In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: M.F., Minor Child, J.F., Father v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
Feb 22 2019, 9:18 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
John T. Wilson Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Natalie F. Weiss
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination February 22, 2019
of the Parent-Child Relationship Court of Appeals Case No.
of: M.F., Minor Child, 18A-JT-1845
J.F., Father Appeal from the Madison Circuit
Court
Appellant-Respondent,
The Honorable G. George Pancol,
v. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
The Indiana Department of 48C02-1712-JT-107
Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.

Brown, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1845 | February 22, 2019 Page 1 of 23
[1] J.F. (“Father”) appeals the involuntary termination of his parental rights with

respect to his child, M.F. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Father and A.P. (“Mother”) are the parents of M.F., who was born in

December 2015. 1 M.F. was born THC positive. M.F., and his older sibling,

M.O., were removed from the home on February 17, 2016. On February 18,

2016, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a petition

alleging that M.F. was a child in need of services (“CHINS”). The petition

alleged that: M.F.’s sibling, M.O., sustained burns, redness, or blistering to his

hand; Father and Mother did not seek medical treatment; Mother held M.O.’s

hand under a hot water faucet as punishment; M.O. had been locked in the

basement on occasion as punishment causing him to be fearful and to cry for

help; and Mother and/or Father had failed to provide appropriate supervision

or care to M.F. in that they did not engage in safe sleeping practices. Also, on

February 18, 2016, the court entered an Order on Initial/Detention Hearing

indicating that it had held a hearing, found that Father and Mother admitted

the allegations in the petition, and concluded that the removal of M.F. was

authorized and necessary to protect the child. The court also entered its Order

Authorizing Filing of CHINS Petition.

1
Mother was married to another man when M.F. was born, but genetic testing revealed that Father is M.F.’s
father. Mother and Father are also parents of a second child. At the June 12, 2018 hearing, M.F.’s maternal
grandmother testified that the second child was eight months old. Mother does not appeal the termination of
her parental rights as to M.F.

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[3] On March 16, 2016, the court entered an Order on Dispositional Hearing. It

ordered Father to contact the case manager every week; notify the case

manager of any changes in address, household composition, employment, or

telephone number within five days; notify the case manager of any arrest or

criminal charges for any household member within five days of the charge;

allow the case manager or other service providers to make announced or

unannounced visits to the home; enroll in recommended programs; keep all

appointments; remain in the county; maintain suitable housing; secure and

maintain a legal and stable source of income; not use illegal controlled

substances or alcohol; participate in counseling; complete a parenting

assessment; complete a substance abuse assessment; submit to random

drug/alcohol screens; not commit any acts of domestic violence; and “attend all

schooled visitations with the child.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 22.

On September 20, 2016, the court entered an Order on Periodic Case Review

finding that Father had not complied with the case plan and was non-compliant

with services.

[4] On December 14, 2017, DCS filed a Verified Petition for Involuntary

Termination of Parent-Child Relationship. On January 11, 2018, the court held

a hearing. Kaylee Jones of the Madison County Department of Child Services

testified that she was assigned as M.F.’s permanency case manager, that Father

and Mother had not notified her of changes of address or household

composition within five days as ordered in the dispositional order, which was a

safety concern. She testified that Father had not notified her of any arrests or

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 criminal charges within five days, that he had been pulled over for DWI and

placed in jail and currently had a warrant in that cause, and that “there is also a

police call for disturbance on New Year’s Day.” Transcript Volume II at 8.

She stated that Father did not complete home based services and that his

medication management was a safety concern because he had been diagnosed

with anxiety and depression, and relapse is very common if not handled

appropriately. She testified that Mother was arrested for domestic battery on

May 29, 2016, services were recommended for both parents in October 2016,

and neither parent completed those services. She stated that Father was visiting

once weekly for two hours and “had a no show for the visit last week.” Id. at

13.

[5] Deondre Hill testified that he worked with M.F. and Father and supervised

visits for approximately three months, and that Father was consistent but had

missed two visits including one the previous week.

[6] Christy Green, a home based case manager and visitation supervisor, testified

that she worked with Father between October 2016 and July 2017, that he

consistently missed visits, would be late, and failed to bring the appropriate

supplies, but had improved with respect to bringing supplies during the last

three months. She expressed concern with Father’s ability to ascertain what

was safe for a child of M.F.’s age and that he “just was not able to understand

child development well enough to be able to care for [M.F.] on his own without

supervision.” Id. at 25.

