation with P.H. was initially inconsistent.1 On May 25, 2018, the
court conducted another permanency review hearing. At that time, P.H. had
resided in the same foster home since her initial placement in March 2016.
The eleven year old informed the juvenile court that she wanted the court to
decide whether to return her to Mother’s care or move towards adoption.
While P.H. expressed a desire to return to Mother, she also recognized that a
return to Mother might not be the “best idea,” and that she needed finality.
Specifically, she responded the juvenile court’s inquiry as follows, “I would
always go back to my mom first. But if you think that’s not the best idea, then
I would go with – to adoption.” 2 N.T., 5/25/18, at 6. In addition to P.H., CYS
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1 Based on Mother’s recurring failure to visit with P.H., CYS filed a petition to
change P.H.’s permanency goal to adoption in December of 2016. The court
denied the petition “to give Mother every opportunity to work towards
reunification.” Permanency Review Order, Additional Findings, 1/17/17.
2 Marylou Matas, Esquire was the guardian ad litem who represented P.H.
during the permanency review hearing. Considering P.H.’s statements in
favor of Mother, we recognize the potential for an appearance of a conflict
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presented the testimony of Kasey Shienvold, Psy.D., and CYS caseworker Gan
Fry. P.H., through her guardian ad litem, presented the testimony of her
foster mother, K.B. Mother did not appear for the hearing. However, she was
represented by counsel.3 Following the hearing, the juvenile court issued an
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between Attorney Matas’s representation of P.H.’s legal interest and her best
interests. In In re J’K.M., 191 A.3d 907 (Pa.Super. 2018), this Court
concluded that a trial court erred in rejecting a parent’s request for the
appointment of a separate guardian ad litem to represent her child’s legal
interest pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6311(b) and the concomitant rules of
juvenile court procedure regarding the powers and duties of a guardian ad
litem. Additionally, while the parties do not raise this issue, we may address
it sua sponte because it implicates a child’s statutory right to legal
representation. See In re K.J.H., 180 A.3d 411, 413 (Pa.Super. 2018); In
re Adoption of T.M.L.M., 184 A.3d 585, 590 (Pa. Super. 2018).
However, further proceedings are not warranted herein. Unlike the
sixteen-year old child in J’K.M., who effectively demanded to be returned to
her mother because she felt betrayed by the juvenile dependency system,
P.H.’s positon actually coalesced with the guardian ad litem’s position insofar
as both agreed that reunification with Mother was not the optimal outcome.
Stated another way, while P.H. indicated a partiality toward Mother, her
preference was for finality. Specifically, she testified, “I just want [you] to
make a decision. I don’t really want to wait any longer. I want it to be adoption
or with my mom. I’m tired of waiting. I think it’s been like a year or two years
or so.” N.T., 5/25/18, at 6. In this context, the positions of the child and
guardian ad litem aligned in a manner that was absent in J’K.M. Accordingly,
we decline to find that the trial court erred in neglecting to interpret the child’s
qualified preference for Mother as grounds to appoint separate counsel in this
dependency case.
3 The court appointed Mother several different counsel. The transcript of the
May 25, 2018 hearing reflects that Mother typically proceeded pro se, with
court-appointed counsel assisting her as needed. N.T., 5/25/18, at 30.
Attorney Joseph Hitchings represented Mother at the hearing and with respect
to this appeal.
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order changing P.H.’s permanency goal to adoption. The order also suspended
visitation between Mother and P.H.
Mother timely filed a notice of appeal and concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b).
On appeal, Mother raises the following questions for our review, which
we reordered for ease of disposition:
1. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt abuse its discretion and commit an
error of law by changing the goal from reunification to adoption
when [Mother] was provided no notice that a goal change was
being requested or being considered at the scheduled permanency
review hearing, and conducting said hearing in [Mother]’s
absence, thus violating [Mother]’s Constitutional rights to due
process.
2. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt abuse its discretion and commit an
error of law when it found, despite a lack of clear and convincing
evidence, that the child’s permanent placement goal of
reunification with [Mother] was neither appropriate nor feasible,
and ordered a goal change to adoption, thus contravening [§]
6351(f) of the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f).
3. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt abuse its discretion and commit an
error of law in determining that [Mother]’s compliance with the
permanency plan and progress toward alleviating the
circumstances which necessitated the original placement was
merely “moderate,” when the evidence showed [Mother] had met
or was meeting all of her reunification plan goals.
Mother’s brief at 4-5.
In her first issue, Mother contends that the court erred in sua sponte
changing P.H.’s permanency goal to adoption without providing Mother notice
that the court was considering such a change. Mother’s brief at 13-16. Mother
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notes that she did not appear for the permanency review hearing and claims
that she was not aware that a goal change would be considered. Id. at 13.
She relies on both the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution and
Pennsylvania Rule of Juvenile Court Procedure 1601 to support her argument
that the failure of the court to specifically advise her that it would consider the
goal change deprived her of her right to due process.4 Mother acknowledges
that her argument relies upon the language of Rule 1601 as amended effective
October 1, 2018, four months after the hearing in question. Id. at 13-14.
However, she asserts that the new rule represents “best practices” that the
trial court should have utilized during the permanency review hearing
regardless of its effective date. Id. at 15. For the reasons that follow, we
disagree.
The juvenile court rejected Mother’s argument:
[Mother] contends that because we “sua sponte” changed
the goal at the permanency review hearing on May 25, 2018, her
right to notice was violated. Section 6351 of the [Juvenile] Act
requires us to have permanency review hearings every six (6)
months. At each permanency hearing, the court shall determine
“[t]he appropriateness and feasibility of the current placement
goal for the child.” Id. at § 6351(f)(4).
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4 Mother’s claim relies upon Rule 1601(B), a new subparagraph that provides
for notice of a petition for a goal change as follows:
B. If a party intends to request a goal change from reunification,
then either the notice shall state this purpose or the party shall
give separate notice of the intended goal change in accordance
with paragraph (A).
Pa.R.J.C.P. 1601(B) (effective October 1, 2018).
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While an agency typically files a petition to change a goal in
a dependency proceeding, there is nothing in the Juvenile Act,
case law or rules of procedure prohibiting the [c]ourt from
ordering the Agency to change the permanency goal at any time
when it is clear that reunification is not viable. Simply stated,
there is no statutory requirement that a juvenile court must
provide express notice that it is contemplating a goal change. The
statute itself provides notice that the juvenile court may modify a
goal at any permanency hearing.
Juvenile Court Opinion, 8/27/18, at 7-8.
We discern no error in the juvenile court’s analysis. “A question
regarding whether a due process violation occurred is a question of law for
which the standard of review is de novo and the scope of review is plenary.”
Commonwealth v. Tejada, 161 A.3d 313, 317 (Pa.Super. 2017). “Due
process requires that the litigants receive notice of the issues before the court
and an opportunity to present their case in relation to those issues.” Brooks–
Gall v. Gall, 840 A.2d 993, 997 (Pa.Super. 2003) (recognizing that
dependency proceedings implicate due process concerns). It is well settled
that “procedural due process requires, at its core, adequate notice,
opportunity to be heard, and the chance to defend oneself before a fair and
impartial tribunal having jurisdiction over the case.” S.T. v. R.W., 192 A.3d
1155, 1161 (Pa.Super. 2018). “The right of a litigant to in-court presentation
of evidence is essential to due process; in almost every setting where
important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an
opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.” M.O. v. F.W.,
42 A.3d 1068, 1072 (Pa.Super. 2012).
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In In Interest of L.T., 158 A.3d 1266, 1278 (Pa.Super. 2017), this
Court confronted a similar challenge to a juvenile court’s sua sponte goal
change based, in part, upon the best practices espoused in the Dependency
Benchbook, and we concluded that the Juvenile Act not only forewarns that
the issue of a goal change could be resolved during a permanency review
hearing as a matter of course, but it also mandates that the juvenile court
decide whether to continue, modify or terminate placement during every
permanency review hearing. We explained,
It is irrelevant that the juvenile court’s decision to change
the permanency goals did not follow a typical procedural course.
