MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Feb 04 2019, 8:41 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE,
Lindsay H. Lepley VIKING, INC.
Burt, Blee, Dixon, Sutton Matthew J. Elliott
& Bloom, LLP Beckman Lawson, LLP
Fort Wayne, Indiana Fort Wayne, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
NBD International, Inc., February 4, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-PL-509
v. Appeal from the Whitley Superior
Court
Viking, Inc., The Honorable Douglas M. Fahl,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
Selective Insurance Company of 92D01-1601-PL-6
America,
Appellee-Defendant
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-509 | February 4, 2019 Page 1 of 9
Case Summary
[1] NBD International, Inc., appeals the denial of its motion to dismiss the lawsuit
filed against it by Viking, Inc. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] We summarize the trial court’s findings of fact, none of which NBD challenges
on appeal, as follows. Viking manufactures exhaust parts at a facility in
Columbia City. On January 6, 2014, a fire caused significant damage to the
facility. Viking contacted its insurer, Selective Insurance Company of America,
which in turn retained NBD, an Ohio company, to perform a “technical
assessment” in order to “determine the nature and scope of the damage, and
what needed to be done to fix it.” Appellant’s App. Vol. III pp. 3-4. NBD
performed this work on January 15-17. At some point, NBD asked Viking’s
president, Steve Schwenn, to sign a “Work Authorization to Proceed” (“Work
Authorization”) so that NBD could perform the next phase of the work:
cleaning and repair. When Schwenn signed, the blanks on the form were
empty, and no rate sheet was attached.1 NBD performed cleaning and repair
work for half a day on January 18 and all day on January 19. On the morning
of January 20, Viking halted NBD’s work. However, NBD remained on site to
do “consulting work” on behalf of Selective. On January 23, Viking asked
1
On this point the trial court accepted Schwenn’s version of events. NBD disputes that version, but it has
chosen not to challenge the trial court’s findings for purposes of this appeal.
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NBD to do some additional cleaning work, but this work was halted on
January 24, and NBD left the project on January 25.
[3] In January 2016, Viking filed suit against NBD and Selective in Whitley
Superior Court, alleging “incompetent work” by NBD, “mishandling” of the
claim by Selective, and, as a result, “losses to its equipment and machines far in
excess of its insurance coverage limits” as well as “a loss of business
customers.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 16. Against NBD, Viking claimed
breach of contract and negligence, and against Selective, Viking claimed breach
of contract, bad faith, negligent hiring, and negligence.
[4] NBD responded to the claims against it with a motion to dismiss based on the
Work Authorization that Schwenn had signed. Specifically, NBD relied on the
following forum-selection clause that was included in the Work Authorization:
“In the event that any legal proceedings are necessary, they will be brought in
the courts of Summit County, Ohio and NBD International Inc. shall be
entitled to recover the cost of collection to include reasonable attorney fees.”
Id. at 89. NBD argued that this clause is applicable and requires dismissal
because (1) each of Viking’s claims against NBD “arises out of the Work
Authorization and/or the performance or supposed non-performance of
obligations related to the Work Authorization” and (2) “it is the terms of that
Work Authorization that governs the relationship between Viking and NBD.”
Id. at 72-73.
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[5] In its response to NBD’s motion, Viking contended that dismissal based on the
forum-selection clause would be inappropriate for four independent, alternative
reasons. First, Viking argued that “only a small portion of the work NBD
performed on the Viking project was covered by the [W]ork [A]uthorization.”