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[7] Thomas Asaunte, a mental health and addiction therapist with Adult and Child

Services, testified that Father was one of his clients receiving addiction

counseling services, that he had been working with Father for about one month,

and that it was his understanding that Father had completed IOP prior to

becoming his client. He testified that he had four visits with Father, that his

current impression was that Father was making progress, and that he needed to

be with Father longer than one month to provide a full assessment.

[8] At the end of the hearing, the court stated that it would continue Father’s

treatment, drug screens, and visitation. The court mentioned the petition to

terminate parental rights and indicated that it would enter a denial for Father

and Mother.

[9] On June 12, 2018, a termination hearing was held. Greenwood Police Sergeant

James Brian Long testified that he had been called to Mother’s address on April

30, 2018, based upon her report that “her apartment building was broke in to by

her son’s father.” Id. at 55. Sergeant Long stated that he observed that the front

door was kicked in and that he was unable to locate Father at the time. He

indicated that a Playstation 4 and some type of sexual toy were taken from the

home but no charges were filed because he was “having a hard time

establishing whether or not [Father] did not have a right to be there.” Id. at 56.

[10] Jones, the permanency case manager, testified that she had the case since

October 2016 and that M.F.’s removal was based on Mother burning the older

child with water, M.F. being born exposed to THC, and unsafe sleep practices.

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 She stated that DCS offered family counseling to the parents and that a referral

was made on March 9, 2016, but that service was not completed successfully.

She testified that the parents completed a parenting assessment, but neither

parent followed through with the recommendations, and that DCS offered

clinical interview services to parents on May 16, 2006, but that was not

completed successfully. She stated that Father successfully completed a

substance abuse assessment but did not successfully complete the substance

abuse treatment because he tested positive for hydrocodone in March 2018 and

also relapsed in May 2018. She stated that parents did not comply with drug

screen referrals and did not successfully complete home based services, and that

Father had been somewhat compliant with visitation but “there were a few

recent no shows or cancellations.” Id. at 66. She also stated that Father did not

successfully complete a referral for home maker services or fatherhood

engagement. On cross-examination, Jones stated that Father’s drug screens

were currently suspended due to “no shows or refusals.” Id. at 87.

[11] Asaunte, the mental health and addiction therapist, testified that Father

enrolled in addiction treatment in November 2017. When asked if there was a

point where Father relapsed, Asaunte answered: “I have his records his screens

here, it was only on March 22, he had a positive for Opiate but he brought in

his prescription medication which was prescribed for him in July and he proved

that he didn’t really relapse (INAUDIBLE).” Id. at 94. On cross-examination

by Father’s counsel, Asaunte responded that Father successfully completed his

part of the program and volunteered to do more.

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[12] Jasmine May, an employee of Children’s Bureau, testified that she had the case

since April 24th and that Father had not visited consistently with M.F. She

indicated that she had concerns with Father’s parenting skills and stated:

[Father] lacks parenting, he is a great father during visit time but
he, he doesn’t really know how to respond to [M.F.]
appropriately . . . for instance, we were in the library for
community visit and [M.F.] was running around playing and
stuff like that and [Father] didn’t really know how to you know,
maintain him being quiet . . . other than that . . . that’s about it.

Id. at 101. When asked if she had any safety concerns, May answered:

[M]y only safety concern that I would have with [Father] at this
moment is when May 16th, I’m sorry, May 10th he smelled of
alcohol . . . , I brought it to [Father’s] attention and [Father]
denied it stating that he did not smell of alcohol. May 16th is
when he stated that he had the food poisoning but later down the
road told his FCM that he had been drinking the night before . . .
.

Id. at 102. On cross-examination, May testified that Father “doesn’t really

know how to interact with” M.F. Id. She stated that Father missed three of

seven sessions with her.

[13] Green, the supervised visitation facilitator, testified that she had the case for

approximately nine months between October 2016 and June or July 2017, that

visits were initially scheduled for twice a week for a total of five hours, and that

visits were reduced because Father did not show up, showed up late, and did

not bring the appropriate supplies. She indicated that she had safety concerns

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 and that she “never saw [Father] demonstrate the ability to parent his child

safely without like constant redirection and guidance and help and that kind of

thing.” Id. at 108.