As the notation that Mother seeks to invoke states explicitly, there
is no statutory requirement that a juvenile court must provide
express notice that it is contemplating a goal change. Indeed,
while Mother is correct in noting that the Dependency Benchbook
refers to goal change hearings, the Juvenile Act does not discuss
goal change hearings or mention the phrase “goal change” at all.
In In re R.J.T., supra at 1183 n.6, our Supreme Court
highlighted that the phrase “goal change,” is used as a term of art
that is synonymous with the juvenile court’s mandated
determination regarding “the continuation, modification or
termination of placement” that a juvenile court must render
pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f), (f.1), and (g) at the conclusion
of every permanency hearing. Id. (“We conclude that an order
to continue, modify, or terminate the current placement, as
required by the statute, is synonymous with a decision to continue
or change the permanency plan goal.”).
Moreover, while Mother concedes that the Juvenile Act
authorizes juvenile courts to alter permanency goals sua sponte,
she focuses on the Dependency Benchbook’s notation that, having
initiated the issue, some judges elect to schedule a goal change
hearing during the next scheduled permanency review hearing.
She reasons that, since the juvenile court did not provide advance
notice that it was going to contemplate the goal change at the
June 2016 hearing, the court erred in addressing that issue.
Mother is mistaken. While it is clear from the foregoing notation
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that the authors of the Dependency Benchbook recommend that
trial courts issue prior notice of a goal change, the statute
forewarns the parties that the issue will be addressed as a matter
of course during every permanency review hearing.
Regardless of the Dependency Benchbook’s observation
concerning the scheduling preferences of “some” judges, the
Juvenile Act remains the dispositive authority in dependency
cases. As we discussed, supra, § 6351 of the Juvenile Act directs
that a juvenile court not only consider the appropriateness and
feasibility of a child’s current goal during the permanency review
hearings, it also mandates that the court enter an order
addressing whether to continue, modify or terminate placement.
See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f)(4), (f.1), and (g).[5] Hence, despite
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5 As it relates to permanency review hearings, in addition to
§ 6351(f)(4), which we reproduced supra, the Juvenile Act provides as
follows:
(f.1) Additional determination. — Based upon the
determinations made under subsection (f) and all relevant
evidence presented at the hearing, the court shall determine one
of the following:
(1) If and when the child will be returned to the child’s
parent, guardian or custodian in cases where the return of
the child is best suited to the safety, protection and
physical, mental and moral welfare of the child.
(2) If and when the child will be placed for adoption, and
the county agency will file for termination of parental rights
in cases where return to the child’s parent, guardian or
custodian is not best suited to the safety, protection and
physical, mental and moral welfare of the child.
(3) If and when the child will be placed with a legal
custodian in cases where return to the child’s parent,
guardian or custodian or being placed for adoption is not
best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental
and moral welfare of the child.
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Mother’s complaint that she was not provided notice that a goal
change would be at issue during the June 2016 permanency
review hearing, a review of the current goal’s feasibility is a
required component of every permanency review hearing.
In Interest of L.T., supra at 1278.
Identical principles apply herein. Mother was served with notice of the
permanency review hearing, as well as a copy of CYS’s petition for a
permanency review hearing. That petition requested that the court determine
the appropriateness and feasibility of the current goal. Although CYS did not
file a formal petition to change P.H.’s permanency goal to adoption, as we
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(4) If and when the child will be placed with a fit and willing
relative in cases where return to the child’s parent,
guardian or custodian, being placed for adoption or being
placed with a legal custodian is not best suited to the
safety, protection and physical, mental and moral welfare
of the child.
(5) If and when the child will be placed in another living
arrangement intended to be permanent in nature which is
approved by the court in cases where the county agency
has documented a compelling reason that it would not be
best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental
and moral welfare of the child to be returned to the child’s
parent, guardian or custodian, to be placed for adoption,
to be placed with a legal custodian or to be placed with a
fit and willing relative.
