[Cite as State v. Claren, 2019-Ohio-260.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF WAYNE )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 17AP0030
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
PAUL CLAREN COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF WAYNE, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. 2016 CRC-I 000289
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: January 28, 2019
SCHAFER, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Paul Claren, appeals the August 24, 2017 journal entry of
the Wayne County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons discussed below, this Court
dismisses the appeal.
I.
{¶2} On September 19, 2016, the Wayne County Grand Jury issued an indictment
charging Claren for offenses stemming from an August 18, 2016 incident resulting in the death
of B.G. Count one charged Claren with aggravated murder in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A), a
special felony. Count two charged Claren with murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A), a special
felony. Counts one and two each included two specifications, respectively: a firearm
specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.145(A), and a repeat violent offender specification pursuant
to R.C. 2941.149(A). Count three charged Claren with having weapons while under disability, a
felony of the third degree, in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2).
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{¶3} Claren entered a plea of not guilty to all charges. The matter proceeded to a trial
before a jury. After the jury returned the verdicts and following the sentencing hearing, the trial
court issued a sentencing entry stating that Claren was guilty of aggravated murder with a
firearm specification and having a weapon while under disability. The sentencing entry also
found Claren to be a repeat violent offender, and sentenced Claren accordingly. Claren now
appeals from this journal entry, raising two assignments of error for our review.
II.
Assignment of Error I
The failure of the trial court to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of
self-defense, including the “castle instruction” pursuant to R.C. 2901.09
constituted plain error and was an abuse of discretion all to the prejudice of
[Claren].
Assignment of Error II
[Claren] received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to
object to the trial court’s decision to not instruct the jury on self-defense in
violation of [Claren]’s rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution.
{¶4} Claren’s assignments of error challenge the trial court’s jury instructions on the
affirmative defense of self-defense, and allege ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the
jury instructions. However, because Claren has not appealed from a final appealable order, this
Court is unable to address the merits of his assignments of error.
{¶5} This matter was tried before a jury upon all three counts as charged in the
indictment: aggravated murder, with a firearm specification and repeat violent offender
specification; murder with a firearm specification and repeat violent offender specification; and
having a weapon while under disability. Upon the conclusion of the trial, the case was submitted
to the jury for deliberations. The jury returned a verdict finding Claren guilty on count one as to
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the charge of aggravated murder and the firearm specification. The jury also returned a verdict
finding Claren guilty on count three, as to the charge of having a weapon while under disability.
The jury did not return a verdict on count two of the indictment.
{¶6} Regarding count two, in the August 22, 2017 journal entry, the trial court stated
“[c]ount [two], [m]urder, is a lesser included offense of [c]ount [one] and given the verdict on
[c]ount [one], the jury did not render a verdict on [c]ount [two].” The trial court set the matter
over for a sentencing hearing. On August 24, 2017, the trial court issued a journal entry stating
the fact of Claren’s conviction as to counts one and three, and indicating that the jury did not
render a verdict on count two. Further, this August 24, 2017 sentencing entry stated “the court
finds that [Claren] is a repeat, violent offender.” Ostensibly, the trial court based this finding on
the repeat violent offender specification of count one. The trial court then sentenced Claren, on
count one, to three years in prison on the firearm specification to run consecutive to a term of life
imprisonment without parole on the charge of aggravated murder and, on count three, to three
years in prison to run concurrent with the sentence imposed under count one. The trial court did
not indicate any verdict or finding as to count two of the indictment, and did not otherwise
address its disposition or purport to enter a sentence on that count.
A. Finality in criminal cases
{¶7} This Court is obligated to raise sua sponte questions related to our jurisdiction.
Whitaker-Merrell Co. v. Geupel Constr. Co., Inc., 29 Ohio St.2d 184, 186 (1972). We have
jurisdiction to hear appeals from final judgments pursuant to Ohio Constitution, Article IV,
Section 3(B)(2) and R.C. 2501.02. If an attempted appeal is not based on a final, appealable
order, this Court must dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. State v. Walker, 9th Dist.
Summit No. 28836, 2018-Ohio-1146, ¶ 8.
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{¶8} A judgment of conviction is a final appealable order pursuant to R.C. 2505.02
when it complies with Crim.R. 32. See State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330.
Crim.R. 32(C) states the elements for a judgment of conviction:
A judgment of conviction shall set forth the fact of conviction and the sentence.
Multiple judgments of conviction may be addressed in one judgment entry. If the
defendant is found not guilty or for any other reason is entitled to be discharged,
the court shall render judgment accordingly. The judge shall sign the judgment
and the clerk shall enter it on the journal. A judgment is effective only when
entered on the journal by the clerk.
“A judgment of conviction is a final order subject to appeal under R.C. 2505.02 when the
judgment entry sets forth (1) the fact of the conviction, (2) the sentence, (3) the judge’s
signature, and (4) the time stamp indicating the entry upon the journal by the clerk.” State v.
Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-5204, paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶9} Moreover, before a trial court can enter a final judgment, it must resolve each and
every charge prosecuted against a defendant. State v. Jackson, 9th Dist. Summit No. 28625,
2018-Ohio-19, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Ford, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23269, 2006-Ohio-6961, ¶ 6.