[14] Emma Johnson testified that she met Father and Mother in January 2015 when

Mother reached out to the Safe Families program for help with M.O., her oldest

son. She testified that she was the director of Safe Families in Madison County

for four years and had since relocated to Oregon and was in the process of

adopting M.O. She stated that she had safety concerns with Father “primarily

because of the dysfunctional relationship between he and” Mother. Id. at 114.

She testified that, during the time M.O. and M.F. were removed from the

home, she talked to Father and encouraged him to leave Mother, obtain an

apartment, and try to gain custody of M.F. by himself, and that she “even

offered to rally the support of our community and to donate furniture and to

really help him get set up on his own since the case was between [Mother] and

[M.O.] and he made no effort at all to take me up on that” and “he didn’t try at

all to get his own place even though it would have gotten his child back a lot

sooner.” Id. at 115. She testified that Mother called her in the spring of 2016

when she and Father were in a “very violent and physical fight” and that

Mother was ultimately taken to jail for three days. Id.

[15] On cross-examination, Johnson testified that the services she last provided

through Safe Families ended at the time that the DCS case began, that Father

has called her for advice, and that she has “encouraged [Father] time and time

and time again to move on with his life and I tried to help him understand that

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 they are in a co-dependent dysfunctional relationship . . . .” Id. at 117-118.

When asked if most of the domestic violence was Mother being physically

violent with Father, she answered in part that M.O. “still to this day talks about

watching [Father] punch [Mother] in the face so I don’t have hard evidence that

it goes both ways, I truly believe that it goes both ways between the two of them

equally but . . . the only one that I can attest to that is on record is where she

you know was the abuser.” Id. at 118.

[16] Casey Lynn Conrad testified that M.F. had been in her care since he was three

and a half months old and that Father “only had two hour visits with him for

over a year.” Id. at 123. M.F.’s court appointed special advocate, Danielle Bell

(“CASA Bell”), testified that she did not think there was a reasonable

probability that the reasons for M.F.’s removal would be remedied and that

adoption is in M.F.’s best interest.

[17] Father presented the testimony of M.F.’s maternal grandmother and great-

grandmother. M.F.’s grandmother testified that Father resided with her and

her mother, was a good man, and loved his children. She also testified that she

did not see him drinking at her apartment but that Father spent most of the time

by himself. M.F.’s great-grandmother testified that she did not have any

concerns about Father’s parenting skills and had not seen him inebriated.

[18] When asked to describe his employment since the case had been opened, Father

testified that he had been an independent contractor, worked in warehouses,

worked at a mall in Indianapolis, worked at a mall in Greenwood, had a period

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 of time when he did not work, obtained another job for about three weeks, and

did not obtain another job besides caring for M.F.’s grandmother and great-

grandmother. When asked where he had lived during the case, he answered:

“the Anderson house, and then my sisters [sic] house on Wheeler Street in

Indianapolis, and then after that we ended up getting, oh that’s when I did the

half-way house thing, [Mother] ended up moving in with her brother uh and

then she moved into a couple half way houses at that time.” Id. at 150. He also

stated that he and Mother then decided to reunite and moved to Greenwood.

He testified that he did not previously listen to the encouragement to separate

from Mother because he “fell in love with that good [Mother],” and that he did

not believe he would ever do that again. Id. at 153.

[19] During the direct examination of Father, the following exchange occurred:

Q. There’s been some . . . testimony or some assumptions or
some allegations that you had relapsed recently.

A. I did. Yep, it is.

Q. What would that consist of?

A. Alcohol[.]

Q. All right. How much alcohol?

A. Oh, I don’t usually drink beers. It’s just a quick little 4-5
shots, that’s it. You know, I try my best to you know, stay away
from it . . . and I know it was [a] mistake and I know I’m capable
of, I stayed a year sober. You know, if I have a goal to work
towards, eliminate evil out of it. I am very confident in myself.
But yeah, I made a couple mistakes. Relapse maybe 2-3 times

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 but if I, if I have a positive goal to work to, I don’t think it will
ever happen again.

*****

Q. When was the last time you had a drink?

A. Two nights ago.

Id. at 156. He testified that his positive drug screen was due to a prescription

and that he did not have a problem with opiates.