....
(g) Court order.— On the basis of the determination made under
subsection (f.1), the court shall order the continuation,
modification or termination of placement or other disposition
which is best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental
and moral welfare of the child.
42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f.1), and (g) (emphasis added).
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explained in In Interest of L.T., supra, the very nature of the permanency
review hearing required the juvenile court to determine whether P.H.’s
permanency goal was appropriate. See id. at 1278 (“a review of the current
goal’s feasibility is a required component of every permanency review
hearing”). Having received notice of the permanency review hearing, Mother
was on notice that the court could change P.H.’s permanency goal, including
changing her permanency goal to adoption. Accordingly, contrary to Mother’s
protestations, the juvenile court did not violate Mother’s due process rights or
the Juvenile Act when it changed P.H.’s permanency goal to adoption.
Next, we address Mother’s contention that the juvenile court erred in
changing P.H.’s permanent placement goal from reunification to adoption.
With regard to our review of a goal change in a dependency case, this Court
recently set forth the following:
In cases involving a court’s order changing the [court-
ordered] goal . . . to adoption, our standard of review is
abuse of discretion. To hold that the trial court abused its
discretion, we must determine its judgment was manifestly
unreasonable, that the court disregarded the law, or that
its action was a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.
While this Court is bound by the facts determined in the
trial court, we are not tied to the court’s inferences,
deductions and conclusions; we have a responsibility to
ensure that the record represents a comprehensive inquiry
and that the hearing judge has applied the appropriate
principles to that record. Therefore, our scope of review is
broad.
In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 977 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations
omitted); see also In re R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190
(Pa. 2010).
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In In re A.K., 936 A.2d 528, 534 (Pa. Super. 2007), this
Court stressed that the focus of dependency proceedings is upon
the best interest of the children and that those considerations
supersede all other concerns, “including the conduct and the rights
of the parent.” Again, in In the Interest of D.P., 2009 PA Super
86, 972 A.2d 1221, 1227 (Pa. Super. 2009), we explained, “In a
change of goal proceeding, the best interests of the child, and not
the interests of the parent, must guide the trial court, and the
parent’s rights are secondary.” Id. Likewise, this Court has held,
“a child's life simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that the
parent will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of
parenting.” In re N.C., 2006 PA Super 285, 909 A.2d 818, 824
(Pa. Super. 2006) (quoting In re Adoption of M.E.P., 2003 PA
Super 210, 825 A.2d 1226, 1276 (Pa. Super. 2003)).
With those principles in mind, we outline the relevant
considerations set forth in the Juvenile Act regarding permanency
planning:
Pursuant to § 6351(f),[6] of the Juvenile Act, when
considering a petition for a goal change for a dependent
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6 Regarding permanency, § 6351(f), provides:
(f) Matters to be determined at permanency hearing.— At
each permanency hearing, a court shall determine all of the
following:
(1) The continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the
placement.
(2) The appropriateness, feasibility and extent of
compliance with the permanency plan developed for the
child.
(3) The extent of progress made toward alleviating the
circumstances which necessitated the original placement.
(4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the current
placement goal for the child.
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child, the juvenile court is to consider, inter alia: (1) the
continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the
placement; (2) the extent of compliance with the family
service plan; (3) the extent of progress made towards
alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the
original placement; (4) the appropriateness and feasibility
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(5) The likely date by which the placement goal for the
child might be achieved.
(5.1) Whether reasonable efforts were made to finalize the
permanency plan in effect.
(6) Whether the child is safe.
....
