NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 26 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRADLEY L. NELSON, No. 18-15330
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:13-cv-00956-DCB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
HIBU, INC., FKA Yellowbook, Inc.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
David C. Bury, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 19, 2019**
Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Bradley L. Nelson appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in his action alleging federal employment claims. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Am. Tower Corp. v. City of San
Diego, 763 F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 2014). We affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Nelson’s claims
arising from his January 27, 2011 and December 6, 2011 Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) charges because these claims were barred by
the applicable statute of limitations. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Scholar v.
Pac. Bell, 963 F.2d 264, 266-67 (9th Cir. 1992) (90-day deadline to file a Title VII
action “constitutes a statute of limitations” and if plaintiff “fails to file within [the]
90-day period, the action is barred”). We reject as meritless Nelson’s contention
that the continuing violations doctrine applies.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Nelson’s
disability, age, and sex discrimination claims, as well as Nelson’s retaliation claim,
because Nelson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for defendant’s actions were pretextual. See
Curley v. City of N. Las Vegas, 772 F.3d 629, 632 (9th Cir. 2014) (burden-shifting
framework applies to disability discrimination claim under the Americans with
Disabilities Act); Shelley v. Geren, 666 F.3d 599, 606-08 (9th Cir. 2012) (burden-
shifting framework applies to age discrimination claims under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act); Porter v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 419 F.3d 885,
894 (9th Cir. 2005) (burden-shifting framework applies to Title VII retaliation
claims); Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061-62 (9th Cir.
2002) (burden-shifting framework applies to sex discrimination claims under Title
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VII; circumstantial evidence of pretext must be specific and substantial).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Nelson’s motion
for a discovery continuance because Nelson failed to demonstrate that he suffered
any actual and substantial prejudice. See Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 342 F.3d
1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A district court is vested with broad discretion to
permit or deny discovery, and a decision to deny discovery will not be disturbed
except upon the clearest showing that the denial of discovery results in actual and
substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant.” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
AFFIRMED.
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