FILED
Feb 28 2019, 10:21 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
David A. Singleton Kelly A. Roth
Chad E. Romey AMERICAN FAMILY INSURANCE
BLACKBURN & GREEN LEGAL DEPARTMENT
Fort Wayne, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
David Martin, February 28, 2019
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-SC-1648
v. Appeal from the Allen Superior
Court
Jose Ramos, The Honorable Craig J. Bobay,
Appellee-Defendant. Judge
The Honorable Thomas P. Boyer,
Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
02D01-1801-SC-1548
Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-SC-1648 | February 28, 2019 Page 1 of 16
Case Summary
[1] David Martin (“Martin”) filed a Notice of Claim in the Allen Superior Court
Small Claims Division, alleging that he had sustained physical injuries in a
vehicular collision with Jose Ramos (“Ramos”). The trial court found Ramos
to be 100% at fault for the collision but denied Martin damages, concluding that
Martin had not established causation. Martin filed a motion to correct error,
which was denied, and he now appeals. We reverse and remand.
Issues
[2] Martin presents two restated issues for review:
I. Whether expert medical testimony is unnecessary in small
claims proceedings designed to administer justice
expediently; and
II. Whether the trial court misapplied the law in determining
that Martin had not established causation.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] Martin filed a Notice of Claim on January 30, 2018. A bench trial was
conducted on April 30, 2018 but it was not recorded. Pursuant to Indiana
Appellate Rule 31, the trial court certified a Statement of Evidence.1 We derive
1
Indiana Appellate Rule 31(A) provides in part: “If no Transcript of all or part of the evidence is available, a
party or the party’s attorney may prepare a verified statement of the evidence from the best available sources,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-SC-1648 | February 28, 2019 Page 2 of 16
our recitation of facts from that Statement of Evidence, which provides in
relevant part:
The Plaintiff testified that he was stopped while traveling on
West Creighton Avenue in Fort Wayne, Indiana, when his
vehicle was struck from the rear by a vehicle being driven by the
Defendant, Jose Ramos.
Plaintiff further testified that he received treatment as a result of
the collision at Lutheran Hospital, where he complained of pain
in the following areas:
a. at the base of the left side of the skull;
b. along the left side of his neck;
c. in the center of his neck;
d. in the mid axillary region under his left arm; and
e. in his left shoulder.
He rated his pain as a seven (7) out of ten (10), with ten being the
greatest amount of pain.
Plaintiff further testified that a CT scan of his cervical spine
showed some preexisting conditions. He testified that he had
which may include the party’s or the attorney’s recollection. The party shall then file a motion to certify the
statement of evidence with the trial court[.]”
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experienced pain in his neck prior to the wreck, but the wreck
caused increased pain for a period of time.
Prior to discharge from Lutheran Hospital, the Plaintiff had to be
cleared by a neurosurgeon, Dr. Jeffrey Kachmann, because the
CT scan of his head showed “left front post traumatic
subarachnoid hemorrhage.”
Plaintiff was released from the hospital after agreeing that he was
required to have someone with him at all times. Dr. Kachmann
told the Plaintiff to be on guard for any possible neurological
changes, including seizures, weakness, numbness, or tingling in
the legs. Plaintiff testified that this warning made him very
worried as he left the hospital.
Plaintiff testified that he later visited Parkview Physicians Group
on January 11, 2017, due to ongoing back pain and neck stiffness
since the collision. His pain was achy generally, but sharp if he
bent forward. The pain was underneath his shoulder blades
toward the middle of the back. He also complained of sharp pain
in his left arm when he reached backwards. He was told to
return in four weeks, but his pain remained intense and he
returned on January 26 with continued complaints of neck pain.
His back pain had improved by that time, but then flared again
which caused him to visit Parkview Hospital on March 25, 2017.
Plaintiff admitted he did have some pre-existing conditions, but
that the collision aggravated those symptoms for a period of time.
Overall, his symptoms went on for two (2) or three (3) months,
after which the Plaintiff return[ed] to his baseline condition.
Plaintiff admitted that in the past he had participated in various
sporting activities and sustained injuries.
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Plaintiff admitted that he suffers from bipolar disorder and
receives Medicare benefits.
Defendant admitted that he was at fault in causing the rear-end
vehicle collision with Plaintiff.
Defendant testified that he was traveling at five (5) to ten (10)
miles per hour at the time of the collision.
Defendant testified that Plaintiff and Defendant spoke to each
other moments after the collision, and that Plaintiff did not make
any complaints of pain at that time.
Statement of Evidence, pgs. 1-2. Martin also submitted his medical records into
evidence.