Id. at 95. Specifically, Viking asserted that NBD’s work occurred in three
phases: the assessment of the damage on behalf of Selective between January 15
and 17, the cleaning and repair work pursuant to the Work Authorization from
mid-day on January 18 through the morning of January 20, and the consulting
work on behalf of Selective on between January 20 and 25. Viking argued that
all of NBD’s “9 or so days” of work on the job are at issue, that “only one-and-
a-half to two days involved the remediation work covered by the [W]ork
[A]uthorization,” and that dismissal based on the Work Authorization would
therefore be improper. Id. Second, Viking asserted that the forum-selection
clause’s provision that “NBD International Inc. shall be entitled to recover the
cost of collection to include reasonable attorney fees” limits the applicability of
the clause to collection actions brought by NBD itself. Third, Viking argued
that the blank Work Authorization “is not sufficiently definite to be a binding
contract.” Id. at 95, 103. And fourth, Viking contended that the forum-
selection clause is unenforceable because (1) “there was no meeting of the
minds or free negotiation regarding the contract in general, let alone the forum
selection clause,” and (2) “enforcement of the forum selection clause is
unreasonable and unjust because it would severely interfere with the orderly
allocation of judicial business, and contradict public interests.” Id. at 96.
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[6] In December 2017, the trial court issued an order denying NBD’s motion to
dismiss. The court agreed with three of Viking’s arguments: that the Work
Authorization covered only a small percentage of NBD’s work, that the blank
Work Authorization form is not sufficiently definite to be a binding contract,
and that the forum-selection clause is unenforceable under the circumstances.
At NBD’s request, the trial court certified its order for interlocutory appeal, and
this Court accepted jurisdiction.2
Discussion and Decision
[7] NBD contends that the trial court erred by denying its motion to dismiss. The
parties agree that our review of the motion is de novo. Appellant’s Br. p. 16;
Appellee’s Br. p. 14.3
[8] NBD begins by challenging the trial court’s conclusion that the Work
Authorization containing the forum-selection clause is not sufficiently definite
to be an enforceable contract. NBD cites our Supreme Court’s holding that
“[a]ll that is required to render a contract enforceable is reasonable certainty in
the terms and conditions of the promises made” and that “absolute certainty in
2
Viking argues that our motions panel erred by accepting jurisdiction and that the appeal should be
dismissed. Having reviewed the matter, we disagree.
3
NBD framed its motion as a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Trial Rule 12(b)(2).
Viking does not dispute that such a motion is the proper mechanism for enforcing a forum-selection clause.
We are not so sure. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 60-61 (2013)
(holding that in federal court “the appropriate way to enforce a forum-selection clause pointing to a state or
foreign forum is through the doctrine of forum non conveniens”). Ultimately, however, we need not express an
opinion on the issue.
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all terms is not required.” Conwell v. Gray Loon Outdoor Mktg. Grp., Inc., 906
N.E.2d 805, 813 (Ind. 2009). NBD contends that the Work Authorization
form, even with the blanks empty, included “all necessary terms[.]” Appellant’s
Br. p. 19. The “Preliminary Scope of Work” section includes the following
introductory language: “The initial focus is to ascertain the logical recovery
process to return customer to operation in as quickly a manner as is reasonably
possible. Therefore, NBD International Inc. is authorized to proceed and
agrees to perform the services including but not limited to the following:”
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 89. The “Direct Authorization” section of the form
includes the following language:
The owner and/or authorized representatives authorize NBD
International Inc. to proceed with mobilization and setup for
disaster recovery services pertaining to the above mentioned
property. It is understood that the customer is responsible for
charges incurred as per this authorization and any change orders
that may be instituted and that NBD may exercise lien right to
secure payment. All costs and charges are due in accordance
with the attached rates. A detailed scope, if needed, and an
estimate will be prepared upon completion of a full site
assessment and survey.
Id. We are inclined to agree with the trial court that these terms are not
sufficiently definite to constitute a binding contract. While the form generally
indicates that NBD will be doing some sort of assessment, it does not identify
any specific work that NBD will be doing, nor does it say how much NBD will
be paid for its work (and the rates were not actually attached). Cf. Paul v. Stone
Artisans, Ltd., 20 N.E.3d 883 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that “a contract
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detailing the cost of the necessary materials and labor needed to install [] new
countertops and backsplashes” contained all essential terms).