[20] Father’s counsel asked: “You had a problem the last couple of months as a

result of what?” Id. at 163. Father answered: “Oh, just losing my home, my

car, and my family and potentially my son, my first born son, [M.F.].” Id. He

also stated: “I would like, there’s a lot that I would like but I would like a

different team of people to start brand new fresh and I think you know a second

chance would be very fair as long as I eliminate a certain person out of the

equation.” Id. at 164.

[21] On July 5, 2018, the court entered a ten-page order terminating the parent-child

relationship between Father and Mother and M.F. In part, the order states:

Findings of Fact

The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence:

1.) [M.F.] was born December 16, 2015, and was two years old
on the date of the trial completed on this matter.

*****

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 7.) The CHINS Court conducted a review hearing on September
20, 2016, making the following findings from which the Court
finds the following facts and inferences for the purposes of the
termination proceedings.

a. Father and Mother appeared in person, and by counsel,
Jon Reeder.
b. Neither parent has complied with services, enhanced their
ability to parent, but both have visited the children.
c. Mother admitted to smoking marijuana and driving
without a license, and was arrested for domestic battery
during this period.
d. Father tested positive for benzodiazepines and struggled
with alcohol.

*****

11.) The CHINS Court conducted a permanency hearing on
April 18, 2017, making the following findings from which the
Court finds the following facts and inferences for the purposes of
the termination proceedings.

*****

d. Father took only 5 drug screens in the period (two
positive), repeatedly cancelled or no-showed for his
parenting assessment, and by failing to communicate
contact information changes to the Department was
unable to begin Fatherhood Engagement. Issues with
visitation led to visits being cut back from twice weekly to
once weekly.

*****

16.) On or about May 2, 2018, DCS filed a report to the CHINS
Court detailing the history of the case and the non-compliance of
both parents as well as notified the Court of a recent incident
between the parents that had led to them no longer co-habitating
and the involvement of the Greenwood Police.

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 *****

20.) At the trial on the termination petition conducted on June
12, 2018, [] Kaylee Jones, Permanency Family Case Manager
testified. The Court makes the following findings and reasonable
inferences from this testimony for the purposes of these
termination proceedings.

*****

l. DCS provided the following services to [Father] and he was
not compliant in those services.

i. Family counseling
ii. Medication evaluation at [Father’s] request
iii. Ongoing medication services
iv. Parenting assessment
v. Clinical Interview services
vi. Substance Abuse assessment services
vii. Outpatient treatment services
viii. Random drug screens
ix. Urine drug screens
x. Gas cards were provided for visitation
xi. Home-based casework
xii. Home maker services
xiii. Fatherhood engagement
xiv. Supervised visitation

m. There is no reasonable probability the conditions which
led to the removals will be remedied.
n. Termination of the parent-child relationship is in the
children’s best interest.
o. A satisfactory plan of adoption exists for the care and
treatment of the minor children.

21.) [Based on the testimony of Jasmine Nave, the court found:]

a. [Father] has not visited [M.F.] in the last month.
b. [Father] has regressed in bringing supplies for the minor
child.

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 c. [Father] struggles to interact appropriately with the child,
ie they tend to just watch videos on his phone, and
[Father] is not always able to properly parent/correct the
child when visits occur in public places.

22.) [Based on Thomas Asaunte’s testimony, the court found:]

a. Mr. [Asaunte] was [Father’s] substance abuse therapist.
b. Father did a six week program with sessions twice weekly
in March-April of 2018.
c. Father requested the program be extended.
d. Father informed Mr. [Asaunte] that he had drank after the
six week program was completed, but Mr. [Asaunte] does
not consider that a relapse as it occurred after the six week
program was completed.
e. Father has attended no sessions since informing Mr.
[Asaunte] of his drinking.

23.) [Based on Christy Green’s testimony, the court found:]

a. Father was inconsistent in visiting [M.F.].
b. Father was often unprepared to meet [M.F.’s] needs
during visitation.
c. Issues with visitation led to a reduction of visits from twice
weekly to once weekly during Ms. Green’s tenure with the
case.

24.) [Based on Emma Johnson’s testimony, the court found:]

a. Mrs. Johnson became involved with the family before
DCS opened the case.
b. Safe Families provided services to the family before DCS
involvement.
c. Both parents have individually reached out to Mrs.
Johnson for help and advice since they began working
with Safe Families.

