IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON
No. 77428-0-1
Respondent,
DIVISION ONE
. V.
IBRAHIM OBAI KAMARA, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
FILED: January 28, 2019
ANDRUS, J. — A jury found Ibrahim Kamara guilty of gross misdemeanor
harassment. He challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting his conviction. We
affirm.
FACTS
On June 7, 2017, Lara Ramey left work and walked to a downtown Seattle bus
stop to Commute home. Ramey saw two men whom she assumed to be homeless. She
first noticed a man seated on one of the two benches at the bus stop and noticed a second
man, Ibrahim Kamara, just north of the bus stop. Kamara was performing what Ramey
believed'to be a slow form of martial arts. Ramey sat down on the unoccupied bench.
Kamara then sat down on the bench close enough to Ramey that their thighs were
touching, and said something akin to: "I still got it" or "I still look good." 7 Verbatim Report
of Proceedings (RP) at 660-61. Ramey responded, "You mean your forms?" 7 RP at
No. 77428-0-1/2
663. Kamara then asked Ramey if she took self-defense classes. She answered in the
affirmative.
Kamara and Ramey, who had never met, then engaged in conversation. Early in
the conversation, Kamara told Ramey that he had recently gotten out of jail. He then
leaned backward, lowered his voice, and asked Ramey if she would do him a favor.
Assuming that Kamara was about to ask for money,1 Ramey preemptively said: "[S]orry I
don't have any cash." 7 RP at 667. Ramey's assumption seemed to offend and anger
Kamara. Kamara responded that he did not need her money. He then leaned toward
Ramey and said: "1 want to take you behind the Federal Building and fuck the shit out of
you." 7 RP at 668.
Ramey turned away and stood up to leave. Kamara also stood up, turned, and
blocked Ramey by standing in front of her. Kamara then told Ramey that if she left he
would "mess [her] up" or "fuck [her] up right there." 7 RP at 670; 8 RP at 728. He then
smirked and flexed his muscles. Ramey then sat back down.
Kamara also sat back down and kept telling Ramey,"You know I can do it." 7 RP
at 671. She interpreted Kamara's statements to mean that he would beat her up or
sexually assault her if she tried to leave. Kamara was bigger than Ramey. Ramey
believed that hitting Kamara "wouldn't do anything." 7 RP at 676. She felt "stuck in this
[bus shelter] with [Kamara] who thought he could do what he wanted." 7 RP at 676.
During this time, a bus had come and gone by the stop and another woman walked
by and boarded that bus. Ramey did not call out for help or attempt to get on the first
I Ramey assumed Kamara was homeless and about to ask her for money because he smelled of
alcohol and excessive body odor. Kamara had also earlier mentioned that he was trying to catch a bus to
Lynnwood.
2
No. 77428-0-1/3
bus. Ramey testified that she was frightened of what might happen if she sought help
and did not believe the other woman who boarded the bus would be able to help if Kamara
physically attacked her. She did not attempt to board the bus because Kamara was sitting
next to her and she was afraid of how he might react. Ramey was also unable to get the
attention of the man sitting on the other bench, and the other man did not make any
attempt to intervene.
Meanwhile, Kamara kept getting up and down from the bench and walking within
five feet of her saying: "I'm nice." 7 RP at 677-78. Ramey did not feel she could escape.
At a certain point, Kamara gave Ramey his phone so that Ramey could enter her name
and number into his contacts. Once Ramey had Kamara's phone, she placed a call to
her own mobile phone2—instead of calling 911—because:
I had [Kamara's] phone in my hand.. . And at that time, I was like, okay . . .
I can call 9-1-1 or I can call my husband or I can do something with this
phone. And I decided not to call 9-1-1 because by the time they got there,
you know, and he registered that I had called 9-1-1, anything could happen
.. . So I decided.. .that if anything were to happen, I need something that's
going to trace something back to this guy.
7 RP at 680-81. Once Kamara recognized that Ramey had made a call on his phone, he
demanded to know if she had given her real number.
Kamara then reached out and ran his finger down the side of Ramey's face to
remove a piece of hair that had blown into Ramey's mouth. She turned away when he
touched her. Kamara then pulled Ramey's chin towards him and again asked if she had
given him a fake phone number. While Ramey did not believe Kamara was trying to
2 Ramey did not have her mobile phone with her at that point because she had accidentally left it
in her vehicle that morning.
No. 77428-0-1/4
physically hurt her by touching her face and chin, she thought it was part of his ongoing
attempts to manipulate her
Kamara continued getting up and down from the bench to smoke. During one of
the times Kamara was away from the bench, Ramey got the attention of the man seated
on the other bench. When the other man's bus came, Ramey boarded the bus as wel1.3
Kamara did not try to prevent Ramey from boarding the bus. The entire encounter
between Kamara and Ramey lasted approximately 15 minutes.