[9] But even if we were to assume that the Work Authorization is an enforceable
contract, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that dismissal of Viking’s
entire action against NBD based on the forum-selection clause would be
inappropriate because the Work Authorization (including the forum-selection
clause) applied only to the second of the three phases of NBD’s work: cleaning
and repair.4 NBD does not dispute the trial court’s finding that “all of NBD’s
work is at issue in this case,” Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 8, but it contends
that the three phases were part of a “single business transaction” and that “the
forum selection clause in the Work Authorization is applicable to that entire
transaction,” Appellant’s Br. p. 24.5 NBD asserts that this argument is
supported by our decision in Dexter Axle Co. v. Baan USA, Inc., 833 N.E.2d 43
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005). We disagree.
4
Also for this reason, we need not address the trial court’s alternate conclusion that the forum-selection
clause, even if it were applicable on its face, is unenforceable under the circumstances of this case.
5
In its opening brief, NBD suggests in passing that “Viking’s Complaint appears to only allege claims arising
out of NBD’s performance of ‘cleaning and restoration services in compliance with its agreement,’” i.e., the
second phase of NBD’s work, as opposed to the technical assessment (phase one) or the consulting (phase
three). Appellant’s Br. p. 24. But NBD does not further develop this assertion, focusing instead on its
argument that the three phases were all parts of a “single business transaction.” See id. at 22-26. In its reply
brief, however, NBD argues emphatically that Viking’s claims against it are based on only the “cleaning and
restoration services.” Appellant’s Reply Br. pp. 7-9. An argument raised for the first time in a reply brief is
waived. French v. State, 778 N.E.2d 816, 826 (Ind. 2002). Waiver notwithstanding, a review of Viking’s
complaint, which includes a detailed description of all of NBD’s activities at Viking’s facility, reveals that
Viking’s claims against NBD are not limited to the second phase of NBD’s work.
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[10] Dexter Axle purchased business software from Baan USA pursuant to a
software agreement that did not include a forum-selection clause. One month
later, because Dexter Axle would need Baan USA’s help to implement the
software, the parties entered into a consulting agreement that included a forum-
selection clause that established “exclusive jurisdiction and venue in the state
and federal courts sitting in Santa Clara County, California.” Later that year,
Dexter Axle filed suit against Baan USA in Indiana state court, claiming that
the software was not working as intended. Dexter Axle made a total of twelve
claims relating to the software itself and also to Baan USA’s consulting services.
Baan USA moved to dismiss Dexter Axle’s complaint based on the forum-
selection clause in the consulting agreement. The trial court granted Baan
USA’s motion, and Dexter Axle appealed. Dexter Axle argued, among other
things, that the forum-selection clause in the consulting agreement applied only
to Dexter Axle’s contract claims under that agreement. We disagreed,
explaining that the two agreements “were part of a single business transaction”
directed at the same objective: the licensing and implementation of business
software. Id. at 51. As such, we held that the forum-selection clause in the
consulting agreement applied to all of Dexter Axle’s claims.
[11] This case is distinguishable from Dexter Axle for a very simple reason: the two
agreements that we found to be part of a “single business transaction” in Dexter
Axle were both entered into by the same two parties, and everything Baan USA
did was done for and on behalf of Dexter Axle, pursuant to those two
agreements. Here, on the other hand, NBD performed two of the three phases
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-509 | February 4, 2019 Page 8 of 9
of its work (the initial technical assessment and later the consulting) on behalf
of, and at the direction of, Selective. NBD went to Viking’s facility at
Selective’s behest to do the technical assessment, and later, after Viking halted
NBD’s cleaning and repair work, NBD remained at the facility at Selective’s
behest to do the consulting work. Because those first and third phases of
NBD’s work were not governed by the Work Authorization, the forum-
selection clause in the Work Authorization does not apply to any claims arising
from those two phases. And for that reason, dismissal of Viking’s entire action
against NBD based on the forum-selection clause would be improper.6
[12] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.
6
We need not decide whether Viking’s claims arising from the second phase of NBD’s work should be
isolated, dismissed, and brought in Ohio, since NBD does not make such an argument. NBD’s sole
contention is that all of Viking’s claims against it should be dismissed.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-509 | February 4, 2019 Page 9 of 9
NBD International, Inc. v. Viking, Inc., and Selective Insurance Company of America (mem. dec.)
Combined Opinion