UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 18-4571
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
YVONNE DENISE ASH,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia,
at Huntington. Robert C. Chambers, District Judge. (3:13-cr-00062-2)
Submitted: January 22, 2019 Decided: January 24, 2019
Before MOTZ, KEENAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Christian M. Capece, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, Lorena E. Litten, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Michael B.
Stuart, United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, Joseph F. Adams, Assistant
United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Huntington,
West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Yvonne Denise Ash appeals from the district court’s order revoking her term of
supervised release and imposing a 15-month term of imprisonment. Ash contends on
appeal, first, that the district court abused its discretion in denying her request to hold its
disposition in abeyance pending her efforts to obtain admission to an inpatient drug
treatment program. Second, Ash asserts that the district court failed to provide a
sufficient individualized explanation, rendering her sentence plainly unreasonable. We
affirm.
We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s judgment revoking supervised
release and imposing a term of imprisonment. United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370,
373 (4th Cir. 2015). To revoke supervised release, a district court need only find by a
preponderance of the evidence a violation of a condition of supervised release. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(3) (2012). Here, Ash admitted to violating the terms of her supervised release,
including multiple positive drug screens, repeated failures to report for drug counseling
and screening, and a failure to complete a residential re-entry program. Given the nature
and lengthy history of the violations, the district court acted within its discretion in
denying Ash’s request for abeyance and revoking her release.
We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release if it is
within the prescribed statutory range and is not plainly unreasonable. United States v.
Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438-40 (4th Cir. 2006). While a district court must consider the
Chapter Seven policy statements, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual Ch. 7, Pt. B
(2012), and the statutory requirements and factors applicable to revocation sentences
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under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e) (2012), the district court ultimately has broad
discretion to revoke supervised release and impose a term of imprisonment up to the
statutory maximum. United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640-41 (4th Cir. 2013).
A supervised release revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district
court considered the Chapter 7 advisory policy statement range and the pertinent
§ 3553(a) factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439-40. A revocation
sentence is substantively reasonable if the district court stated a proper basis for
concluding the defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up to the statutory
maximum. See Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Only if a sentence is found procedurally or
substantively unreasonable will this court “then decide whether the sentence is plainly
unreasonable.” Id. at 439 (emphasis omitted).
We discern no error in the district court’s decision to impose a 15-month term of
imprisonment without a further term of supervised release. The court considered the
pertinent factors and adequately stated permissible reasons for the sentence, including
Ash’s lengthy history of violations, the serious nature of the violations, her previous
revocation, the repeated efforts by the probation officer to help Ash get into counseling,
and Ash’s failure to comply with the rules at a halfway house. Accordingly, we affirm
the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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