So long as a judgment of conviction otherwise complies with Crim.R. 32(C) and the
requirements stated in Lester, the resolution by dismissal as to other charges in a multicount
indictment will not prevent a judgment from being final and appealable. State v. Jackson, 151
Ohio St.3d 239, 2017-Ohio-7469, ¶ 9. To be final, a journal entry need not include a reiteration
of counts and specifications that “‘were resolved in other ways, such as dismissals, nolled
counts, or not guilty findings.’” (Emphasis added.) State ex rel. Rose v. McGinty, 128 Ohio
St.3d 371, 2011-Ohio-761, ¶ 3, quoting State ex rel. Davis v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common
Pleas, 127 Ohio St.3d 29, 2010-Ohio-4728, ¶ 2, quoting State ex rel. Davis v. Cuyahoga Cty.
Court of Common Pleas, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93814, 2010-Ohio-1066, ¶ 8. A court cannot
sentence a defendant for a count that has been dismissed or for which he was found not guilty,
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therefore, a journal entry need not “contain reference to counts that were dismissed or upon
which the defendant was acquitted,” in order to constitute a final appealable order. State v.
Smead, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24903, 2010-Ohio-4462, ¶ 9-10.
{¶10} This Court recognizes that the trial court is not required to restate the resolution or
disposition of counts for which a defendant was not convicted in the sentencing entry for that
entry to be final and appealable. See id. Nonetheless, the trial court must actually resolve and
dispose of all charges in the indictment in order to issue a final appealable order. State v.
Heavilin, 9th Dist. Medina No. 15CA0034-M, 2016-Ohio-1284, ¶ 9.
B. The order appealed is not final
{¶11} A journal entry is deficient when it disposes of some charges, but fails to dispose
of all pending charges, against the defendant in that case. State v. Goodwin, 9th Dist. Summit
No. 23337, 2007-Ohio-2343, ¶ 3. Therefore, this Court must look to the record to determine
whether the trial court resolved and disposed “of all charges brought in a single case against
[Claren]” for there to be a final appealable order in the matter. State v. Roberson, 9th Dist.
Lorain No. 09CA009555, 2009-Ohio-6369, ¶ 6, quoting Goodwin. This requirement applies to
the offenses and specifications charged in each count. Heavilin at ¶ 9, citing State v. Hayes, 9th
Dist. Lorain 99CA007416, 2000 WL 670672. *1 (May 24, 2000).
{¶12} The verdict forms, the August 22, 2017 journal entry, and the August 24, 2017
sentencing entry reflect that the jury did not render a verdict as to count two, which charged
Claren with the offense of murder and contained two specifications. The trial court implied that
it was unnecessary for the jury to make a finding on count two based on the trial court’s
observation that murder is a “lesser included offense” of aggravated murder. In this case,
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however, murder was charged as a separate offense in the indictment and the record does not
indicate any manner of resolution or disposition for that count.
{¶13} The procedure in this case is the cause of the defect. Relevant to this discussion
are the two separate counts in the indictment charging Claren for aggravated murder and murder.
The trial court was required to resolve these counts before it could issue a final and appealable
order. Because the second count, which the trial court deemed a lesser included offense, was not
resolved, it remains pending. If Claren had been charged only with aggravated murder, and the
trial court merely instructed the jury as to the lesser included offense of murder, it would not
have been necessary for the trial court to “resolve” that lesser included offense in order to enter a
final appealable order. In that instance, a single count of aggravated murder would have been
resolved by the jury’s verdict on either the indicted count or by consideration of the lesser
included offense. The instant matter is distinguishable because Claren was actually indicted on
both the greater and lesser offenses, and it was necessary for the trial court to resolve all indicted
counts to enter a final appealable order.
{¶14} It is unclear whether the trial court assumed that count two had somehow been
implicitly dismissed, or whether the trial court viewed the guilty verdict as to count one for
aggravated murder to necessarily result in a finding of guilt on the murder charge of count two.
However, if the trial court considered count two to have been resolved in some manner other
than a conviction, it failed to journalize and identify the basis for disposition in the record. See
Heavilin, 2016-Ohio-1284 at ¶ 9; Roberson, 2009-Ohio-6369 at ¶ 6. Alternatively, the trial court
did not state the fact of conviction as to count two, enter a sentence, or merge the offense for
purposes of sentencing and, therefore, failed to enter a final appealable judgment of conviction.
See Crim.R. 32; Lester. Thus, under either view, the trial court did not resolve count two of the
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indictment and the judgment of conviction is not a final, appealable order. Consequently, this
Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the merits of Claren’s attempted appeal.
III.
{¶15} Having determined that Claren has not appealed from a final, appealable order,
this Court is unable to review the merits of Claren’s assignments of error. Accordingly, this
attempted appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Appeal dismissed.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
JULIE A. SCHAFER
FOR THE COURT
HENSAL, J.
CONCURS.
CARR, J.
CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY.
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APPEARANCES:
NORMAN R. “BING” MILLER, Atorney at Law, for Appellant.
DANIEL R. LUTZ, Prosecuting Attorney, and NATHAN R. SHAKER, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for Appellee.