After boarding the second bus, she exited this bus a few blocks later in order to
catch her normal bus at a different stop. As she waited for a bus at this location, Ramey
saw an acquaintance. This acquaintance testified that he saw Ramey shaking with fear
and almost on the verge of tears. Ramey told the acquaintance that she had almost been
mugged.
After arriving home, Ramey informed her spouse about the encounter with Kamara
and then contacted law enforcement. A King County Sheriff detective identified Kamara
as a suspect by running his phone number—obtained from Ramey's phone—through one
of its databases. Ramey later identified Kamara from a photographic lineup. When
Ramey identified Kamara in the lineup, the detective noticed that her "voice wavered and
cracked" and "her lips were trembling or quivering." 7 RP at 552. Subsequently, law
enforcement arrested Kamara and discovered that his phone had registered an outgoing
call to Ramey's phone on June 7, 2017.
3 The bus Ramey boarded was not one that she normally took and it was not one that would have
taken her home.
4
No. 77428-0-1/5
The State charged Kamara with unlawful imprisonment, assault in the fourth
degree, and gross misdemeanor harassment. It also alleged that Kamara committed
each of these offenses with sexual motivation.
Kamara testified at trial in his own defense. He admitted sitting next to Ramey
after his stretches, engaging her in conversation, and asking for her phone number.
However, he denied threatening Ramey, saying that he wanted to "fuck the shit out of"
her, preventing her from leaving the bus stop, or making any physical contact with her.
Without objection, the trial court instructed the jury regarding the harassment
allegation, in relevant part as follows:
To convict the defendant of the crime of Harassment, as charged in
Count 111, each of the following four elements of the crime must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) That on or about June 7, 2017, the defendant knowingly threatened:
(a) to cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to Lara
Ramey; or,
(b) to subject Lara Ramey to physical confinement or restraint;
(2) That the words or conduct of the defendant placed Lara Ramey in
reasonable fear that the threat would be carried out;
(3) That the defendant acted without lawful authority; and
(4) That the threat was made or received in the State of Washington.
If you find from the evidence that elements (2), (3) and (4) and any
of the alternative elements (1)(a), or (1)(b), have been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, then it will be your duty to return a verdict of guilty as to
Count III. To return a verdict of guilty, the jury need not be unanimous as
to which of alternatives (1)(a) or (1)(b) has been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, as long as each juror finds that at least one alternative
has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Kamara did not request and the trial court did not give an instruction requiring jury
unanimity as to whether Kamara committed the harassment under the threat of bodily
5
No. 77428-0-1/6
injury prong or the physical restraint prong. In closing, the prosecutor argued that
evidence supported both prongs.
The jury acquitted Kamara of unlawful imprisonment and of assault in the fourth
degree, but found him guilty of gross misdemeanor harassment. It did not find that
Kamara committed harassment with sexual motivation. Kamara appeals.
ANALYSIS
Kamara argues insufficient evidence supports his conviction for harassment.
Specifically, Kamara claims the State failed to prove he knowingly threatened to subject
Ramey "to physical confinement or restraint that placed her in reasonable fear that the
threat would be carried out." He contends this lack of evidence requires a reversal of his
conviction because the jury instruction did not require jury unanimity on the alternative
means of committing harassment, threat to commit bodily harm. We disagree.
Due process requires the State to prove every element of the charged crimes
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Kalebaugh, 183 Wn.2d 578, 584, 355 P.3d 253
(2015). "To convict a person of a criminal charge, the jury must be unanimous that the
defendant committed the criminal act." State v. Bobenhouse, 166 Wn.2d 881, 892, 214
P.3d 907 (2009)(quoting State v. Camarillo, 115 Wn.2d 60, 63, 794 P.2d 850 (1990)).
However, when the crime can be committed by alternative means, unanimity is required
"only when a general verdict raises due process concerns; i.e., when one or more
alternatives presented to the jury are not supported by sufficient evidence." State v.
Woodlvn, 188 Wn.2d 157, 162, 392 P.3d 1062 (2017). If there is sufficient evidence to
support each alternative means submitted to the jury, the conviction will be affirmed
6
No. 77428-0-1/7
because we infer that the jury rested its decision on a unanimous finding as to the means.
State v. Randhawa, 133 Wn.2d 67, 73-74, 941 P.2d 661 (1997).
In reviewing sufficiency of evidence claims, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State and test for whether any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Salinas,
119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of
the State's evidence and all reasonable inferences a trier of fact can draw from that
evidence. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d at 201. Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence are
equally reliable. State v. Delmarter, 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 618 P.2d 99 (1980). We defer
"to the trier of fact on issues of conflicting testimony, credibility of witnesses, and the
persuasiveness of the evidence." State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 874-75, 83 P.3d 970
(2004).
To convict a defendant of misdemeanor harassment, the State must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt the defendant, without lawful authority, knowingly (1) threatened to
cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened, or(2)threatened
to subject the person threatened to physical confinement or restraint.4 RCW
9A.46.020(1)(a). Furthermore, the State must prove the defendant, by words or conduct,
placed the person threatened in reasonable fear that the threat will be carried out. RCW
9A.46.020(1)(a),(b).
