Digitally signed by
Reporter of
Decisions
Reason: I attest to
Illinois Official Reports the accuracy and
integrity of this
document
Appellate Court Date: 2019.02.04
15:01:53 -06'00'
In re Marriage of Kranzler, 2018 IL App (1st) 171169
Appellate Court In re MARRIAGE OF ULIANA KRANZLER, Petitioner-Appellant,
Caption and LEONARD KRANZLER, Respondent-Appellee.
District & No. First District, Fourth Division
Docket No. 1-17-1169
Filed September 27, 2018
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 15-D-9295; the
Review Hon. John Thomas Carr, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on Grund & Leavitt, P.C., of Chicago (Marvin J. Leavitt, David C.
Appeal Adams, and Ilene E. Shapiro, of counsel), for appellant.
Davis Friedman, LLP, of Chicago (Míle Knabe, Errol Zavett, and
David M. Goldman, of counsel), for appellee.
Panel JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice McBride and Justice Ellis concurred in the judgment
and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Petitioner Uliana Kranzler appeals the circuit court’s orders granting respondent Leonard
Kranzler’s motion for declaratory judgment and denying her motion to dismiss. We affirm,
based on our conclusions that the circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute
and the parties’ premarital agreement was valid and enforceable.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 On October 9, 1984, Uliana and Leonard married on the same day they executed the
premarital agreement. At the time, Leonard was 47 years old and Uliana was 29 years old and
approximately five months pregnant with the couple’s first child. The parties ultimately had
three children, all of whom were emancipated adults at the time Uliana filed her petition for
dissolution in 2015.
¶4 The agreement provides, inter alia, that (1) any property acquired before marriage would
remain in their individual names upon termination of the marriage and each party waived any
interest in or claim to the other’s property or income; (2) any property acquired jointly during
the marriage would be divided equally upon termination of the marriage or death; (3) provided
they were married at the time of death, Leonard would leave to Uliana a certain percentage of
his net estate, which increased the longer they were married (40% if the parties were married
more than 180 months); and (4) if either party filed for dissolution or separation, Leonard
agreed to pay to Uliana, in lieu of maintenance, a set monthly amount for a certain number of
months, both of which increased the longer they were married. As the parties were married for
more than 240 months, Uliana was entitled to receive $2500 per month for 100 months.
Attached to the agreement was a document disclosing Leonard’s financial condition and
assets, which were approximately $6.9 million in 1984.
¶5 On October 8, 2015, Uliana filed a petition for dissolution of marriage (case No.
15-D-9295). Leonard filed an answer on November 19, 2015, raising no counterclaims.
¶6 On December 10, 2015, Leonard filed a motion for a declaratory judgment under section
2-701 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-701 (West 2014)) requesting that
the circuit court find the premarital agreement valid and enforceable.
¶7 Uliana filed a response and an amended response on July 14, 2016, to Leonard’s motion for
declaratory relief. She also filed a countermotion for declaratory judgment regarding the
agreement. Uliana argued that the agreement was invalid on grounds that it was unfair and
unreasonable; created an unforeseeable condition of penury, was void due to duress, lack of
knowledge, and undue influence; was unconscionable; and was based on an illusory promise.
¶8 On November 14, 2016, Uliana filed a motion for voluntary dismissal of her dissolution
action. On November 15, 2016, Leonard filed a counterpetition for dissolution of marriage and
a motion for leave to file the counterpetition. On November 16, 2016, Leonard filed a response
to Uliana’s motion for voluntary dismissal of her petition, asserting that his motion for
declaratory relief could stand as an independent cause of action surviving the dismissal.
¶9 On November 17, 2016, the circuit court granted Uliana’s motion for voluntary dismissal
of her petition for dissolution, but found that, based on In re Marriage of Best, 228 Ill. 2d 107
(2008), and In re Marriage of Krol, 2015 IL App (1st) 140976, Leonard’s motion for
declaratory judgment constituted an independent action surviving dismissal of her petition. On
-2-
November 18, 2016, the court denied Leonard’s motion for leave to file a counterpetition for
dissolution of marriage.
¶ 10 On November 18, 2016, Leonard initiated a separate dissolution action by filing his own
petition for dissolution of marriage, which proceeded before the same judge (case No.
16-D-10698). He filed a motion to consolidate the two cases but later withdrew it. Uliana filed
an answer and counterclaim, asserting, inter alia, the same arguments she had raised against
the agreement in response to Leonard’s motion for declaratory relief. Leonard moved to
dismiss Uliana’s counterclaims in his dissolution case.
¶ 11 On November 29, 2016, Uliana filed a motion to dismiss Leonard’s motion for declaratory
judgment in the present case on the basis of (1) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and
(2) failure to satisfy the termination-of-controversy required for declaratory relief.
¶ 12 The circuit court denied Uliana’s motion to dismiss Leonard’s motion for declaratory
judgment on January 3, 2017, citing the same reasons it relied on in allowing Leonard’s motion
for a declaratory judgment to survive the dismissal of Uliana’s petition for dissolution. The
court also denied Uliana’s request for a finding that there was no just reason for delaying
appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). In addition, the
circuit court entered an order in Leonard’s dissolution case (case No. 16-D-10698), granting
Leonard’s motion to dismiss most of Uliana’s counterclaims.
¶ 13 A trial on Leonard’s motion for declaratory relief (in case No. 15-D-9295) occurred over
two days. Leonard testified that he and Uliana began dating in August 1983 but continued to
date other people. Within a few months of meeting, Uliana moved into his apartment. At some
point, Uliana became pregnant; she had an abortion after they discussed it. Approximately one
year later, Uliana again became pregnant. Uliana told Leonard that she did not want to have
another abortion. Leonard responded that he understood, but he did not want to get married.
Leonard testified that neither he nor Uliana wanted to get married.
¶ 14 Leonard testified that when his father and Uliana’s father learned of the second pregnancy,
they spoke to each other and then to Leonard about marrying Uliana. “[T]he discussion was get
married, have an antenuptial agreement that allows you to have a short marriage if that is what
you wish, this covers all the bases, the baby will not be born improperly, you will go on with
your lives without great cost emotionally and socially.” Leonard testified that the two fathers
reasoned that the marriage could be short and “[t]he prenup will protect you from serious
financial consequences. If you choose to stay married longer, you can do so. *** And that
seemed like a reasonable compromise so that since there will be no abortion, the baby will
have a name and be a legitimate baby not born out of wedlock.”
