NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted February 6, 2019*
Decided February 6, 2019
Before
DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
No. 18‐2086
JAMES E. MANLEY, Appeal from the United States District
Petitioner‐Appellant, Court for the Southern District of Indiana,
Indianapolis Division.
v. No. 1:16‐cv‐03292
KEITH BUTTS, Tanya Walton Pratt,
Respondent‐Appellee. Judge.
O R D E R
Indiana inmate James Manley petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2254 to contest the discipline he received—loss of earned good‐time credits
and demotion to a lower credit‐earning class—after a hearing officer at New Castle
Correctional Facility found him guilty of being a “habitual conduct rule violator.” The
district court denied Manley’s petition, concluding that Manley received due process
during his disciplinary proceedings. We agree and affirm the judgment.
* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs
and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would
not significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
No. 18‐2086 Page 2
In 2016, a prison disciplinary officer charged Manley with being a “habitual
conduct rule violator,” which the Indiana Department of Corrections defines as an
inmate who has been found guilty of five “unrelated” Class C conduct offenses within
six months. See IND. DEP’T OF CORR., MANUAL OF POLICIES & PROCEDURES, No. 02–04–101,
App. I: Offenses, at 3 (June 2018), www.in.gov/idoc/files/02‐04‐101%20Appendix%20I%
206‐4‐2018.pdf.). The conduct report specified six convictions that Manley had accrued
over a six‐week period, each for refusing a housing assignment in violation of the
Department’s disciplinary code section C‐356. Manley was notified of the charge later
that day and was given a printout listing the underlying offenses and dates of
conviction; the six charges were grouped and adjudicated at disciplinary hearings held
on three different days before hearing officer Tyrone Thompson.
At a hearing on the habitual‐violator charge, Thompson found Manley guilty.
Thompson rejected Manley’s argument that several of the predicate offenses were
“related” because more than one of the disciplinary hearings had been held on the same
day; he deemed the six offenses “unrelated” based on the underlying conduct reports,
which showed that each violation occurred on a different day. In one of its standing
orders, the facility defines multiple assignment‐refusal offenses as “unrelated” if the
refusals occur on different days. As a result of the conviction, Manley lost 90 days of
good‐time credit and was demoted to a lower credit‐earning class.
Manley appealed to Warden Keith Butts, challenging this disciplinary decision
on several grounds, including the adequacy of the notice for his hearing and the
accuracy of the conduct report. Butts denied Manley’s administrative appeal, as did the
state appeal review officer.
Manley then petitioned for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The
district court denied his petition as well as his subsequent motion to alter or amend the
judgment. See FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e).
On appeal, Manley first contends that Thompson was not impartial because he
reviewed the underlying conduct reports. But examining the factual basis for guilt, and
then determining that such a basis exists, does not amount to bias or an impermissible
investigation. See Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666–67 (7th Cir. 2003). Thompson
appropriately reviewed the earlier reports to establish the dates of the qualifying
offenses and thus determine whether the habitual‐violator charge was supportable.
No. 18‐2086 Page 3
Manley next argues that he did not receive sufficient notice that his repeated
refusal to accept housing assignments would render him a habitual‐rule violator
because he did not learn of the standing order defining “unrelated” until after his
hearing. But Manley did not raise this argument in his habeas petition, so it is deemed
waived. See Ben‐Yisrayl v. Neal, 857 F.3d 745, 747 (7th Cir. 2017). In any event, even
without specific awareness of the standing order, Manley reasonably could be expected
to understand that multiple refusals of direct orders—given by a variety of officers on
different days—are not “related” offenses in the commonsense meaning of the word.
Third, Manley contends that he received inadequate administrative review of the
disciplinary decision because Butts did not specifically address the arguments that
formed the basis of his appeal. To the extent that Manley was entitled to meaningful
review at the administrative level, he received it. The warden’s response was not
“merely pro forma.” Forbes v. Trigg, 976 F.2d 308, 320 (7th Cir. 1992). Rather, Butts
generally addressed the substance of Manley’s arguments when he stated that he had
reviewed the conduct report, the disciplinary record, and Thompson’s findings; found
no procedural errors that would have impeded the hearing or appeal process; and
concluded that the conduct report and the evidence in the record supported both the
charge and the sanctions imposed.
Finally, Manley argues that his habitual‐violator conviction violates equal
protection. He points to the Department’s executive directive—issued while his habeas
petition was pending—that bars disciplinary convictions for a different C‐356 offense
(refusing to participate in a state sex‐offender program) from supporting a habitual‐
violator charge. In Manley’s view, “equal protection” requires that this directive apply
to all C‐356 violations, including refusals to accept a housing assignment. But prison
administrators may treat inmates differently so long as their basis for doing so is
“rationally related to a legitimate penological interest.” Flynn v. Thatcher, 819 F.3d 990,
991 (7th Cir. 2016). And it is reasonable for the Department to treat inmates who refuse
to partake in a therapeutic program differently from those who refuse to comply with
direct orders regarding prison housing assignments.
AFFIRMED