People v. Relwani

2019 IL 123385

IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

(Docket No. 123385)

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee,
v. DAKSH N. RELWANI, Appellant.

Opinion filed January 25, 2019.

JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Thomas, Garman, Burke, Theis, and
Neville concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol, and his
driver’s license was summarily suspended under Illinois’s implied consent statute
(625 ILCS 5/11-501.1 (West 2016)). He filed a petition to rescind the statutory
summary suspension. When defendant rested his case at the hearing on his
rescission petition, the State successfully moved for a directed finding, arguing he
had not met his initial burden of proof. On appeal, a divided panel of the Appellate
 Court, Third District, affirmed the directed finding in favor of the State. 2018 IL
App (3d) 170201.

¶2 Defendant now seeks this court’s review, asking whether he was required to
present affirmative evidence to make a prima facie case for rescission. We answer
that question in the affirmative and affirm the appellate court’s judgment.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 Defendant, Daksh N. Relwani, was charged with driving under the influence of
alcohol (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2016)) in the circuit court of Will
County. In October 2016, he was found alone in an altered or partially unconscious
state behind the steering wheel of a running car in a Joliet Walgreens parking lot at
about 3:30 a.m. Under the Illinois implied consent statute (625 ILCS 5/11-501.1
(West 2016)), his driver’s license was summarily suspended by the Secretary of
State. The present appeal arose out of his petition to rescind that statutory summary
suspension. In relevant part, defendant claims that rescission is warranted because
he was arrested in a privately owned Walgreens parking lot that did not meet the
definition of a “public highway,” as required by the implied consent law.

¶5 At the hearing on his petition to rescind, defendant was the only witness. He
testified on direct examination that he was parked in a Walgreens parking lot
located at 1801 Ingalls Avenue in Joliet and “was sleeping behind the wheel of [his]
car” when he “was woken up by police officers,” who arrested him for DUI.

¶6 During the State’s cross-examination, defendant was often unable to provide
clear or responsive answers, repeatedly stating, “I don’t remember.” He admitted,
however, that the police found him in his car with the keys in the ignition and the
engine running. When the State asked whether the reason he did not remember
performing some field sobriety tests was “because [he was] intoxicated and had
taken heroin and clozapine[1] that night,” defendant answered, “I, I don’t know. I
guess.” While defendant was able to confirm he told the police that he “had been
driving from the restaurant [in Chicago] with [his] family” earlier that evening, he

1
Clozapine is a psychotropic drug used as an antipsychotic medication. Clozapine, National
Institutes of Health, U.S. National Library of Medicine, https://medlineplus.gov/druginfo/meds/
a691001.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2019) [https://perma.cc/UTX7-73G6].

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 did not recall if he also told them that he had “used heroin and clozapine for [his]
birthday that night” and was “not sure” whether “there was an open bottle of
Budweiser beer in [his] car.” During redirect questioning, his counsel elicited
testimony affirming that “while [defendant was] at the police station, [he was]
actually administered, administered a drug and then taken to Saint Joseph [Medical
Center] for treatment because of [his] condition.” 2

¶7 At the close of defendant’s case, the State successfully moved for a directed
finding, arguing that he had not met his burden of proof in seeking rescission of his
statutory summary suspension. Rejecting defendant’s claim that the summary
suspension statute was inapplicable because he was not driving on a “public
highway,” the trial court initially stated its belief that only private driveways were
excluded from the statute. The judge then explained,

“[h]ere, we have not truly established the fact, by the petitioner’s case, that this
truly was—they said he was in the Walgreens, that it was [a] privately-owned
parking lot. If I don’t know that[,] I can’t assume that simply because it is the
parking lot of Walgreens.”

The trial court denied defendant’s motion to reconsider.