¶ 15 Leonard testified that he was persuaded to get married because having a baby out of
wedlock would “affect the child, it would affect my professional standing, reputation, and
Uli[ana]’s reputation.” Leonard testified that he was concerned with the embarrassment it
would bring to him and his family. He also decided to get married out of respect for his father,
although his father would not have disowned or disinherited him. Leonard testified that
Uliana’s father was similarly eager for her to marry because of the concern of bringing shame
to her and her family. Leonard testified that “to a large extent” both he and Uliana were forced
to get married.
¶ 16 Leonard believed his father, who was an attorney, contacted a law firm to draft the
agreement. Leonard believed Uliana’s lawyer was sent a draft of the agreement on September
-3-
27, 1984. Leonard testified that “various versions of the prenup were presented back and forth”
and there were negotiations and revisions by Uliana and her lawyer.
¶ 17 With regard to the execution of the agreement, Leonard testified that “[t]he understanding
was that if she would sign the agreement, I would sign the agreement. And apparently some
many days or weeks went by where she was not signing, I was not signing.” On the evening of
October 9, 1984, his father called him and informed him that Uliana had agreed to sign the
agreement. Leonard “said, well, I had agreed to sign it if she did also. So I left what I was doing
and went to the apartment, and the rest followed.”
¶ 18 When he arrived at his apartment, his father, Uliana’s father, Uliana, a rabbi, and a mutual
friend were already there. He believed Uliana signed the document around 7, 8, or 9 p.m. that
evening. Leonard testified that they did not discuss anything but sat down at the dining room
table and signed the agreement. Uliana initialed each page and signed it. He did not force her to
sign it. Uliana was five months pregnant at the time. She was experiencing a difficult
pregnancy as “she was nauseated, retching, and she had to eat continuously,” but he did not
notice these symptoms that evening. Leonard described Uliana’s demeanor at the time as
“normal” and “composed”; she did not appear to be upset. A list of Leonard’s assets, liabilities,
and income was attached to the agreement. Leonard made one alteration when he signed the
agreement, which was to extend the time period Uliana would receive alimony from 24 months
to 36 months if they were married for less than 24 months. The wedding ceremony occurred
immediately afterwards on the balcony of their apartment.
¶ 19 Leonard testified that he and Uliana lived together for a year or a year and a half before
they married. They did not have a formal financial arrangement; she asked him for money
whenever she needed it. They lived in a 3500 square foot apartment on Lake Shore Drive
which cost approximately $3500 per month. Leonard was a physician at the time and he
obtained a law degree during the marriage. Uliana worked in a real estate office as either the
office manager or a “high-level secretary.” She stopped working shortly after they married.
¶ 20 Leonard conceded that after Uliana filed the petition for dissolution, he created an estate
plan that was not in conformance with the agreement. He subsequently modified it to conform
to the agreement.1 She also had a life insurance policy for him.
¶ 21 Uliana testified that she is originally from Europe and came to the United States in 1972.
She attended the University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, graduating in 1979 with a degree in
communications, speech, and theater, and a minor in Biology. She worked throughout high
school and college and paid for her education. She has previously worked as a babysitter,
instructor at a health club, manager of a health club, and in a real estate office. Uliana survived
cervical cancer when she was 24 years old.
¶ 22 She testified that she became pregnant in 1982. When her mother, who was a “Ph.D.
nurse,” realized Uliana was pregnant, her mother disowned her, so she moved in with Leonard.
She got an abortion. At the time, she was 26 years old and Leonard was 44 years old.
¶ 23 Uliana became pregnant again in 1984. Uliana testified that she and Leonard did not really
discuss marriage. Uliana testified Leonard “was not unhappy or happy. But he didn’t promote
1
On October 21, 2016, Uliana filed a motion for mandatory temporary injunctive relief, arguing
that the agreement provided that Leonard shall leave 40% of his net estate to Uliana if they were
married at the time of his death and had been married for more than 20 years. Uliana asserted that
Leonard executed a will in which he left her only one-eighth of his estate.
-4-
the marriage. And I stated to him I will not have another abortion. I would have a child, and I
don’t need to be married. I will not—I am not looking for marriage, but I will not kill another
baby.” She testified that she did not want to get married because she felt that Leonard wanted
her to have another abortion; he did not push marriage but instead avoided the situation and her
by coming home late from work.
¶ 24 Uliana testified that she could not support herself at the time. She was “running the front
desk” of a real estate office and earned “a couple hundred dollars” per week. She was also
making payments on her own car. She worked full time until January 1985, approximately one
and a half months before she gave birth. She testified that she experienced a “toxic pregnancy”;
she was “throwing up day and night,” ate bread or bagels constantly, and had to take a
two-hour lunch at work in order to take a nap due to fatigue. She experienced edema in her feet
and became “tremendously overweight.”
¶ 25 Uliana did not tell her father about the pregnancy until she was over four months along
because she knew she would “break his heart” since he was “old fashioned.” Her father asked
about marriage, but she informed him that she and Leonard did not want to get married. Her
father refused to speak to her for one month after that. Her father stated that he would “disown
me to have a bastard of a child.” Uliana testified that Leonard’s father spoke with her father
and they then told Uliana “you need to get married because you don’t want to have a bastard
for a child.” They called her every day. She testified that she trusted Leonard’s father “[f]or his
advice and for his tremendous care of me, calling me, asking me how I feel *** on a daily
basis.”
¶ 26 Uliana testified that when she was four and a half months pregnant, Leonard presented her
with “a prenup” and told her “the only way we could get married is if you sign this prenup.”
Uliana testified that Leonard gave her the draft agreement in September and stated “this is a
prenup. If you want to sign this, I guess we will get married.”
¶ 27 She read the agreement, but could not understand it. She called Leonard’s father because
he was “[a] lawyer and I trusted him *** to guide me on the prenup, to say—I didn’t
understand. I have never heard of prenups.” He told Uliana to look for an attorney. Through a
colleague, she found a lawyer to examine it. She met with him once to review the agreement.
¶ 28 Approximately one week after Leonard presented her with the agreement, Uliana informed
him that she did not want to sign it. She testified that Leonard “didn’t say anything. I said I am
not signing it and I am not going through this. I don’t need to marry you. I am going to have a
child. I am happy to have a child and to raise a child.”
¶ 29 Uliana testified that she did not want to marry Leonard. However, she ultimately married
him anyway because “[b]eing called daily and being told by two separate people that were
fathers, his father, my father saying you can’t have a child that is a bastard. You cannot do that.
