MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
Feb 25 2019, 9:09 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Yvette M. LaPlante Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Keating & LaPlante, LLP Attorney General of Indiana
Evansville, Indiana
Laura R. Anderson
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
K.S., February 25, 2019
Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-JV-1826
v. Appeal from the
Vanderburgh Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable
Appellee-Petitioner. Brett J. Niemeier, Judge
The Honorable
R.A. Ferguson, Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
82D04-1802-JD-257
Kirsch, Judge
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-1826| February 25, 2019 Page 1 of 6
[1] K.S. appeals his juvenile adjudication for what would be Level 4 felony child
molesting1 if committed by an adult, raising two issues, which we consolidate
and restate as follows: whether there was sufficient evidence to support his
adjudication.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On January 23, 2018, R.S., who was seven years old, told her mother that K.S.,
her fourteen-year-old step-brother, had been “humping” her. Tr. Vol. II at 8; 10-
11, 14, 21-22, 27, 30. R.S. said that when K.S. would hump her, both her pants
and K.S.’s pants were down. Id. at 28. She also said that K.S. put his “ding-a-
ling,” R.S.’s word for penis, into “in [her] butt.” Id. at 30; State’s Ex. 2, 3. This
occurred more than two times. Tr. Vol. II at 31-32. On one occasion, K.S. put
his fingers in R.S.’s “private part,” which she indicated on a diagram of a
female child as her vaginal area. Id. at 29, 32; State’s Ex. 2. K.S. threatened
R.S. that “something would happen to [her]” and that he would punch her in
the eye if she told anyone. Tr. Vol. II at 24, 32.
[4] The day after R.S. told her mother what K.S. had done, R.S.’s mother took her
to the hospital. Id. at 7, 13. After R.S. told medical personnel that her “private
1
See Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(b).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-1826| February 25, 2019 Page 2 of 6
part” hurt when she used the bathroom, she was diagnosed with a urinary tract
infection. Id. at 13, 35.
[5] On February 7, 2018, the State filed a delinquency petition alleging that K.S.
had committed child molesting under Indiana Code section 35-42-4-3(a), which
would be a Level 3 felony if committed by an adult, and child molesting under
Indiana Code section 35-42-4-3(b), which would be a Level 4 felony if
committed by an adult. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 17-18. The State alleged that
K.S. had inappropriately touched R.S., who was less than fourteen years old.
Id.
[6] At the end of the March 26, 2018 fact-finding hearing, the trial court took the
matter under advisement. Later that day, it adjudicated K.S. to be a delinquent
child as to Count 2, child molesting as a Level 4 felony, but not on Count 1,
child molesting as a Level 3 felony, because the State failed to prove
penetration. Id. at 11. At the dispositional hearing, the trial court placed K.S.
under the supervision of the Vanderburgh County Probation Department at the
Sexually Maladaptive Youth Program. Id. at 12.
[7] Appellate counsel failed to file a timely Notice of Appeal. New appellate
counsel was appointed, and on July 26, 2018, K.S. filed a Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief, seeking permission under Post-Conviction Rule 2(3) to file a
belated Notice of Appeal. The trial court granted the request, and counsel filed
the Notice of Appeal on July 30, 2018. Id. at 2. K.S. now appeals.
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Discussion and Decision2
[8] K.S. alleges the State failed to present sufficient evidence for his adjudication as
a delinquent child for what would be Level 4 felony child molesting if
committed by an adult because it failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
his act of touching R.S. was accompanied by the specific intent to arouse or
satisfy sexual desires. See Clark v. State, 695 N.E.2d 999, 1002 (Ind. Ct. App.
1998).
[9] When reviewing a claim of sufficiency of the evidence with respect to juvenile
adjudications, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of
witnesses. D.W. v. State, 903 N.E.2d 966, 968 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans.
denied. We look only to probative evidence supporting the adjudication and the
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence to determine
whether a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the juvenile was guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. Id. If there is substantial evidence of probative value to
support the adjudication, we will not set it aside. Id. The uncorroborated
testimony of one witness may be sufficient by itself to sustain an adjudication of
delinquency on appeal. Id. Evidence “need not overcome every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence; it is sufficient so long as ‘an inference may reasonably
2
K.S. asks this court to affirm the trial court’s ruling that allowed him to file a belated Notice of Appeal and
let this appeal go forward. A juvenile may not bring a belated appeal pursuant to Post-Conviction Rule 2 but
must instead file a Trial Rule 60 motion for relief from judgment in the trial court. See Haluska v. State, 663
N.E.2d 1193, 1194 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). However, because the State does not object to K.S.’s request, and
reviewing K.S.’s substantive issue on the merits serves judicial economy, we choose to let the appeal proceed.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-1826| February 25, 2019 Page 4 of 6
be drawn from it to support the verdict.’” Lock v. State, 971 N.E.2d 71, 74 (Ind.
2012) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 2007)).
[10] “A person who, with a child under fourteen (14) years of age, performs or
submits to any fondling or touching, of either the child or the older person, with
intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the older
person, commits child molesting, a Level 4 felony.” Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(b).
Mere touching alone is not sufficient to constitute child molesting. Bowles v.
State, 737 N.E.2d 1150, 1152 (Ind. 2000). The State must also prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the act of touching was accompanied by the specific
intent to arouse or satisfy sexual desires. Id. Intent may be established by
circumstantial evidence and may be inferred from the actor’s conduct. Id.
[11] Here, it was reasonable for the fact-finder to infer that K.S. intended to satisfy
either his or R.S.’s sexual desires. Placing his penis in R.S.’s “butt” and
inserting his fingers into her vagina support the inference that he intended to
arouse or satisfy sexual desires. Also, R.S.’s statement that K.S. was
“humping” her supports the same inference. “Humping” is commonly
understood as touching of a sexual nature, including intercourse. Merriam-
Webster’s dictionary defines the verb “hump” as “usually vulgar: to copulate
with.” See hump, available at https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/hump (last visited Feb. 15, 2019). These facts support
the inference that K.S. intended to satisfy his or R.S.’s sexual desires. See
Bowles, 737 N.E.2d at 1152-53. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to
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support K.S.’s adjudication as a delinquent child for what would be Level 4
felony child molesting if committed by an adult.
[12] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Robb, J., concur.
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