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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 18-11834
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cr-00184-LMM-JFK-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHOICE PHILLIPS,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(February 26, 2019)
Before WILSON, JORDAN, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Choice Phillips pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), and the district court sentenced him to 43
months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release. That custodial sentence
was below both the ten-year statutory maximum penalty for the offense and the
advisory guideline range of 46 to 57 months’ imprisonment. Despite the district
court’s downward variance, Mr. Phillips argues that his 43-month sentence was
substantively unreasonable because the district court failed to adequately consider
evidence of an untreated brain injury that allegedly inhibited his ability to control
his impulses and learn from past mistakes. Mr. Phillips also argues that, to the extent
that the district court did consider his brain injury, it used that evidence to aggravate
his sentence instead of mitigate it. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs,
we affirm. 1
We review the substantive reasonableness of a defendant’s sentence for abuse
of discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007); United States v. Irey,
612 F.3d 1160, 1188–89 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). In order to impose a reasonable
sentence, a district court must consider all of the applicable factors set out in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a). See United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th
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At sentencing, Mr. Phillips objected to his sentence as both procedurally and substantively
unreasonable. On appeal, however, Mr. Phillips only argues substantive unreasonableness. We
therefore do not consider whether his sentence is procedurally unreasonable. See United States v.
Ardley, 242 F.3d 989, 990 (11th Cir. 2001).
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Cir. 2015). We leave the weight afforded to any particular § 3553(a) factor to the
district court’s discretion, which we do not disturb unless we are “left with the
definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of
judgment” and imposed an unreasonable sentence. United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d
739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007). For example, “a district court abuses its discretion when
it (1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that were due significant weight,
(2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear
error of judgment in considering the proper factors.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189. A clear
error of judgment occurs if the court “considers the proper factors but balances them
unreasonably.” Id.
Two factors support the reasonableness of Mr. Phillips’ 43-month sentence.
First, the sentence was substantially below § 924(a)(2)’s ten-year statutory
maximum penalty. See Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1256–57 (noting that the fact that
a sentence is below the statutory maximum penalty “is a consideration favoring its
reasonableness”). Second, the sentence was below Mr. Phillips’ advisory guideline
range of 46 to 57 months. See United States v. Sweeting, 437 F.3d 1105, 1107 (11th
Cir. 2006) (noting that a downward variance from the sentencing guidelines
indicates reasonableness). Although it is not dispositive, the fact that Mr. Phillips’
sentence was below both the statutory maximum and the advisory guideline range
suggests that his sentence was not unreasonable.
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To counter these facts, Mr. Phillips argues that the district court failed to
adequately consider evidence that he suffered from an untreated brain injury and
mental health issues. And, to the extent the district court did consider his mental
health issues, Mr. Phillips argues that it used that evidence to aggravate his sentence.
We find these arguments unpersuasive.
The record shows that, in determining the appropriate sentence, the district
court did consider evidence that Mr. Phillips suffered from an untreated brain injury
and mental health issues. At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, the district
court acknowledged the evidence that Mr. Phillips offered to mitigate his sentence
and stated that it had “reviewed the report in detail prior to [the sentencing hearing].”
D.E. 41 at 3. After explaining that its downward variance was motivated in part to
ensure that Mr. Phillips received credit for his time served, the district court stated
that it “ha[d] concerns about [Mr. Phillips’] lack of treatment for some of the other
issues.” D.E. 41 at 30. See § 3553(a)(1) (considering the “history and characteristics
of the defendant”). The district court also encouraged Mr. Phillips to find healthier
ways to deal with his mental health issues and noted that prison, although not an
ideal place, had some resources to help him. See D.E. 41 at 31; §§ 3553(a)(2),
(a)(2)(D) (considering “the need for the sentence” to provide the defendant with
“medical care[ ] or other correctional treatment”).
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The district court then considered other relevant § 3553(a) factors—
particularly Mr. Phillips’ substantial criminal history—to formulate his sentence. Cf.
Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1256 (concluding that an upward variance from the
sentencing guidelines was reasonable in light of defendant’s earlier crimes and
because it was below the statutory maximum). Specifically, the district court
explained that “[t]here was necessity for a serious sentence” because this was Mr.
Phillips’ third conviction for possessing a firearm as a felon. See D.E. 41 at 30. See
also §§ 3553(a)(2), (a)(2)(A) (considering “the need for the sentence . . . to reflect
the seriousness of the offense”). The district court also expressed concern for the
public’s safety because Mr. Phillips was committing property crimes while carrying
a firearm and “those are circumstances where things turn bad and ugly very quickly.”
D.E. 41 at 29. See §§ 3553(a)(2), (a)(2)(C) (considering “the need for the sentence .
. . to protect the public”).
In our view, the district court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing Mr.
Phillips to 43 months’ imprisonment. His sentence was below both the statutory
maximum and the advisory guideline range, and although Mr. Phillips presented
mitigating evidence related to his mental health, his criminal history and the district
court’s legitimate concern for public safety supported a 43-month sentence.
We affirm Mr. Phillips’ sentence.
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AFFIRMED.
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