Think of your child. The child needs a name. And, of course, I was sicker and sicker, gaining
more weight. Had edema, swelling feet, couldn’t walk.” She was hospitalized three or four
times for dehydration during her pregnancy.
¶ 30 Uliana testified that on October 9, 1984, she came home from work at 6 p.m. and Leonard
arrived at 9 p.m. and told her “we get married tonight or never” and “here is the prenup. And if
you don’t sign it, we will not get married anymore. That’s it. This is the last chance.” Leonard
informed her that his parents were coming over for the Jewish holiday, Sukkot, and “[w]e get
married today or never, and you got to sign this. Without this, we don’t get married.” Uliana
testified that it took her 20 to 30 minutes to sign it. None of her friends or family were present;
-5-
her father was at work and her brother lived in Wisconsin. She initialed every page but did not
read it. She did not make any changes to it. She then signed the ketubah and the ceremony was
held “[a] few minutes before midnight.” Leonard’s father and mother, Leonard’s sister and her
husband, the rabbi, and their mutual friend and his wife were present. Uliana testified that she
was five months pregnant at the time; she felt fatigued and tired and “couldn’t even keep my
head up.” She testified that she threw up in the bathroom a few times and then went out onto
the balcony, where the ceremony occurred. She testified that she leaned against a post during
the ceremony because her feet were so swollen.
¶ 31 Uliana testified that she had last seen the agreement in September when she reviewed it
with her lawyer, but she did not understand what she would receive in the event of divorce or
what she was giving up. She had a copy of it at home. She testified that she was not aware of
the value of Leonard’s estate before she married him, although she was presented with the
exhibit attached to the agreement when she met with her lawyer.
¶ 32 She testified that Leonard supported her financially during the marriage and she did not
have other assets. He gives her a $1000 a month “allowance” for food and clothing and covers
her travel expenses separately. She owns a house in Michigan jointly with her three children
that she estimates is worth $200,000. She also owns five cemetery plots. Uliana testified that
she currently manages four residential real estate rental properties that Leonard owns. She
lives in the couple’s 5500 square foot home. The property they lived in before that was also a
5500 square foot custom-built home. They also have a 3600 square foot penthouse in Florida.
She drove Lexus vehicles for most of their marriage. They vacationed in Florida every year,
traveled internationally, and attended the opera, symphony, and theater.
¶ 33 She testified that $2500 per month would not cover her current medical bills. Regarding
her current health status and medical expenses, Uliana testified that she had abnormal tissue
removed from her breast in 2009 and suffered an infection when her implant was removed. She
is also diabetic and suffers from high blood pressure, depression, and severe osteoporosis,
which requires a $1600 shot twice a year to treat. She suffers from complications as a result of
bariatric surgery in 2006. She needs a hip replacement but cannot afford it. She is in chronic
pain and is qualified to receive a morphine pump.
¶ 34 On May 1, 2017, the circuit court entered an order in which it found that the agreement was
valid and enforceable and granted Leonard’s motion for declaratory relief. The circuit court’s
order provided:
“A. When petitioner and respondent signed the Antenuptial Agreement it was fair
and reasonable.
B. Uliana Kranzler did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that the
Antenuptial Agreement was the product of fraud, duress, or coercion.
C. Neither party particularly wanted to get married.
D. Uliana Kranzler although she did not read the Antenuptial Agreement on the day
she signed it, she was represented by counsel and had the opportunity to be advised on
the Antenuptial Agreement and the time to read and understand the agreement.
E. The parties may have contemplated a short marriage and the court observes that
the Premarital Agreement Act, enacted after the parties’ marriage, the court believes
redefines penury differently than prior case law.
-6-
F. If there was any coercion on the parties, who *** married for religious/ cultural
reasons, it came from their parents, but that does not amount to the coercion or duress
contemplated by the case law.
G. The court finds that the award of scheduled payments are sufficient in the
circumstances may have been on the low side of fair and reasonable but even so
especially when coupled with the award of a portion of Leonard Kranzler’s estate,
given the age differences between the parties, that the Antenuptial Agreement is fair
and reasonable.
H. Uliana Kranzler entered into the Antenuptial Agreement voluntarily.
I. The Antenuptial Agreement in the event of Leonard’s death did not differentiate
between his separate estate and his entire estate.”
¶ 35 The trial court included a Rule 304(a) finding. Uliana filed a timely notice of appeal from
the May 1, 2017, order.
¶ 36 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 37 A. Standard of Review
¶ 38 A motion to dismiss brought pursuant to section 2-619(a)(1) of the Code (735 ILCS
5/2-619(a)(1) (West 2014)) permits involuntary dismissal of an action based on lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. We review de novo the trial court’s decision to grant or deny a
motion under this section. R.L. Vollintine Construction, Inc. v. Illinois Capital Development
Board, 2014 IL App (4th) 130824, ¶ 23. In doing so, we must interpret the pleadings and any
supporting documents in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.
¶ 39 The appropriate standard of review to be applied to declaratory judgments depends on the
underlying questions at issue and “the nature of the proceedings in the trial court.” Pekin
Insurance Co. v. Hallmark Homes, L.L.C., 392 Ill. App. 3d 589, 593 (2009). “A premarital
agreement is a contract ***.” In re Marriage of Heinrich, 2014 IL App (2d) 121333, ¶ 40. The
interpretation of a contract and whether a valid contract exists are determinations reviewed
de novo, to the extent the facts are undisputed. Id.; In re Marriage of Rife, 376 Ill. App. 3d
1050, 1054 (2007). We review factual issues under the manifest weight standard, that is, we
reverse only if an opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s,
London v. Abbott Laboratories, 2014 IL App (1st) 132020, ¶ 48.
¶ 40 B. Uliana’s Motion to Dismiss Leonard’s Motion for Declaratory Judgment
¶ 41 On appeal, Uliana first contends that the circuit court erred in denying her motion to
dismiss Leonard’s motion for declaratory judgment because the court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction over Leonard’s motion after she voluntarily dismissed her petition for dissolution.
¶ 42 Leonard responds that his request for declaratory relief was based on distinct statutory
grounds from Uliana’s petition for dissolution of marriage and constituted an independent
controversy which could stand on its own.