¶8 On appeal, a majority of the appellate court affirmed. Relying on the appellate
decisions in People v. Helt, 384 Ill. App. 3d 285, 287 (2008), and People v.
Culbertson, 258 Ill. App. 3d 294, 296 (1994), the majority concluded that “a
parking lot on privately owned property may constitute a public highway for the
purposes of the summary suspension statute.” 2018 IL App (3d) 170201, ¶ 17
(citing Helt, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 288). More specifically, a parking lot would be
considered a “public highway” for summary suspension purposes if it is publicly
maintained and open to the public for vehicular travel. See 625 ILCS 5/1-126 (West
2016) (defining “highway” for purposes of the Illinois Vehicle Code). Defendant
bore the burden of establishing a prima facie case for rescission. Because the only

2
The details of defendant’s “condition” and treatment remain undisclosed because the pertinent
records were made part of the secured record on appeal. The “secured record” is “[a] sealed,
impounded, confidential or protected document(s), report of proceeding, or exhibit which shall not
be accessed except by court order.” Supreme Court of Illinois, Standards and Requirements for
Electronic Filing the Record on Appeal, ¶ 1(k) (rev. Jan. 2018), http://efile.illinoiscourts.gov/
documents/IL-Record-on-Appeal-Standards-v1.2.pdf [https://perma.cc/GN6F-ZHRM].

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 evidence he offered on whether the parking lot was a “public highway” was noting
it was near a Walgreens store, the majority concluded the trial court’s directed
finding for the State was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 2018 IL
App (3d) 170201, ¶¶ 18-20.

¶9 The dissenting justice argued that defendant met his burden of establishing a
prima facie case for rescission by providing evidence that he was arrested inside his
car in a Walgreens parking lot, citing People v. Ayres, 228 Ill. App. 3d 277 (1992),
and People v. Kissel, 150 Ill. App. 3d 283 (1986), overruled on other grounds by
People v. Brown, 175 Ill. App. 3d 725 (1988). The dissent maintained that because
defendant established that he was arrested in a Walgreens parking lot the burden
shifted to the State to prove that the parking lot was publicly maintained and used
for public vehicular travel. The dissent asserted that the Third District should not
follow the Second District’s approach in Helt, requiring the motorist to provide
proof that the parking lot was not a “public highway” for purposes of summary
suspension, because that approach “places an undue burden on defendants to prove
that private property is not publicly maintained.” 2018 IL App (3d) 170201,
¶¶ 35-42 (Lytton, J., dissenting). This court allowed defendant’s petition for leave
to appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315(a) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017).

¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11 The dispositive question in this appeal is narrow: Was a defendant seeking
rescission of the statutory summary suspension of his driver’s license required to
offer affirmative evidence to satisfy his initial burden of making a prima facie
showing that he was not on a “public highway” while in control of his car?

¶ 12 While on its face the idea that a parking lot can be a “public highway” may
seem to be easily dismissed, “[a] parking lot that is publicly maintained and open to
use by the public for vehicular travel will constitute a ‘highway,’ even if the
parking lot is on privately owned property.” Helt, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 288. Reading
their texts together, the applicable statutes create a cohesive statutory scheme
supporting that conclusion.

¶ 13 Under the Illinois Vehicle Code, the implied consent statute in DUI cases
states:

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 “Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon
the public highways of this State shall be deemed to have given consent *** to a
chemical test or tests of blood, breath, other bodily substance, or urine for the
purpose of determining the content of alcohol, other drug or drugs, or
intoxicating compound or compounds or any combination thereof in the
person’s blood if arrested *** [for a DUI offense] ***.” (Emphasis added.) 625
ILCS 5/11-501.1(a) (West 2016).

¶ 14 If the driver refuses or fails to complete any of the enumerated tests when
requested by a law enforcement officer possessing probable cause and after receipt
of appropriate warnings and documentation, the individual’s driver’s license
“shall” be summarily suspended by the Illinois Secretary of State. 625 ILCS
5/11-501.1(a), (c), (d), (e) (West 2016). To seek rescission of the summary
suspension,

“[w]ithin 90 days after the notice of statutory summary suspension *** is
served under Section 11-501.1, the person may make a written request for a
judicial hearing in the circuit court of venue. The request to the circuit court
shall state the grounds upon which the person seeks to have the statutory
summary suspension *** rescinded.” 625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b) (West 2016).