(9) If the child has been in placement for at least 15 of the
last 22 months or the court has determined that
aggravated circumstances exist and that reasonable efforts
to prevent or eliminate the need to remove the child from
the child’s parent, guardian or custodian or to preserve and
reunify the family need not be made or continue to be
made, whether the county agency has filed or sought to
join a petition to terminate parental rights and to identify,
recruit, process and approve a qualified family to adopt the
child unless:
(i) the child is being cared for by a relative best
suited to the physical, mental and moral welfare of
the child;
(ii) the county agency has documented a
compelling reason for determining that filing a
petition to terminate parental rights would not
serve the needs and welfare of the child; or
(iii) the child’s family has not been provided with
necessary services to achieve the safe return to the
child’s parent, guardian or custodian within the time
frames set forth in the permanency plan.
42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f).
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of the current placement goal for the children; (5) a likely
date by which the goal for the child might be achieved; (6)
the child’s safety; and (7) whether the child has been in
placement for at least fifteen of the last twenty-two
months.
In re A.B., 2011 PA Super. 75, 19 A.3d 1084, 1088-89 (Pa.
Super. 2011). Additionally, courts must consider whether
reasonable efforts were made to finalize the permanency plan in
effect. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f)(5.1).
In Interest of L.T., supra at 1276-1277 (footnotes omitted).
Although Mother presents three distinct issues in her statement of issues
involved, Mother’s brief combines the latter two issues into one argument.
She claims that the juvenile court erred when it concluded that reunification
was neither appropriate nor feasible, and that Mother’s compliance with her
family service plan goals was only “moderate.” Mother’s brief at 9. Mother
further contends that the court failed to appropriately weigh her progress
towards alleviating the circumstances underlying P.H.’s dependency and
placement. Id. at 10. Mother argues she was cooperating with CYS,
maintaining appropriate housing, visiting with P.H., meeting her mental health
needs, and had submitted to a mental health evaluation. Id. at 10. Mother
claims CYS presented no evidence that she had not alleviated the issues
surrounding P.H.’s placement, and assails the court for purportedly focusing
on Mother’s history rather than her progress. Id. at 11. In this context,
Mother asserts the court erred in determining her compliance with her goals
was moderate. Id. Further, Mother argues that although P.H. implored the
court to make a decision between reunification and adoption at the May 25,
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2018 permanency review hearing, the court’s decision to change P.H.’s
permanency goal to adoption was not in her daughter’s best interests.
Mother’s argument is founded upon the fact that when P.H. told the court she
wanted it to decide between returning her to Mother or moving towards
adoption, P.H. was unaware that her current foster parents had determined
they would not be an adoptive resource for P.H., as had a respite home where
P.H. previously stayed. Id. at 11-13.
The juvenile court summarized its rationale for changing P.H.’s
permanency goal to adoption as follows:
We sua sponte changed P.H.’s goal from reunification to
adoption because she had been in placement for twenty-six (26)
months. She told us that she was tired of waiting. She was clear
that her first choice was to go home with her mother. However,
if that could not be accomplished that day, she wanted the goal
to change and visits to stop. We were never in a position to feel
that it would be safe to return her to Mother. We were hoping
that Dr. Sh[ie]nvold could provide us with that comfort level. He
could not. Therefore, we felt that a sua sponte goal change to
adoption was the disposition best suited to the safety, protection
and physical, mental, and moral welfare of P.H.
Juvenile Court Opinion, 8/27/2018, at 8.
At the time of the hearing, P.H. had been in foster care for more than
two years. P.H. informed the juvenile court that she wanted the court to make
a decision, stating, “I don’t really want to wait any longer. I want it to be
adoption or with my mom. I’m tired of waiting. I think it’s been like a year
or two years or so.” N.T., 5/25/2018, at 6. While P.H. expressed her
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preference to return to Mother, if the court determined returning to Mother
would “not [be] the best idea,” she would prefer adoption. Id.
Following P.H.’s testimony, Kasey Shienvold, Psy.D., testified regarding
his comprehensive psychological evaluation of Mother. Dr. Shienvold
observed that Mother had a difficult time being forthcoming at the evaluation.