¶ 43 Circuit courts of our State possess original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters brought
before it. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 9; In re Luis R., 239 Ill. 2d 295, 301 (2010). “This court
defines subject-matter jurisdiction as a court’s power to hear and determine cases of the
general class to which the proceeding in question belongs.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Luis R., 239 Ill. 2d at 300. To invoke the circuit court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, the
-7-
complaint or petition must allege the existence of justiciable matter. Id. at 300-01. “Generally
speaking, a ‘justiciable matter’ is ‘a controversy appropriate for review by the court, in that it is
definite and concrete, as opposed to hypothetical or moot, touching upon the legal relations of
parties having adverse legal interests.’ ” Id. at 301 (quoting Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 335 (2002)). “In other words, the only consideration
is whether the alleged claim falls within the general class of cases that the court has the
inherent power to hear and determine.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id.
¶ 44 The parties do not dispute that the circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction over
Uliana’s petition for dissolution of marriage, which she brought under the Illinois Marriage
and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Marriage Act) (750 ILCS 5/101 et seq. (West 2014)). Such
jurisdiction is statutorily conferred. In re Marriage of Milliken, 199 Ill. App. 3d 813, 817
(1990) (“The jurisdiction of a court in a dissolution proceeding is limited to that conferred by
statute.”).
¶ 45 Leonard filed his motion for declaratory relief under section 2-701 of the Code. Subsection
(a) of this statute provides that a court
“may, in cases of actual controversy, make binding declarations of rights, having the
force of final judgments, whether or not any consequential relief is or could be claimed,
including the determination, at the instance of anyone interested in the controversy, of
the construction of any *** contract or other written instrument, and a declaration of
the rights of the parties interested. *** The court shall refuse to enter a declaratory
judgment or order, if it appears that the judgment or order, would not terminate the
controversy or some part thereof, giving rise to the proceeding.” 735 ILCS 5/2-701(a)
(West 2014).
¶ 46 Under subsection 2-701(b), a “[d]eclarations of rights, as herein provided for, may be
obtained by means of a pleading seeking that relief alone, or as incident to or part of a
complaint, counterclaim or other pleading seeking other relief as well.” Id. § 2-701(b).
¶ 47 Uliana argues that the validity of the agreement was merely an ancillary issue to her
petition for dissolution and the jurisdictional basis to decide it did not survive the voluntary
dismissal of her petition. She relies on In re Marriage of Leopando, 96 Ill. 2d 114, 119-20
(1983), where our supreme court held that a dissolution proceeding constituted only a single
claim, and therefore, rulings on other issues raised within that proceeding, such as custody
matters, were merely ancillary issues and not separate claims individually appealable under
Rule 304(a).
¶ 48 More recently, however, our supreme court in Best, 228 Ill. 2d at 119, found that an
appellate court may consider a declaratory judgment motion concerning the validity and effect
of a premarital agreement before a final dissolution order has been entered, as long as the
requirements under section 2-701 have been met. In Best, the husband petitioned for
dissolution of the marriage and later filed a motion, as part of the dissolution case and not as a
separate action or case, for a declaratory judgment regarding the validity and construction of
the parties’ premarital agreement. Id. at 109-112. The trial court found the premarital
agreement valid and enforceable and included Rule 304(a) language in its order; the husband
appealed the order while the dissolution proceeding remained pending. Id. The Best court
distinguished Leopando, observing that only the Marriage Act was at issue in Leopando,
whereas the petitioner in Best sought not only nondeclaratory relief (dissolution of marriage)
under the Marriage Act but also declaratory relief under section 2-701 and the Illinois Uniform
-8-
Premarital Agreement Act (750 ILCS 10/1 et seq. (West 2004)) (to address the validity and
construction of the premarital agreement). Best, 228 Ill. 2d at 114-15. Unlike Leopando, “the
two requests for relief here had distinctly different statutory bases.” Id. at 115. In further
distinction, assuming the request for declaratory relief met the statutory requirements, a
declaratory judgment could be entered even if the dissolution petition was not granted. Id.
Additionally, the declaratory judgment in Best did not make actual awards in the pending
dissolution matter, unlike in Leopando. Id. As such, the court held the petitioner’s two actions
in the dissolution proceeding were “not so closely related that they must be deemed part of a
single claim for relief, as they were in Leopando.” Id.
¶ 49 The petitioner in Best also argued that the termination-of-controversy requirement in
section 2-701(a) was met despite the fact that ruling on the declaratory judgment motion would
not resolve the dissolution petition or any claims for fees or support. Our supreme court held
that because the Marriage Act incorporates the Civil Practice Law (735 ILCS 5/2-101 et seq.
(West 2004)), “the legislature expressly provided for the entry of declaratory judgments in
dissolution cases.” Best, 228 Ill. 2d at 116. “[A] reviewing court may consider the validity and
effect of a declaratory judgment order in a dissolution proceeding, even if it is entered before
the final dissolution order, if the prerequisites of the declaratory judgment statute are met.” Id.
at 119. Thus, the court concluded that under section 2-701(a), “a declaratory judgment of the
parties’ rights under the premarital agreement is proper if: (1) there is an actual controversy;
and (2) entry of a declaratory judgment would terminate ‘some part’ of that controversy (735
ILCS 5/2-701(a) (West 2004)).” Best, 228 Ill. 2d at 116-17. It was undisputed that an actual
controversy existed in Best. The court found that the second statutory criterion was also met
because a declaratory judgment would end “some part” of the controversy, i.e., a ruling on the
validity and application of the premarital agreement would determine various rights of the
parties in the dissolution proceeding and “terminate a significant part” of the controversy. Id. at
117.
¶ 50 We also find Krol, 2015 IL App (1st) 140976, ¶ 22, helpful in analyzing whether Leonard’s
motion could stand on its own. In Krol, the father filed a petition for dissolution in Polish court
and the mother subsequently filed a petition for dissolution and custody in the circuit court of
Cook County. The father then filed a petition in the Cook County case under the Convention
on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89),
requesting a decision on the habitual residence of the child. After the mother voluntarily
dismissed her petition, this court held that the father’s “Hague petition should be treated as an
independent action that survives the dismissal of the petition for dissolution of marriage” given
its independent statutory grounds and the “Hague petition could have initiated a cause of
action” on its own. Id.
¶ 51 Along similar lines, the court in Rife, 376 Ill. App. 3d at 1061-62, held that a petition for
declaratory relief “raised an independent controversy” that satisfied the requirements of
section 2-701(a), despite being filed after a dissolution judgment was entered. The respondent
filed several petitions to modify the dissolution judgment, the petitioner filed responses, and
the respondent then filed a petition for declaratory relief, claiming that the petitioner’s
response constituted a counterpetition and triggered a modification clause in the dissolution
judgment. Id. at 1052-53. The petitioner asserted that the declaratory action would not
terminate some or all of the controversy. Id. at 1061. The appellate court found the declaratory
-9-
action “raised an independent controversy, one that did not depend on the resolution of any
other that was pending.” Id. at 1062.