¶ 15 In the instant defendant’s attempt to rescind his summary suspension, he chose
to disprove that “the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that [defendant] was
driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a highway while under
the influence of alcohol, other drug, or combination of both.” (Emphasis added.)
625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b)(2) (West 2016). Critically, for purposes of the Illinois
Vehicle Code, a “highway” is defined as “[t]he entire width between the boundary
lines of every way publicly maintained when any part thereof is open to the use of
the public for purposes of vehicular travel or located on public school property.”
625 ILCS 5/1-126 (West 2016). Based on that definition, a property is a “public
highway” within the meaning of the implied consent statute if it is both “publicly
maintained” and either open to use by the vehicular public or it constitutes public
school property. 625 ILCS 5/1-126 (West 2016); see also Helt, 384 Ill. App. 3d at
288. Here, it is undisputed that the parking lot where defendant was found is not
“public school property.” Thus, defendant chose to show that the parking lot was
either not publicly maintained or not open for public use.

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¶ 16 In People v. Orth, 124 Ill. 2d 326, 337-38 (1988), this court concluded that “the
motorist, who is requesting judicial rescission of [a summary] suspension, should
bear the burden of proof” and must present a prima facie case supporting that
request. While defendant agrees that he was required to establish a prima facie case
to support his rescission request, he maintains that he met that burden by relying on
the purported inference that any parking lot by a Walgreens store is private
property. He adds that “the State failed to rebut this presumption by providing any
evidence of public ownership or maintenance.”

¶ 17 In making the latter argument, however, defendant puts the proverbial cart
before the horse: this appeal is premised on the trial court’s grant of the State’s
motion for a directed finding. In the rescission context, a directed finding is,
necessarily, entered before the State has any obligation to present evidence. “If, and
only if,” defendant makes a sufficient prima facie showing, thereby avoiding a
directed finding, “the burden will shift to the State to come forward with evidence
in rebuttal justifying suspension.” Orth, 124 Ill. 2d at 338. In making a prima facie
case, a defendant “has the primary responsibility for establishing the factual and
legal bases” for the requested action. People v. Brooks, 2017 IL 121413, ¶ 22, cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1343 (2018).

¶ 18 Because in rescission cases we apply the same standard of review used in
appeals of suppression motion rulings, “[t]he trial court’s factual findings are
reviewed under the manifest weight of the evidence standard, while the ultimate
legal ruling regarding rescission is reviewed de novo.” People v. Gocmen, 2018 IL
122388, ¶ 21. A prima facie case is “[a] party’s production of enough evidence to
allow the fact-trier to infer the fact at issue and rule in the party’s favor.” Black’s
Law Dictionary 1310 (9th ed. 2009). “The trial judge’s finding as to the prima facie
case will not be overturned upon appeal unless against the manifest weight of the
evidence.” Orth, 124 Ill. 2d at 341. A finding is against the manifest weight of the
evidence only if “the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding itself is
unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented.” People v. Deleon,
227 Ill. 2d 322, 332 (2008).

¶ 19 In Orth, the motorist argued, in relevant part, that the statutory summary
suspension of his driver’s license should be rescinded because the result of his
breath test was unreliable. This court explained that to make a prima facie case, the

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 motorist had to present evidence “of any circumstance which tends to cast doubt on
the test’s accuracy, including, but not limited to, credible testimony by the motorist
that he was not in fact under the influence of alcohol. *** Only if the trial judge
finds such testimony credible will the burden shift to the State ***.” Orth, 124 Ill.
2d at 341. Applying that standard to defendant’s contention in this case, he had to
offer evidence that the trial court found to be credible. In addition, to ward off the
State’s motion for directed verdict and shift the evidentiary burden to the State,
defendant’s proffered evidence had to “tend[ ] to cast doubt on” whether the
parking lot constituted a “public highway” as defined by the relevant statute.

¶ 20 Our examination of the record reveals that the only evidence defendant offered
to establish his prima facie case was his own testimony. And the only portion of his
testimony that even tangentially related to whether the parking lot was a “public
highway” was even more abbreviated. In its entirety, that testimony consisted of
two short colloquies. First, on direct examination by defense counsel:

“Q. [Defendant], can I talk to you about October 20—October 10th, 2016,
about 3:30 a.m.?
A. Yes.
Q. Where were you at that time?
A. In the Walgreens parking lot.
Q. Is that located at 1801 Ingalls Avenue in Joliet?
A. Yes.
Q. And where were you—were you in your car?
A. Yes, I was.”

