SECOND DIVISION
MILLER, P. J.,
BROWN and GOSS,
JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timelyfiled.
http://www.gaappeals.us/rules
February 26, 2019
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A18A1764. DANIEL v. BREMEN-BOWDON INVESTMENT CO. GS-065
GOSS, Judge.
We granted Sheryl Daniel’s application for discretionary appeal to review the
superior court’s order which affirmed the decision of the Appellate Division of the
State Board of Workers’Compensation to denyDaniel’s claimfor benefits under the
Workers’ Compensation Act (the “Act”). For the following reasons, we affirm.
The facts in this case are undisputed. At the time of the incident, Daniel was
employed as aseamstress at Bremen-BowdenInvestment Company(the “Employer”).
Daniel parked in a lot owned by the Employer, but in order to get to and from the
parkinglotshe wasrequiredtowalkdowna public sidewalk andacrossthe street. On July
22, 2016, Daniel left her work station for her regularly scheduled lunch break and
planned to drive home. The Employer’s employees were allowed to leave the
workplace and do whatever they wished during this regularly scheduled lunch break.
As she walked to her car, Daniel tripped on the sidewalk and was injured.
Daniel sought temporary total disability benefits beginning the day after her
injury, payment of medical bills, designation of a certain doctor as the authorized
testing physician, and attorney fees. Relying upon this Court’s decision in Rockwell
v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 248 Ga. App. 73 (545 SE2d 121) (2001), the
Administrative Law Judge with the trial division of the State Board of Workers’
Compensation (“ALJ”) concluded, inter alia, that Daniel was entitled to income
benefits under the ingress and egress rule on a scheduled lunch break. The ALJ also
awarded Daniel medical expenses, the ability to select her treating physician, and
attorney fees pursuant to OCGA § 34-9-108. The Employer appealed the ALJ’s
decision to the appellate division of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation (the
“Board”). The Board reversed the ALJ’s award, concluding that Daniel’s injury did
not arise out of her employment because it occurred while she was on a regularly
scheduled break. The superior court affirmed the Board’s denial of benefits, and this
Court granted Daniel’s application for discretionary review.
1. Daniel argues that the superior court erred by holding that her trip and fall
2
duringa periodof egressona regularlyscheduledlunchbreakdid not arise in andout
of the course of her employment. We find no error.
Because the pertinent factsare notdisputed,andbecause Danielarguesthatthe
Board and the superior court “applied an erroneous theory of law to the facts, we
applya de novo standard of review.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Freeman
v.
Southwire Co., 269 Ga. App. 692, 693 (605 SE2d 95) (2004).
In the absence of legal error, the factual findings of the State Board of
Workers’ Compensation must be affirmed by the superior court and by
the Court of Appeals when supported by any evidence in the
administrative record. However, erroneous applications of law to
undisputed facts, as well as decisions based on erroneous theories of
law, are subject to the de novo standard of review.
(Citationomitted.) Hillv. Omni HotelatCNN Ctr., 268Ga. App. 144, 146(601SE2d
472) (2004).
To be compensable under the Workers Compensation Act, an “injury by
accident” mustarise “out of andinthe course of employment[.]” See OCGA §34-9-1
(4). Both of these “independent and distinct criteria” must be satisfied. Mayor &c. of
Savannah v. Stevens, 278 Ga. 166, 166 (1) (598 SE2d 456) (2004). The words
3
“in the course of the employment” relate to the time, place,
and circumstances under which the accident takes place, and an accident
arises in the course of employment when it occurs within the period of
employment at a place where the employee may reasonably be in the
performance of his duties and while he is fulfilling those duties or
engaged in something incidental thereto.
(Citation omitted.) General Fire &Cas. Co. v. Bellflower, 123 Ga. App. 864, 867 (3)
(182 SE2d 678) (1971). The words “arising out of the employment” refer to the
causal connection between the employment and the injury. Id. at 868 (4).
Inparallelbutseparate linesof cases, Georgia courts have fashionedaningress and
egress rule and a scheduled break exception to the Workers’ Compensation Act.