[4] On May 14, 2018, the trial court entered an order providing in pertinent part:
On December 8, 2016, Plaintiff was involved in an automobile
collision on Lafayette Street. Defendant was 100% at fault in
causing the collision.
It is Plaintiff’s contention that the collision caused injuries
(damages) to his head, neck, chest, back, and shoulder.
Plaintiff has the burden of proving by a reasonable medical
probability that the collision caused his injuries. Topp v. Laffers,
838 N.E.2d 1027 (Ind. App. 2005).
Prior to December 8, 2016, Plaintiff had a history of injuries to
his neck and back regions.
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The results of Plaintiff’s CT scans and X-rays taken on December
8, 2016 reflect multilevel degenerative changes in his cervical
spine and mild arthritic changes in his left shoulder.
The injuries that Plaintiff claims were caused by the collision are
subjective in nature. A subjective complaint or injury is
perceived or experienced by the patient and reported to the
patient’s doctor but is not directly observable by the doctor.
Foddrill v. Crane, 894 N.E.2d 1070 (Ind. App. 2008).
In order to establish causation based on the facts and
circumstances of this case Plaintiff needs an expert medical
opinion. Daub v. Daub, 629 N.E.2d 873 (Ind. App. 1994); Topp v.
Laffers, 838 N.E.2d 1027 (Ind. App. 2005).
The medical records submitted into evidence and Plaintiff’s lay
testimony regarding his injuries are not sufficient to establish
within a reasonable medical probability that the collision on
December 8, 2016 caused injuries to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of proof on the issue of
causation.
Appealed Order at 1.
[5] Martin filed a motion to correct error. He contended that the trial court had
erroneously relied upon Topp and Daub “to determine that [he] needed to
present expert medical opinion to establish causation” because those decisions
involved jury trials. (App. at 92.) Martin also argued, “although a plaintiff in a
small claims case still has the burden of proof for his claims, the evidentiary
standard to meet that burden of proof cannot be equated to the standard
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applicable in a jury setting; otherwise, the entire purpose of the small claims
process would be defeated.” Id. at 93-94. The motion to correct error was
denied. Martin appeals.
Discussion and Decision
Standard of Review
[6] Small claims judgments are “subject to review as prescribed by relevant Indiana
rules and statutes.” Ind. Small Claims Rule 11(A). Martin had the burden of
proof on his small claims action and now appeals a negative judgment. When a
party appeals from a negative judgment, we will reverse only if the decision of
the trial court is contrary to law. LTL Truck Service, LLC v. Safeguard, Inc., 817
N.E.2d 664, 667 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). A decision is contrary to law if the
evidence and reasonable inferences lead to but one conclusion and the trial
court has reached the opposite conclusion. Id. However, the deferential
standard applied to findings of fact does not apply to the substantive rules of
law, which are reviewed de novo. Hastetter v. Fetter Props., LLC, 873 N.E.2d
679, 683 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
Necessity for Expert Testimony in Small Claims
[7] Martin claims that “expert medical opinion is not necessary to prove causation
of a subjective personal injury in a small claims action.” Appellant’s Brief at
15. He points out that small claims proceedings are intended to be informal,
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cost-effective, and expedient, even if complex issues are presented. In sum, he
asserts that:
Requiring expert medical opinion in a small claims action is
contrary to public policy because it will defeat the purpose of the
small claims court; it will create a chilling effect on those
plaintiffs with small claims for subjective injuries; it will
unnecessarily increase the burden on superior and circuit courts;
it will result in an unjust windfall to tortfeasors; and it will create
confusion for both plaintiffs and defendants alike.
Id. at 23.
[8] Martin correctly observes that small claims proceedings are to be informal.
Indiana Small Claims Rule 8(A) provides: “The trial shall be informal, with the
sole objective of dispensing speedy justice between the parties according to the
rules of substantive law, and shall not be bound by the statutory provisions or
rules of practice, procedure, pleadings or evidence except provisions relating to
privileged communications and offers of compromise.” Nonetheless, despite
the informality of the proceedings, the parties in a small claims court bear the
same burdens of proof as they would in a regular civil action on the same
issues. LTL Truck Service, 817 N.E.2d at 668. Although “the method of proof
may be informal, the relaxation of evidentiary rules is not the equivalent of
relaxation of the burden of proof.” Id. Thus, it remains incumbent upon the
party who bears the burden of proof to demonstrate that it is entitled to the
recovery sought. Id. The burden of proof with respect to damages is with the
plaintiff. Id. (citing Noble Roman’s, Inc. v. Ward, 760 N.E.2d 1132, 1140 (Ind.