¶ 52 Uliana argues that Leonard’s motion for declaratory relief cannot stand on its own because
there was no “actual controversy” remaining after she voluntarily dismissed her petition and
(2) the motion for declaratory relief should have been dismissed because it failed to satisfy the
“termination of controversy” requirement under section 2-701(a). She argues that upon
voluntary dismissal of her petition, she essentially no longer disputed the enforceability of the
agreement and Leonard’s motion became moot.
¶ 53 We find that both of the requirements for declaratory relief outlined in Best are satisfied in
the present case. See Best, 228 Ill. 2d at 117. Our supreme court has explained that an “actual
controversy” under section 2-701
“does not mean that a wrong must have been committed and injury inflicted. Rather, it
requires a showing that the underlying facts and issues of the case are not moot or
premature, so as to require the court to pass judgment on mere abstract propositions of
law, render an advisory opinion, or give legal advice as to future events.” Underground
Contractors Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 66 Ill. 2d 371, 375 (1977).
The underlying purpose of section 2-701 is “to allow the court to address a controversy one
step sooner than normal, after a dispute has arisen but prior to any action which gives rise to a
claim for damages or other relief.” Delano Law Offices, P.C. v. Choi, 154 Ill. App. 3d 172, 173
(1987). As such, an actual controversy requires “a concrete dispute admitting of an immediate
and definitive determination of the parties’ rights, the resolution of which will aid in the
termination of the controversy or some part thereof.” Underground Contractors, 66 Ill. 2d at
375.
¶ 54 In the present case, at the time the circuit court considered Uliana’s motion for voluntary
dismissal of her petition for dissolution, an active controversy regarding the agreement
remained. There were several matters pending before the court, e.g., Leonard’s motion for
declaratory relief concerning the agreement, Uliana’s countermotion for declaratory relief to
find the agreement invalid, and Leonard’s motion for leave to file a counterpetition for
dissolution of marriage. Uliana had also filed a motion for injunctive relief claiming that
Leonard violated the agreement in executing a will after she filed for divorce in which he left
her one-eighth, instead of 40%, of his estate. Additionally, at the time the trial court considered
and denied Uliana’s subsequent motion to dismiss Leonard’s declaratory judgment action,
Leonard had already initiated a separate dissolution action by filing his own petition for
dissolution, which remained pending. Notably, Uliana raised as counterclaims in Leonard’s
dissolution case the same arguments she raises against the declaratory judgment action in the
present case. Thus, it is clear from the record that an actual controversy existed regarding the
validity and enforceability of the agreement at the time the circuit court made the pertinent
rulings. The validity and enforceability of the agreement was not merely an ancillary issue like
in Leopando. Rather, it formed a separate claim for relief based on separate statutory grounds,
similar to Best, Krol, and Rife.
¶ 55 Additionally, we find the trial court’s ruling on Leonard’s motion for declaratory judgment
would terminate “some part” of the parties’ controversy. Best, 228 Ill. 2d at 117. As the
supreme court observed in Best, 228 Ill. 2d at 117, such a ruling would determine whether the
premarital agreement controls “various facets of the parties’ rights in the pending dissolution
proceeding.”
- 10 -
¶ 56 Uliana also contends that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because Leonard did
not file his motion as a separate pleading or counterclaim or pay a fee for filing a counterlcaim.
However, in Best, the petitioner filed a motion for declaratory judgment as part of the
dissolution case and not as a separate pleading or counterclaim. Id. at 110. Thus, the fact that
Leonard’s declaratory judgment request was not titled “counterclaim” did not deprive the
circuit court of subject-matter jurisdiction. Moreover, “the caption of a motion is not
controlling; the character of the pleading is determined from its content, not its label.”
Sarkissian v. Chicago Board of Education, 201 Ill. 2d 95, 102 (2002) (citing Barnes v.
Southern Ry. Co., 116 Ill. 2d 236 (1987)).
¶ 57 Accordingly, we find that the court had subject-matter jurisdiction to consider Leonard’s
motion for declaratory judgment.2
¶ 58 C. Validity of the Antenuptial Agreement
¶ 59 We now turn to Uliana’s challenge to the trial court’s decision to grant Leonard’s motion
for declaratory judgment and determination that the agreement was valid and enforceable.
¶ 60 i. Illinois Uniform Premarital Agreement Act
¶ 61 Uliana argues that the circuit court erred as a matter of law because it applied the Illinois
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (Premarital Agreement Act) (750 ILCS 10/1 et seq. (West
2014)). Uliana points to the trial court’s statement in its written order that “the parties may
have contemplated a short marriage and the court observes that the Premarital Agreement Act
enacted after the parties’ marriage the court believes redefines penury differently than prior
case law.”
¶ 62 It is undisputed that the Premarital Agreement Act does not apply to the agreement here,
which the parties executed on October 9, 1984. See Heinrich, 2014 IL App (2d) 121333, ¶ 49
(the Premarital Agreement Act applies to “any prenuptial agreement executed on or after
January 1, 1990”). A closer examination of the circuit court’s written order demonstrates that it
understood it was applying common law and not the Premarital Agreement Act. The trial
court’s reference to the Premarital Agreement Act was merely a general observation, as it
noted that the Premarital Agreement Act was enacted after the parties entered into the
agreement. The circuit court made findings specific to pre-Premarital Agreement Act
decisional law.
¶ 63 Prior to the enactment of the Premarital Agreement Act, Illinois common law provided that
a premarital agreement that governed property and maintenance rights was
2
In ruling, we note that, at several points in his response brief, Leonard requests this court take
notice of matters outside the record and refers to documents that were not part of the instant proceeding
in the circuit court. We previously denied his motion to supplement the record. While we decline
Uliana’s request to strike his brief en toto, we disregard any improper argument or reference to facts not
supported by the available lower court record. “[A] party may not rely on matters outside the record to
support its position on appeal ***.” In re Marriage of Reidy, 2018 IL App (1st) 170054, ¶ 20. See In re
Marriage of Iqbal, 2014 IL App (2d) 131306, ¶ 14 (striking a brief for failure to comply with Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 341 (eff. Mar. 16, 2007) is “a harsh sanction” appropriate “only when the
procedural violations interfere with our review”).