Under the scheduled break exception, this Court has carved out an exception to the
Workers’ Compensation Act “for injuries occurring during a regularly scheduled
lunch break or rest break and at a time claimant is free to do as she chooses.” Miles
v. Brown Transport Corp., 163 Ga. App. 563, 564 (294 SE2d 734) (1982). Under the
ingressandegressrule, this Courthasconcludedthatthe Workers’CompensationAct
applies “where an employee is injured while still on the employer’s premises in the
4
actof goingtoor coming fromhisor her workplace.” (Citationomitted.Hill,268Ga. App.
at 147.
DanielsreliesuponRockwellv. LockheedMartinCorp., 248Ga. App.73 (545 SE2d
121) (2001), for the assertion that, under the ingress and egress rule, where an
employee is still on her employer’s premises in the act of egressing those premises,
even if on a regularly scheduled break, the Workers’ Compensation Act applies. Id.
at 73. However, during the pendency of the instant appeal, this Court disapproved
Rockwell, 248 Ga. App. at73, andother cases, toholdthatthe ingress and egress rule
doesnotextend coverage tocasesinwhichthe employee isinjured while leavingand
returning to workona regularlyscheduledlunchbreak. Frettv. State Farm Employee
Workers’ Compensation, __ Ga. App. __ (821 SE2d 132) (2018). In Frett, this Court
concluded that “the extension of the ingress and egress rule to cover cases in which
the employee is injured while leaving and returning to work” for a regularly
scheduled break was improper. Id.
In the instant case, we apply the holding in Frett, supra, to conclude that
because Daniels’ injury occurred while she was egressing the Employer’s property
during her regularly scheduled lunch break, her injury is not compensable under the
Workers’ Compensation Act. The superior court did not err in affirming the Board’s
5
denial of her claim under the Workers’ Compensation Act.
2. Morgan argues that the superior court erred in affirming the Appellate
Division’s reversal of the ALJ’s assessed attorney fees for the Employer’s
violation
of OCGA § 34-9-221. We disagree.
The ALJorderedthe Employer topayattorneyfeesandexpensesunder OCGA
§ 34-9-108 (b). The Board then reversed the ALJ and denied Daniels’ request for
assessed attorney fees. OCGA § 34-9-108 (b) (2) provides:
If any provision of [OCGA §] 34-9-221,1without reasonable grounds, is
not complied with and a claimant engages the services of an attorney to
enforce his or her rights under that Code section and the claimant
prevails, the reasonable quantum meruit fee of the attorney, as
determined by the [B]oard, and the costs of the proceedings may be
assessed against the employer.
(Emphasis supplied.) In the instant case, however, Daniels did not prevail on her
claimsfor benefits under the Workers’CompensationAct. Accordingly, the superior
court did not err byaffirming the Board’s denial of her request for attorneyfees. See,
1
OCGA §34-9-221, inturn, requiresanemployer topaybenefitsor controvert
the claim within 21 days of its knowledge of the injury. OCGA § 34-9-221 (b), (d).
6
e. g., Dasher v. City of Valdosta, 217 Ga. App. 351, 352 (2) (457 SE2d 259) (1995)
(in light of the fact that the employee failed to show that he was entitled to disability
benefits, the employer was not liable for attorney fees under OCGA § § 34-9-221 or
34-9-108).
Judgment affirmed. Brown, J., concurs. Miller, P. J., dissents.*
THIS OPINION IS PHYSICAL PRECEDENT ONLY. COURT OF
APPEALS RULE 33.2 (a).
7
A18A1764.DANIELv.BREMEN-BOWDON INVESTMENT,CO.
et al.
MILLER, Presiding Judge, dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision for the reasons
stated in my dissenting opinion in Frett v. State Farm Employee Workers’
Compensation, 348 Ga. App. 30, 37-40 (821 SE2d 132) (2018). In my view, the
ALJ correctly determined that Daniel’s injury was compensable, and I would
therefore reverse the ruling of the superior court.