A threat is a direct or indirect communication of the intent to do the act threatened.
RCW 9A.04.110(28). To constitute harassment—and to avoid infringing upon any free
4 The harassment statutes provide four alternative ways to commit the offense; however, only two
of the alternatives are relevant here. See RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a)(i)-(iv). The offense of harassment is,
generally, a gross misdemeanor but is a felony if the defendant threatens to "kill the person threatened."
RCW 9A.46.020(2)(b).
7
No. 77428-0-1/8
speech rights protected under the First Amendment—the threat must be a "true threat."
State v. Kilburn, 151 Wn.2d 36, 41, 84 P.3d 1215 (2004). A "true threat" is "a statement
made in a context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would
foresee that the statement would be interpreted . . . as a serious expression of intention
to inflict bodily harm upon or to take the life of another person." Kilburn, 151 Wn.2d at 43
(internal quotations and citations omitted). Additionally, "the nature of a threat depends
on all the facts and circumstances, . . . [not] a literal translation of the words spoken."
State v. C.G., 150 Wn.2d 604, 611, 80 P.3d 594 (2003).
Kamara does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence that he harassed
Ramey by knowingly threatening to cause her bodily injury. Kamara threatened to "mess"
or "fuck" Ramey up. Kamara also concedes that he made "Ramey afraid." App.'s Br. at
17. There is sufficient evidence to establish that Kamara harassed Ramey by means of
threatening her with bodily injury.
Kamara argues the State failed to present sufficient evidence he knowingly
threatened to subject Ramey to physical confinement or restraint. Further, he contends
Ramey's "perception that her movement was restricted was unreasonable, and was
based on racial fear and mistaking [his] social status as a threat." App.'s Br. at 17.
Knowingly Threaten Physical Confinement of Restraint
The jury had ample evidence from which to find Kamara knowingly threatened
physical confinement or restraint. Kamara sat uncomfortably close to Ramey at the bus
stop. Kamara told Ramey that he wanted to "fuck the shit out" of her. When Ramey got
up to leave the bus stop, Kamara blocked her path,flexed his muscles and said he would
"mess" or "fuck her up" if she left. Kamara remained within five feet of Ramey, telling her:
-8
No. 77428-0-1/9
"I'm nice" and "You know I can do it." A reasonable jury could conclude that Karama
intentionally threatened to restrain Ramey by standing in front of her, blocking her path,
and verbally threatening to assault her if she left.
Reasonableness of Ramey's Fear
At trial, Kamara argued that his case is "a lot about bias" and "a lot about
institutional racism" because he is black and Ramey is white. 8 RP at 862. He claimed
that Ramey's fear of physical confinement or restraint was not objectively reasonable
because she was "suspicious of him from the moment she saw him. And at that point,
she knew nothing abut[sic] the content of his character. She's just looking at the color of
his skin." 8 RP at 867. Kamara told the jury that Ramey "was scared because there was
a big black guy talking to her[,]" and that "[s]he was afraid of a black man who... reminded
her of brown leather." 8 RP at 870, 872-73. There is sufficient evidence from which we
conclude the jury rejected this argument.
To show reasonable fear, the State must show that Kamara's words and actions
caused Ramey to subjectively and objectively fear that his threat would be carried out.
State v. Cross, 156 Wn. App. 568, 582,234 P.3d 288(2010), remanded on other grounds,
172 Wn.2d 1009 (2011). Ramey testified that Kamara was physically bigger than she
and that she felt trapped and frightened to the point that she used Kamara's phone to dial
her own in order to leave something tracing back to Kamara if something happened to
her. When the chance came to flee safely, Ramey boarded a bus that she did not
normally take in order to get away from Kamara. Witnesses testified when they saw
Ramey after the incident, she was shaking with fear and appeared on the verge of tears.
When Ramey was asked to identify her assailant in a photomontage, she became visibly
-9-
No. 77428-0-1/10
distressed when she saw Kamara's picture. This evidence supports the jury's conclusion
that Kamara's words and conduct caused Ramey to subjectively fear he would confine or
restrain her from leaving the bus stop.
Moreover, Kamara's words, combined with his act of standing and flexing his
muscles in front of Ramey—irrespective of his race—support an objective fear of
confinement or restraint. "A true threat is a serious threat, not one said in jest, idle talk,
or political argument." Kilburn, 151 Wn.2d at 43. Under the circumstances presented,
Kamara's statements and conduct cannot be described as "jest, idle talk, or political
argument." The evidence supports a finding that Ramey's fear was objectively
reasonable.
Because the State presented sufficient evidence of both alternative means by
which Kamara committed harassment,there was no need for a unanimity instruction. The
absence of a unanimity instruction on the alternative means was not error. Therefore, we
affirm Kamara's conviction.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
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