- 11 -
“valid and enforceable as long as three conditions are met: (1) the agreement does not
create an unforeseen condition of penury due to one spouse’s lack of property or
employability; (2) the parties entered into the agreement with full knowledge, free of
fraud, duress, or coercion; and (3) the agreement is fair and reasonable.” Berger v.
Berger, 357 Ill. App. 3d 651, 656 (2005).
¶ 64 Here, the circuit court held that the agreement was fair and reasonable; was not the product
of fraud, duress, or coercion; that Uliana had the opportunity to read and understand the
agreement and consult with counsel; and that Uliana entered into the agreement voluntarily. At
the hearing on Leonard’s motion, the court observed that “penury is not in the present statute”
and stated that it was holding “as a matter of law” penury did not exist at the time the
agreement was executed in 1984.
¶ 65 In contrast, under the Premarital Agreement Act, a premarital agreement is unenforceable
if the party challenging it proves that
“(1) he or she did not execute the agreement voluntarily; or (2) the agreement was
unconscionable when it was executed and, before execution of the agreement, the party
was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the other’s property, did not waive
the right to such disclosure in writing, and did not have (and could not reasonably have
had) an adequate knowledge of the other’s property.” Heinrich, 2014 IL App (2d)
121333, ¶ 49 (citing 750 ILCS 10/7(a) (West 2012)).
Here, the circuit court made no findings regarding whether the agreement was unconscionable
or whether there was full financial disclosure.
¶ 66 Accordingly, we find that the trial court applied the correct law in assessing the validity of
the agreement. Regardless, “[a] court of review may affirm a trial court’s judgment upon any
ground appearing in the record, regardless of whether it was relied upon by the trial court and
regardless of whether the reasoning of the trial court was correct.” In re Marriage of Lehr, 317
Ill. App. 3d 853, 862 (2000); see also In re Marriage of Murphy, 359 Ill. App. 3d 289, 300
(2005).
¶ 67 ii. Penury
¶ 68 Uliana contends that, contrary to the circuit court’s ruling, the agreement should be
invalidated as it created an unforeseen condition of penury given her poor health, medical
costs, and her lack of employability due to her age, health, and the fact that she stopped
working shortly after getting married. Berger, 357 Ill. App. 3d at 656.
¶ 69 Here, the court found that at the time the parties signed the agreement, it did not create an
unforeseen condition of penury and was fair and reasonable given the parties’ age difference,
the maintenance provision and the estate provision, and the fact that they may have
contemplated a short marriage.
¶ 70 In comparison, in Warren v. Warren, 169 Ill. App. 3d 226, 228 (1988), the premarital
agreement gave the wife no rights to marital property, maintenance, or attorney fees upon
dissolution of marriage. The wife worked as a secretary before marriage and had a net worth of
$70,000, while her oil executive husband had a net worth of $7 million. The parties lived
together for three years before getting married, and she quit her job at the husband’s request.
Id. at 228. Although the court ultimately found the total waiver of maintenance provision
unenforceable on other grounds, the court concluded that the wife would not be reduced to an
- 12 -
unforeseen condition of penury because, although her assets were modest in comparison, they
were sufficient, and the fact that she voluntarily quit her employment one year before the
marriage made her lack of future employability foreseeable. Id. at 230-31.
¶ 71 Similarly, in In re Marriage of Barnes, 324 Ill. App. 3d 514, 522-23 (2001), the appellate
court upheld the parties’ premarital agreement in which the wife waived all maintenance other
than a stipulated amount tied to the length of the marriage ($10,000 after seven years of
marriage). The court found that the agreement “reflected the gross disparity in the parties’
assets and income at the time of marriage.” Id. at 523. Although the wife enjoyed a lifestyle
beyond what she could have afforded on her own and was earning a salary of only $24,000 at
the time of trial, there was no undue hardship or unforeseen circumstances considering she
knew the husband’s income far exceeded her own at the time she entered into the agreement
and the fact that it was the husband’s fifth marriage. Id. at 523-24.
¶ 72 Based on Warren and Barnes, we find no error in the circuit court’s decision here. Unlike
in Warren, where the agreement provided for absolutely no financial settlement upon divorce,
Uliana was entitled to receive a monthly payment in maintenance which increased in amount
and number of months in proportion to the length of the parties’ marriage. As the parties were
married for over 30 years at the time the petition was filed, Uliana was to receive $2500 per
month for 100 months. The agreement further provides Uliana with all property in her name,
such as the house in Michigan worth $200,000, in addition to half of all marital property. The
agreement further required Leonard to leave Uliana 40% of his net estate upon death.
¶ 73 In addition, Uliana was familiar of Leonard’s income and wealth before signing the
agreement. Uliana lived with Leonard for approximately one or two years before the parties
married. They lived in a 3500 square foot apartment which costs $3500 per month, and he
would give her money as needed and he was supporting her financially before they married.
Thus, similar to the situation in Barnes, the agreement reflected the parties’ disparity of
income and assets before the marriage. It was foreseeable that a withdrawal of this support in
the future would affect her standard of living. At the time the parties signed the agreement,
Uliana was working full time in a real estate office, paying for her own vehicle, and earning “a
couple hundred dollars” per week. Given that she quit her job shortly after the parties signed
the agreement and married, her claimed lack of employability was foreseeable. We note that
Uliana testified that she currently manages four residential real estate rental properties for
Leonard. She has previously worked at other positions of responsibility, including managing a
health club, she possesses a college education, and she is fluent in several languages.
¶ 74 The court found that at the time the parties signed the agreement, it did not create an
unforeseen condition of penury and was fair and reasonable given the parties’ age difference,
the maintenance provision and the estate provision, and the fact that they may have
contemplated a short marriage. We cannot say that the court’s factual determinations in that
regard were manifestly erroneous. See Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 2014 IL App
(1st) 132020, ¶ 50. Considering that the maintenance and property waiver provisions are more
generous here than in Warren, we find no error in the trial court’s determination that, at the
time of signing, the agreement would not give rise to an unforeseen condition of penury.
¶ 75 In asserting that the trial court erred, Uliana relies on cases from other jurisdictions. See
Hill v. Hill, 356 N.W.2d 49, 55-58 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (upholding validity of antenuptial
agreement but finding that the maintenance provision was unconscionable under Minnesota
law given the wife’s poor health, emotional problems, and lack of earning capacity). “The
- 13 -
decisions of foreign courts are not binding on Illinois courts ***.” People v. Applewhite, 2016
IL App (1st) 142330, ¶ 23. We are persuaded by Warren and Barnes.