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 d. Mrs. Johnson advised [Father] that his relationship with
[Mother] was toxic and it would be in [M.F.’s] best
interest if they separated.
e. Mrs. Johnson has been involved as either a service
provider or a foster parent for longer than the DCS case
has been opened and has witnessed the parents’ pattern of
domestic violence and reconciliation multiple times.

*****

27.) [Based on Father’s testimony, the court found:]

a. [Father] is currently unemployed.
b. [Father] no longer lives with [Mother] and their youngest
child.
c. [Father] lives with [Mother’s] mother and grandmother.
d. [Father] stated he took the game system and sex toy, but
did not break in to do so and he wanted to get his things.
e. [Father] testified the door at his former residence was
damaged on or around New Years of 2018 during a
domestic violence incident in which [Mother] threw him
into the door.
f. This New Year’s Day incident occurred in the presence of
the couple’s youngest child as well as [Mother’s] mother
and grandmother.
g. [Father] testified he did relapse with alcohol usage in May
of 2018.
h. [Father] testified he cannot explain why he has continued
to get back together with [Mother] other than he loves her.
i. [Father] stated he will not be getting back together with
her ever again.

Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 45-52.

[22] The court concluded that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions

that resulted in M.F.’s removal from and continued placement outside the care

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 and custody of the parents would not be remedied; termination of the parent-

child relationship between the parents and M.F. was in the best interests of

M.F.; and the plan of DCS of adoption of M.F. was acceptable and satisfactory.

Discussion

[23] The issue is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the termination of

Father’s parental rights. In order to terminate a parent-child relationship, DCS

is required to allege and prove, among other things:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for
placement outside the home of the parents will not be
remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-
being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). If the court finds that the allegations in a petition

described in Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4 are true, the court shall terminate the parent-

child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a).

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[24] The State’s burden of proof for establishing the allegations in termination cases

“is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-

1261 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2), reh’g denied. This is “a

‘heightened burden of proof’ reflecting termination’s ‘serious social

consequences.’” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014) (quoting In re G.Y.,

904 N.E.2d at 1260-1261, 1260 n.1). “But weighing the evidence under that

heightened standard is the trial court’s prerogative—in contrast to our well-

settled, highly deferential standard of review.” Id. We do not reweigh the

evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses, but consider only the

evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn

from the evidence. Id. We confine our review to two steps: whether the

evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings, and then whether the

findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment. Id. “[W]e do not

independently determine whether that heightened standard is met, as we would

under the ‘constitutional harmless error standard,’ which requires the reviewing

court itself to ‘be sufficiently confident to declare the error harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting Harden v. State, 576 N.E.2d 590, 593 (Ind.

1991) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967))). “Our

review must ‘give “due regard” to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the

credibility of the witnesses firsthand,’ and ‘not set aside [its] findings or

judgment unless clearly erroneous.’” Id. (quoting K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child

Servs., Dearborn Cty. Office, 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2013) (citing Ind. Trial

Rule 52(A))). “Because a case that seems close on a ‘dry record’ may have been

much more clear-cut in person, we must be careful not to substitute our
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 judgment for the trial court when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence.” Id.

at 640.

[25] Father argues that DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that

the conditions resulting in the removal of M.F. would not be remedied or that

termination was in the best interest of M.F. He asserts that the “primary

condition for the child’s removal was due to Mother burning the older child and

M.F. being born drug exposed to THC.” Appellant’s Brief at 11. He contends

that the record shows that he was in substantial compliance with the case plan.

DCS asserts there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to

M.F.’s removal would not be remedied, and that Father did not participate in a

majority of services and had a pattern of relapsing, never provided evidence of a

permanent job, and never obtained suitable housing. DCS also contends that

termination is in M.F.’s best interest.

[26] In determining whether the conditions that resulted in M.F.’s removal will not

be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis. See E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642-643.

First, we identify the conditions that led to removal, and second, we determine

whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be

remedied. Id. at 643. In the second step, the trial court must judge a parent’s

fitness as of the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration

evidence of changed conditions, balancing a parent’s recent improvements

against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial

probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. We entrust that delicate

balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent’s prior history

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 more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination. Id. Requiring

trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them

from finding that a parent’s past behavior is the best predictor of his future

behavior. Id.