N.T., 5/25/2018, at 13. Mother refused to discuss certain areas of inquiry
because she was concerned about how the answers would be used against
her. Id. For instance, she would not tell Dr. Shienvold where she worked or
where her other child received childcare.7 Id. at 19. Based on his evaluation,
Dr. Shienvold concluded Mother has a paranoid personality disorder, which he
described as a pervasive and enduring mistrust of the world. Id. at 16-17.
Dr. Shienvold did not believe Mother would “get better” without strong
supports in place and a willingness on Mother’s part to engage in treatment.
Id. at 24. Dr. Shienvold expressed concerns about her level of commitment
and motivation to make substantial changes in how she interacts, parents,
and relates to others. Id. at 29. Mother’s personality disorder, in itself, did
not inhibit Mother from parenting P.H., but he was concerned that her history
showed she could not work cooperatively with anyone who had authority or
decision-making power over her. Id. at 17-18. Further, her guardedness and
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7 Mother gave birth to another daughter, also with the initials P.H., in October
2017. While the court adjudicated Mother’s infant daughter dependent, she
remains in Mother’s home with services provided by CYS.
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defensiveness made it nearly impossible for him to fully evaluate Mother’s
ability to provide a safe and stable environment due to her refusal to provide
pertinent information. Id. at 18. He opined that her lack of cooperation
makes it difficult to anticipate or predict that she would be cooperative going
forward. Id. at 19. Dr. Shienvold believed Mother posed a risk due to her
character and ingrained style, in that she refuses to provide information and
would not commit to follow CYS’s rules. Id. Further, he could not determine
whether Mother’s parenting style posed a risk of harm to P.H. because she did
not share enough about herself to understand her parenting style. Id.
Additionally, Dr. Shienvold expressed concerns that Mother’s
relationships are transient and do not endure, and that this could carry over
into her relationship with P.H. Id. at 25. Dr. Shienvold believed that if P.H.
was returned to Mother and then removed again, it would increase the
likelihood of P.H. developing attachment disorders, as well as relationship and
behavioral issues. Id. at 26.
Following Dr. Shienvold’s testimony, Gan Fry, a CYS caseworker,
testified that Mother complied with some of her goals, including housing,
mental health counseling, attending visits, and communicating with the
agency. Id. at 35-36. Ms. Fry noted that Mother missed several visits with
P.H. Id. at 31-32. Further, although Mother claimed to have employment,
she did not inform Ms. Fry where she was working, despite leaving Ms. Fry a
voicemail indicating she would do so. Id. Additionally, Ms. Fry testified that
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Mother, after the court ordered her to provide childcare information for her
infant daughter, gave names but no contact information. Id. at 34. The
individuals who Ms. Fry could contact indicated they had not provided
childcare. Id.
P.H. then presented the testimony of K.B., P.H.’s foster mother. K.B.
noted that P.H. is happy in her home and excited to be in school and
participate in activities. Id. at 40. However, she also observed that, when
Mother’s visits with P.H. occurred in a less supervised setting, P.H.’s negative
behavior intensified, including P.H. making allegations of abuse against K.B.
Id. at 40-41. Due to the allegations of abuse, K.B. acknowledged that her
family decided they could no longer be an adoptive resource for P.H. Id. at
41.
While Mother asserts that she complied with her goals, the record
demonstrates that despite the more than two years P.H. had been in foster
care, Mother still refused to be forthcoming such that the court could
determine she did not pose a threat to P.H. Mother’s refusal to provide
information regarding her job or childcare is indicative of her overall attitude.
Although Mother claims her progress was more than “moderate,” the record
demonstrates that Mother still failed to provide information to CYS and Dr.
Shienvold. Accordingly, the juvenile court determined Mother had not
provided sufficient information to allow it to be confident that Mother could
safely care for P.H. Further, P.H. herself expressed a desire for the court to
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make a decision to either return her to Mother’s care or move towards
adoption. After more than two years in foster care, the juvenile court did not
abuse its discretion when it concluded it was in P.H.’s best interest to change
her placement goal to adoption.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s order changing
P.H.’s permanency goal to adoption.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 01/24/2019
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