And later, during the State’s cross-examination:

“Q. And the Walgreens parking lot you were parked at was in Joliet; is that
correct?
A. Yes.”

¶ 21 Before this court, defendant asserts this purported inference: the parking lot by
the Joliet Walgreens store where police found him is private property, not a “public
highway” as defined in the Illinois Vehicle Code. The sole basis for defendant’s
claimed inference is, necessarily, the above-quoted testimonial snippets.
Nonetheless, he contends that an inference based on those brief snippets is

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 sufficient to overcome his burden of making a prima facie showing that the parking
lot was outside the reach of the implied consent statute. We disagree.

¶ 22 In its entirety, defendant’s evidentiary showing simply recites the most basic
background facts underlying his arrest: at about 3:30 a.m. on October 10, 2016, he
was in his parked car in a “Walgreens parking lot” “located at 1801 Ingalls Avenue
in Joliet.” As we have explained, to make his prima facie case, defendant had to
offer evidence that “tend[ed] to cast doubt on” whether that parking lot was
“publicly maintained” or open to use by the motoring public. See 625 ILCS 5/1-126
(West 2016); see also Helt, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 288. Because defendant bears the
initial burden of presenting sufficient evidence of his chosen ground for rescission,
we cannot review that evidence in the light most favorable to him on appeal.
Gocmen, 2018 IL 122388, ¶ 22. The sum total of the substantive evidence
defendant offered on the relevant question in this case consisted of (1) the lot’s
association with a Walgreens store and (2) its street address. Defendant’s testimony
did not even specify the proximity or physical connection of the parking lot to the
storefront or the location of his car within the parking lot.

¶ 23 As we have noted, to make his prima facie case, defendant was obliged to
produce “enough evidence to allow the fact-trier to infer the fact at issue and rule in
[his] favor.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1310 (9th ed. 2009). Here, defendant’s mere
reference to “Walgreens,” without more, establishes nothing about either the
identity of the entity that maintained the lot or the public’s use of the lot. Those are
the essential substantive components for a prima facie showing that the parking lot
was not a “public highway” within the meaning of the relevant statutes. While a
defendant’s initial showing need not conclusively establish each required element
of the case, it must provide some affirmative evidence of each one and cannot rely
on a passing reference and mere supposition to avoid a directed finding. Here,
defendant’s prima facie showing fell well short of the required mark.

¶ 24 Nonetheless, defendant cites Ayres, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 278, Kissel, 150 Ill. App.
3d at 286, People v. Montelongo, 152 Ill. App. 3d 518, 523 (1987), and People v.
Kozak, 130 Ill. App. 2d 334, 334-36 (1970), for the proposition that “a motorist
need only show that he was operating on or in control of his automobile in the
parking lot of a private business to establish a prima facie case for rescission under
the implied consent statute.” Again, defendant’s argument misses the mark.

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 Evidence of the private nature of the parking lot where defendant was found asleep
in his running car is precisely what was missing from his prima facie case, but that
was not true in the cases cited by defendant.

¶ 25 In both Ayres, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 278, and Kissel, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 286, the
appellate court expressly relied on the “undisputed” fact that the defendants were
observed driving only on “privately owned parking lots.” Here, of course, whether
the parking lot constituted a “public highway” or was strictly private property is
highly contested. In further contrast, the evidence in Montelongo and Kozak
actually supported the conclusion that the parking lots at issue were not “public
highways,” with police officers in both cases testifying that no governmental body
maintained the properties at issue. Montelongo, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 520; Kozak, 130
Ill. App. 2d at 334-35. In addition, the officers testified either that the lot was
owned by a nonpublic body (Kozak) or that it was fenced, with posted signage
stating that the lot was private and intended for use by only patrons of the adjoining
business (Montelongo). Kozak, 130 Ill. App. 2d at 334-35; Montelongo, 152 Ill.
App. 3d at 520. Thus, those cases are readily distinguishable and cannot be applied
here to overcome the deficiency in defendant’s evidentiary showing.