[27] The statute does not simply focus on the initial basis for a child’s removal, but

also those bases resulting in the continued placement outside the home. In re

N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). A court may consider

evidence of a parent’s prior criminal history, history of neglect, failure to

provide support, lack of adequate housing and employment, and the services

offered by DCS and the parent’s response to those services. Id. Where there

are only temporary improvements and the pattern of conduct shows no overall

progress, the court might reasonably find that under the circumstances the

problematic situation will not improve. Id.

[28] To the extent Father does not challenge the trial court’s findings of fact, the

unchallenged facts stand as proven. See In re B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2007) (failure to challenge findings by the trial court resulted in waiver

of the argument that the findings were clearly erroneous), trans. denied.

[29] During the direct examination of Jones, the permanency case manager, the

following exchange occurred:

Q. . . . Based on your time in this case and the testimony you
just provided in court, is there reasonable probability that the
conditions that lead to the removal of [M.F.] be remedied?

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 A. No.

Q. Why do you say that?

A. Neither parent has successfully completed any of the services
DCS has put in place that they were court ordered to participate
in at the dispositional hearing. [I]t’s been clearly established that
the parents have cycling behavior of . . . being together, being
okay for a little bit, getting into drinking, drugs, domestic
violence, getting arrested or having criminal charges, . . . being
separated for a while and then doing it all over again and getting
back together. We just recently saw that . . . at the initial TPR
hearing everything was going well[;] since that time, [Father] has
been kicked out of the home. There have been several police
calls. Uh, [Father] has relapsed. It’s clear at this point that there
is a cycle of issues with their relationship that severely puts
[M.F.]’s safety at risk.

Transcript Volume II at 67.

[30] Green, the supervised visitation facilitator, testified that she had the case for

approximately nine months between October 2016 and June or July 2017 and

that “[t]here was not a time that I supervised visitation where I was confident

that [Father] would be able to care for [M.F.] without the assistance of DCS or

somebody being involved to guide him and his ability to parent.” Id. at 107-

108.

[31] The following exchange occurred during the direct examination of CASA Bell:

Q. [B]ased on your time on this case, is there reasonable
probability that the reasons for the removal will be remedied?

A. Uhm, I do not think so.

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 Q. All right and why do you say that?

A. [A]s I stated in my report, . . . CASA feels that there is no
reasonable probability that the conditions that caused [M.F.’s]
removal or the reasons for the continued placement outside of the
home will not be remedied due to [Mother] and [Father’s]
inconsistency and lack of compliance with offered services and
ability or refusal to maintain a safe stable home and ability or
refusal to provide or maintain a source of income and ability or
refusal to obey the law, provide a safe environment without
domestic violence and/or an ability or refusal to maintain
commitment to [M.F.’s] best interest for safety and permanency
needs as evidence[d] by lack of and/or adherent to utilization of
appropriate and healthy coping skills provided by services
offered.

Id. at 125.

[32] Based upon the court’s findings and the record, we conclude that clear and

convincing evidence supports the trial court’s determination that there is a

reasonable probability that the conditions leading to M.F.’s removal will not be

remedied.

[33] In determining what is in the best interests of a child, the trial court is required

to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and to the totality of the evidence.

McBride v. Monroe Cty. Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2003). In so doing, the court must subordinate the interests of the parent

to those of the children. Id. Children have a paramount need for permanency

which the Indiana Supreme Court has called a central consideration in

determining the child’s best interests, and the Court has stated that children

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 cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or

reunification and courts need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such

that the child’s physical, mental, and social development is permanently

impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d

at 647-648. However, focusing on permanency, standing alone, would

impermissibly invert the best-interests inquiry. Id. at 648. Recommendations

by both the case manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in

addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be

remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that

termination is in the child’s best interests. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 987

N.E.2d 1150, 1158-1159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[34] Jones, the permanency case manager, and CASA Bell testified that adoption

was in M.F.’s best interest. Based on the testimony, as well as the totality of the

evidence in the record and set forth in the court’s termination order, we

conclude that the determination that termination is in the best interests of M.F.

is supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Conclusion

[35] We conclude that the trial court’s judgment terminating the parental rights of

Father is supported by clear and convincing evidence. We find no error and

affirm.

[36] Affirmed.

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Bradford, J., concurs.

Bailey, J., concurs in result.

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