¶ 76 iii. Duress and Undue Influence
¶ 77 We next address jointly Uliana’s contentions that the circuit court erred in finding that the
agreement was not procured under duress or by undue influence, as she raises similar
arguments for each issue. She asserts that a confidential relationship existed between her and
Leonard, that she was 16 years younger than him, foreign born, a non-native English speaker,
from a sheltered background with less education and was physically ill due to her pregnancy
when she signed the agreement.
¶ 78 “Duress has been defined as including the imposition, oppression, undue influence or the
taking of undue advantage of the stress of another whereby one is deprived of the exercise of
his free will.” In re Marriage of Hamm-Smith, 261 Ill. App. 3d 209, 215 (1994). Undue
influence is an improper “urgency of persuasion whereby the will of a person is overpowered
and he is induced to do or forbear an act which he would not do or would do if left to act
freely.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kuster v. Schaumburg, 276 Ill. App. 3d 220, 224
(1995). “The person asserting duress has the burden of proving, by clear and convincing
evidence, that he was bereft of the quality of mind essential to the making of the contract.”
Hamm-Smith, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 215.
¶ 79 We find no error in the trial court’s determination that Uliana did not enter into the
agreement under duress. “One party’s agreement to marry is in and of itself sufficient
consideration for financial concessions by the other party in the context of a premarital
agreement.” Barnes, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 519. Conditioning marriage on the execution of the
agreement did not constitute coercion. Id. Both parties could have remained single. Both
parties testified that they did not particularly want to marry each other but did so primarily to
avoid the stigma attached to having a baby out of wedlock within their religious and cultural
traditions. Considering the testimony presented, the trial court’s factual determinations were
not manifestly erroneous. See Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 2014 IL App (1st)
132020, ¶ 50. According to Uliana’s own testimony, she did not want to marry Leonard; she
informed Leonard that she wanted to have the baby and she did not “need to be married. *** I
am not looking for marriage, but I will not kill another baby.” Despite Uliana’s assertion on
appeal that she was unable to support herself, was dependent on Leonard at the time she
executed the agreement, and that she was in “desperate straits, both emotionally and
financially,” she testified that she told Leonard she was prepared to go ahead with the
pregnancy without him. She initially refused to sign the agreement, telling Leonard that “I
don’t need to marry you. *** I am happy to have a child and to raise a child.” Uliana was 29
years old at the time she signed the agreement. She had survived cancer at the young age of 24.
She worked her way through college without debt, was making payments on her own
automobile, had held several positions of responsibility in the workforce, and was working full
time. She had lived in different countries and spoke four languages.
¶ 80 Although Uliana argues that she was ill at the time due to the pregnancy, she nevertheless
testified that she was still working. She also obtained a lawyer, had him examine the agreement
and explain it to her, and had various revisions and drafts made. Despite Uliana’s contention
that she did not feel well on the evening she signed the agreement and the wedding occurred,
she had several weeks to review it prior to that evening. She received the agreement in
- 14 -
September, reviewed it with her lawyer, had a copy at home, and did not sign it until October.
She also conceded that she was presented with the exhibit attached to the agreement that
disclosed Leonard’s assets, debts, and income. There was no evidence that anyone rushed her
to sign the agreement or prevented her from reading it again that evening. In sum, the evidence
did not establish that, due to her difficult pregnancy, Uliana was “bereft of the quality of mind
essential to the making of the contract.” Hamm-Smith, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 215. An opposite
conclusion is not clearly apparent. See Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 2014 IL App
(1st) 132020, ¶ 50.
¶ 81 Uliana contends that she faced tremendous pressure to get married from her father and
Leonard’s father. However, the testimony from both parties indicated that this pressure did not
come from Leonard. He simply presented her with a premarital agreement and stated that they
could get married if she signed it. Even if we were to consider the actions of the parties’
fathers, “threats cannot constitute duress unless they are legally or morally wrong,” (Barnes,
324 Ill. App. 3d at 519) and there was no evidence that they did anything legally or morally
wrong that would amount to coercing Uliana to sign the agreement. The evidence did not
establish that the fathers’ attempts to convince their children to marry to avoid having a child
out of wedlock deprived Uliana of the exercise of her free will. See Hamm-Smith, 261 Ill. App.
3d at 215.
¶ 82 In addition, the agreement itself provided that it had been reviewed by each party with the
assistance of counsel of their choice who advised them regarding the agreement and their
rights, and it “is believed by them to be fair, just, and equitable with respect to each of them.” It
provided that the agreement was made and entered into by the parties “consequent to a full,
fair, and complete disclosure by each of the said parties to the other of the nature, extent, and
value or his or her property, assets indebtedness, and income.” Uliana does not dispute that she
initialed each page and signed the document. See Warren, 169 Ill. App. 3d at 229-30 (finding
that the wife signed the premarital agreement knowingly and in absence of any fraud or
coercion where she had opportunity to seek legal counsel, the agreement was explained by the
husband’s counsel prior to signing, she was not inexperienced in the ways of the business
world, the husband provided a general disclosure of his financial status, she lived with him and
had worked for the same company, the marriage occurred two months after the agreement was
executed, and the wife was in good spirits at the time of execution despite her own testimony
that she cried on the way to sign the agreement).
¶ 83 In conjunction with her undue influence claim, Uliana asserts that Leonard took advantage
of a confidential relationship between them as they were engaged to be married. “Parties
engaged to be married, prior to signing a prenuptial agreement, are in a confidential
relationship with each other.” In re Marriage of Drag, 326 Ill. App. 3d 1051, 1056 (2002).
“[I]f the provisions made for the wife are disproportionate to the extent and value of the
husband’s estate, the presumption is raised that the husband intentionally concealed his
assets, and the burden shifts to those claiming the validity of the agreement to prove
that the wife had full knowledge of the husband’s property.” In re Estate of Hopkins,
166 Ill. App. 3d 652, 656 (1988).
However, “[t]his presumption arises only when there is an engagement between the parties,
placing them in a confidential relationship.” In re Marriage of Sokolowski, 232 Ill. App. 3d
535, 543 (1992).
- 15 -
¶ 84 Here, the testimony showed that the parties were cohabitating and Uliana was pregnant, but
they were not actually engaged. Moreover, there was no evidence that Leonard used any
“confidential relationship” to coerce Uliana into signing the agreement and marrying him.