¶ 26 We conclude the trial court’s finding that defendant failed to present a
prima facie case for rescission is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Orth, 124 Ill. 2d at 341 (stating the standard of review for factual determinations). It
is certainly not clearly evident from the minimal evidence defendant presented that
the trial court should have arrived at the opposite conclusion or that its conclusion
was unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence. See Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d at
332 (explaining the manifest weight of the evidence standard of review). Nor is the
trial court’s ultimate ruling that defendant’s rescission request must be denied
erroneous based on our review of the relevant statutes and case law. Gocmen, 2018
IL 122388, ¶ 21 (stating the standard of review for the trial court’s ruling on a
rescission request).

¶ 27 Defendant, however, also raises a policy argument. He claims that requiring
more evidence than he offered to avoid a directed finding “would also create an
undue burden on petitioner-motorists who may not have access to the information
necessary to satisfy the *** ‘publicly maintained’ requirement.” He asserts the
State should bear that burden because it is “in a much better position to know if a

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 parking lot is publicly maintained.” He contends that “the state is in a far better
place to ascertain the relationship between public entities and private property
owners than are private citizens” because it “has the resources and the authority to
more easily obtain the relevant information.”

¶ 28 What defendant fails to explain, however, is why this court should reverse
course now and reallocate a burden that has long been placed on the party bringing
a summary suspension rescission action to provide sufficient evidence on each of
the required elements needed to make a prima facie case. See Gocmen, 2018 IL
122388, ¶ 20; Helt, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 287; Orth, 124 Ill. 2d at 337-38 (all
explaining the initial burden of proving a prima facie case and the subsequent
reallocation of the evidentiary burden). Defendant also does not explain why it is
unduly burdensome for him to provide some affirmative evidence simply tending to
cast doubt on the parking lot being publicly maintained. It is unclear why
subpoenas or extensive searches of property records would be required to support
his initial claim. If defendant offers a satisfactory prima facie case and the State
fails to rebut it, rescission of the summary suspension is proper. See Gocmen, 2018
IL 122388, ¶ 19. The ultimate burden of proof, however, must be continuously
borne by the defendant. People v. Brooks, 2017 IL 121413, ¶ 22.

¶ 29 Defendant also appears to misunderstand the breadth of his chosen evidentiary
burden. By focusing on the alleged difficulty of determining whether a public entity
maintains the parking lot, he ignores the equally viable option of making his
prima facie case by offering affirmative evidence that tends to cast doubt on
whether the parking lot is open to public use. After all, property constitutes a
“public highway” only if it is both “publicly maintained” and either open to use by
the vehicular public or is public school property. 625 ILCS 5/1-126 (West 2016)
(defining “highway” for purposes of the Illinois Vehicle Code). To avoid a directed
finding against him, defendant could have made a prima facie offering of evidence
that tended to cast doubt on either one of those statutory requirements. Something
as simple as evidence of a posted “private property” sign may, in the proper
circumstances, suffice to satisfy the prima facie burden of proof in a rescission
action, shifting the burden to present evidence on the lot’s “public highway” status
to the State. See Gocmen, 2018 IL 122388, ¶ 20 (citing People v. Wear, 229 Ill. 2d
545, 560 (2008) (explaining that “[i]f the driver establishes a prima facie case for
rescission, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with evidence justifying

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 the suspension”)); Montelongo, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 520 (noting police testimony
that a sign posted in the lot indicated it “was private and was provided for the
patrons of the establishment”). Here, defendant did not attempt to make even that
minimal showing.

¶ 30 Because we uphold the trial court’s directed finding for the State based on
defendant’s failure to satisfy the burden of presenting a prima facie case, we need
not address the State’s alternative argument that the rescission of his driver’s
license could be upheld based on evidence that he drove his car on a public highway
sometime prior to his arrest in the parking lot.

¶ 31 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 32 For the reasons stated, we hold that defendant was required to offer some
affirmative evidence that the parking lot where he was arrested for DUI was not a
public highway within the definition in the Illinois Vehicle Code to make his
prima facie case and fend off the State’s motion for a directed finding. Because he
failed to provide that quantum of evidence, we uphold the trial court’s directed
finding for the State.

¶ 33 Affirmed.

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