IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 18-1132
Filed February 20, 2019
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JASON D. GRYP,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Thomas G. Reidel and
Mark D. Cleve, Judges.
The defendant appeals his ten-year sentence. AFFIRMED.
Lauren M. Phelps, Davenport, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., Doyle, J., and Mahan, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2019).
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POTTERFIELD, Presiding Judge.
Jason Gryp appeals the district court’s imposition of a ten-year sentence of
incarceration for his conviction for possession with intent to deliver
(methamphetamine), a class “C” felony. Gryp maintains the court should have
suspended his sentence. He argues the court abused its discretion by failing to
place more weight on positive factors outlined in the report from the presentence
investigation (PSI) and failing to consider the “naturally deterrent effect” of the fact
that, during the commission of this crime, Gryp was shot multiple times by the
friend to whom he intended to sell methamphetamine.
“[T]he decision of the district court to impose a particular sentence within
the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor, and will only
be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of inappropriate
matters.” State v. Bentley, 757 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Iowa 2008) (alteration in original)
(citation omitted). “Abuse of discretion occurs only when ‘the decision was
exercised on grounds or for reasons that were clearly untenable or unreasonable.’”
Id. (citation omitted).
As Gryp concedes, the sentence imposed by the district court is within the
statutory limits. See Iowa Code §§ 124.401(1)(c)(6) (defining the crime as a class
“C” felony); 902.9(1)(d) (providing the maximum sentence for a class “C” felony is
“no more than ten years”). Additionally, we note that both the State and the
preparer of the PSI recommended incarceration. Still, Gryp maintains the court
abused its discretion because it did not place more emphasis on the facts that Gryp
did not commit any additional offenses during the thirteen months he was out on
bond between his arrest and sentencing, he was prepared for and cooperated with
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the preparation of the PSI report, only one crime in his long criminal history was
violent in nature, he had been steadily employed at the same job for two years at
the time of sentencing, he has a consistent employment history, and he graduated
high school.
First, we cannot agree with all Gryp’s contentions. While he maintains he
did not committ any additional offenses while out on bond, the more accurate
statement would be that he was not charged with any additional offenses during
that time period. According to Gryp’s statements to the PSI preparer, he continued
to smoke marijuana “a couple times per week” until “a few weeks” before meeting
with the preparer on May 23, 2018. Additionally, Gryp told the preparer he
continued to use methamphetamine monthly until a week before their meeting.
And while Gryp has generally maintained employment during the times he has not
been incarcerated, having a job has not prevented Gryp from using or selling illegal
substances. At the time of the present offense, he was employed but decided to
sell drugs in order “make some quick cash.”
That being said, the factors Gryp claims the court should have placed more
emphasis on—including the specific facts surrounding his commission of the
crime—were included in the PSI report, which the district court explicitly stated it
considered. During the sentencing colloquy, the court said:
The—it has been noted by both parties, the primary issue
before the Court this morning is whether or not the Court should
suspend that sentence. And in making that determination, I have
taken into consideration all of the information contained in the
presentence investigation report as well as the recommendations
made by the presentence investigation writer, by the State, and by
the defense in this case.
And when I put all that together, I note with considerable
concern, Mr. Gryp, your prior criminal conviction history which
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consists of two felony convictions and a conviction of 2013 that led
to your probation being revoked on two occasions in connection with
that file, ultimately landing you in prison on that offense and the fact
that this offense took place less than a year—or approximately a
year, I should say, after you finished your parole from that offense. I
also note the positive information that’s contained in the presentence
investigation report, and again, all of the statements that have been
made by the various parties here today.
In—on balance, the Court does find that for the protection of
the community, that imposition of the sentence is the most
appropriate sentence to be entered here today.
I do note the positive things, Mr. Gryp. These are things you
should have taken into consideration before this particular offense
was undertaken. And for all of the reasons I have stated, I—the
Court concludes it is the most appropriate sentence. And therefore,
the Court will order that mittimus will issue immediately.
It is the role of the sentencing court, in an exercise of its discretion, to determine
the weight to place on the various considerations. See State v. Wright, 340 N.W.2d
590, 593 (Iowa 1983) (“The right of an individual judge to balance the relevant
factors in determining an appropriate sentence inheres in the discretion
standard.”). Though the court did not give the same weight to the factors Gryp
emphasizes, the sentence imposed by the court was not based “on grounds or for
reasons clearly untenable,” nor was its choice “clearly unreasonable” under the
circumstances. See Bentley, 757 N.W.2d at 262 (providing standard for
determining an abuse of discretion). Thus, we affirm the sentence imposed by the
district court.
AFFIRMED.