Rather, the testimony showed that the parties did not particularly wish to be married but their
families wanted them to because of the pregnancy. Leonard did not propose marriage to
Uliana; rather, he informed her that if she would sign a prenuptial agreement, they could
marry. Indeed, Leonard testified that he was dating another woman up until the day they signed
the agreement and he married Uliana. Thus, Leonard did not have the burden of proving that
Uliana was aware of the value and extent of his property. See id. At any rate, even if he did,
there was no dispute that Leonard provided such a disclosure document attached to the
agreement and Uliana had already been living with Leonard for some time and was
undoubtedly aware of his financial position. The circuit court’s factual determinations in that
regard were not manifestly erroneous. See Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 2014 IL
App (1st) 132020, ¶ 50.
¶ 85 We note that Uliana asserts that Leonard made last minute changes to the agreement before
they signed it. However, based on Leonard’s testimony and the copy of the agreement
presented to the court, the change he made inured to her benefit and it was initialed by both
parties. Leonard increased the number of months Uliana would receive $1000 in maintenance
payments from 24 to 36 months if the parties were married for less than 24 months.
¶ 86 iv. Fairness and Reasonableness
¶ 87 Uliana asserts that the agreement was not fair and reasonable because $2500 per month for
100 months is insufficient and unfair given her health costs, standard of living, and Leonard’s
wealth, and the total amount she can receive is capped at $250,000, reduced by any amounts
Leonard pays for temporary maintenance or attorney fees to Uliana’s counsel.
¶ 88 “Although marriage is sufficient legal consideration for an antenuptial agreement
[citation], the agreement must be fair and reasonable. Illinois requires that an antenuptial
agreement guarantee both parties an equitable financial settlement in lieu of a waiver of their
rights to property or maintenance.” Warren, 169 Ill. App. 3d at 231.
¶ 89 Uliana likens the present case to the circumstances in Warren. There, the court held that
although the premarital agreement would not create an unforeseen condition of penury and it
was not the product of coercion or fraud, it found the total waiver of maintenance provision in
the agreement was not “fair and reasonable” under the circumstances. Id. at 231-32. It provided
“no financial settlement whatsoever” to the wife, and the couple had enjoyed “a lifestyle far
more extravagant than [the wife] could hope to afford on her own” for several years. Id. at 231.
The wife had not worked since before the marriage and had $33,000 in assets, while the
husband was worth $1.5 to $2 million, with $700,000 in debts. Id. at 229. In addition, the
provision requiring the parties to pay their own attorney fees upon dissolution was not fair and
reasonable given the husband’s superior financial position and the fact that he instituted the
dissolution proceedings. Id. at 231; see also Kolflat v. Kolflat, 636 So. 2d 87, 90 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1994) (applying Illinois law to hold that while the premarital agreement did not create an
unforeseen condition of penury and was not procured by fraud or duress, the maintenance
waiver provision was unfair where the husband’s net worth was over $4.7 million, while the
wife had $109,000 in assets, was over 50 years old, lacked a college education or work skills,
and the agreement provided absolutely no financial support to the wife).
- 16 -
¶ 90 In contrast, in In re Marriage of Burgess, 138 Ill. App. 3d 13, 15-16 (1985), the court
upheld the waiver of maintenance provision in the parties’ premarital agreement where the
wife had a net worth of over $400,000 before marriage, her husband did not receive any of her
premarital assets, she had yearly investment income of over $38,000, and she had sufficient
funds to furnish her new household. See also Drag, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 1057 (upholding
maintenance provision where the wife was receiving over $200,000 in addition to a monthly
maintenance award of $1400 for six years).
¶ 91 Considering the circumstances in the present case, we cannot say that the trial court erred
in finding the agreement fair and reasonable. The trial court observed that the agreement’s
financial provisions “may have been on the low side of fair and reasonable but even so
especially when coupled with the award of a portion of Leonard Kranzler’s estate, given the
age differences between the parties, that the Antenuptial Agreement is fair and reasonable.” As
stated, the agreement did not leave Uliana without a financial settlement and did not involve a
complete waiver of maintenance. She was entitled to receive $2500 per month for 100 months
because the parties were married for more than 180 months. In addition, she retains her
property in Michigan, which has an estimated value of $200,000, and all other premarital
property. She is also entitled to half of all jointly titled marital property upon resolution of the
dissolution case. We further note that, unlike the wife in Warren, who lacked a college
education or any specific work skills, Uliana has a college degree and she presently manages
four rental properties. As the trial court observed, the agreement also provided that Uliana was
entitled to 40% of his net estate upon his death if the parties remain married at the time of
death.
¶ 92 We further note that the dissolution case remained pending at the time the circuit court
determined the validity of the agreement. The circuit court stated that it was finding the
agreement to be valid and enforceable, but noted that it would make further rulings in the
future and “hear the condition of the parties in a trial.” See Warren, 169 Ill. App. 3d at 231;
Burgess, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 15 (a court may find a premarital agreement valid, but nevertheless
modify a maintenance provision it finds unfair or unreasonable in order to mitigate the
potential harm to a spouse that could result in the strict enforcement of such provisions if it
finds enforcement would result in the spouse becoming a public charge to due lack of
resources, “a catastrophic illness or other severe physical or mental impairment”).
¶ 93 v. Unconscionability
¶ 94 Uliana contends that the agreement is procedurally and substantively unconscionable and
the trial court erred in failing to find it unconscionable. As Leonard argues, unconscionability
is not part of the common law analysis. See Berger, 357 Ill. App. 3d at 656; Heinrich, 2014 IL
App (2d) 121333, ¶ 49. The trial court made no specific finding as to unconscionability.
¶ 95 However, “[t]he rules governing the interpretation of contracts apply to the interpretation
of prenuptial agreements.” Drag, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 1055. “The test for establishing an
unconscionable contract is to determine whether the agreement is one which no reasonable
person would make and no honest person would accept.” Id.
¶ 96 In support of her contention regarding unconscionability, Uliana cites and reiterates the
same arguments she made in contending that the agreement was the product of duress and
undue influence and was not fair and reasonable. Consistent with our prior analysis regarding
these issues, we find that Uliana has not shown that the agreement was so unconscionable such
- 17 -
that it involved “a lack of meaningful choice by one party” under the circumstances. Id.
¶ 97 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 98 For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court’s order allowing Leonard’s motion for
declaratory judgment to stand on its own and its order finding the premarital agreement valid
and enforceable. The parties’ briefs adequately relay their respective contentions and
adequately respond thereto, indicating that oral argument would not further our consideration
of this appeal.
¶ 99 Affirmed.
- 18 -