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Ct. App. 2002)). Martin’s public-policy arguments are unavailing; he was
required to prove his negligence claim without deviation from the substantive
law. We turn to consideration of whether the trial court properly applied the
law when it determined that Martin failed to meet his burden.
Establishment of Negligence Claim
[9] “The tort of negligence consists of three elements: (1) a duty owed to the
plaintiff by the defendant; (2) a breach of that duty by the defendant; and (3)
injury to the plaintiff proximately caused by that breach.” Kincade v. MAC
Corp., 773 N.E.2d 909, 911 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Ramos conceded, and the
trial court found, that he was at fault for causing the collision. The third
element was in dispute. In reliance upon Daub v. Daub, 629 N.E.2d 873 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied, and Topp v. Leffers, 838 N.E.2d 1027, 1033 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied (finding necessity of expert witness testimony when
the issue of causation is not within the understanding of a layperson), the trial
court concluded that Martin’s testimony and medical records were insufficient
to establish causation. Martin argues that the trial court erroneously relied
upon decisions that he views as “inapplicable because the concerns presented in
those cases regarding a lay juror’s ability to comprehend medical evidence are
not present in a small claims setting.” Appellant’s Brief at 15. He observes that
small claims courts are routinely required to resolve complex issues.
[10] To the extent that Martin suggests the burden of proof is lessened in a small
claims case, we have already rejected that contention. To the extent that he
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suggests a small claims judge has specialized medical knowledge a layperson or
juror does not, we find that argument unpersuasive. The trial court need not
have disregarded the reasoning of Daub and Topp simply because the fact-
finders were jurors in those cases.
[11] That said, the cases do not create a rule of law that expert medical testimony is
always required in personal injury cases. If a layperson can readily understand
the causation, an expert opinion is not necessary. “An essential element in a
cause of action for negligence is the requirement of a reasonable connection
between a defendant’s conduct and the damages which a plaintiff has suffered.”
Daub, 629 N.E.2d at 877. “When an injury is objective in nature, the plaintiff is
competent to testify as to the injury and such testimony may be sufficient for
the jury to render a verdict without expert medical testimony.” Id. But a
“causal connection between a permanent condition, an injury, and a pre-
existing affliction or condition is a complicated medical question.” Topp, 838
N.E.2d at 1033 (citing Daub, 629 N.E.2d at 877-78)). Expert testimony is
needed then because a layperson is unable to understand causation in those
circumstances. Id.
[12] In Daub, Patricia Daub had slipped on snow and ice on her in-laws’ patio,
feeling a jerk but not pain. See Daub, 629 N.E.2d at 877. The next day, she felt
stiffening. She subsequently received chiropractic treatment and was
hospitalized for ten days. She underwent two back surgeries, and then slipped
and fell at a grocery store. Years earlier, she had been struck by a car and she
had also sustained a whiplash injury. See id. Daub testified in the trial of her
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personal injury action against her in-laws, but she was unable to distinguish
between her various back problems. On appeal, we addressed the deficiency of
her testimony relative to causation:
[I]t is so lacking in probative value on the question of cause in
fact that it offers the jury at best only the mere possibility that her
back ailment was in fact caused by the slip Mrs. Daub
experienced at her in-laws. The distinctions between Mrs.
Daubs’ various back problems are not objectively discernible,
even to Mrs. Daub. The temporal congruity which Mrs. Daub
recognized between the slip and her lower back pain is
admittedly some evidence of causation, which when coupled
with a diagnosis of the nature of her ailment, and an application
of scientific principles by one knowledgeable in the treatment of
the ailment, may be sufficient to permit a jury to find for the
Daubs without resort to speculation. But, in the absence of that
additional evidence, Mrs. Daubs’ lay report of the facts which
she experienced first-hand amounts to nothing more than her
own hypothesis that her back ailment was caused by the slip.
Alone, Mrs. Daub has established nothing more than the facts
which make up her allegation.
Id. at 878.
[13] The Topp panel relied upon the reasoning of Daub and likewise concluded that
the testimony of an expert medical witness was necessary to establish the
element of causation in her claim for aggravation of pre-existing injuries. 838
N.E.2d at 1033. Yvonne Topp was a passenger in a vehicle that was rear-
ended; upon impact, she hit her head and experienced immediate intense pain.
See Topp, 838 N.E.2d at 1029. The next day, she had pain in her neck and
back. Topp, who had already been in several car accidents, sued for
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aggravation of pre-existing injuries. Topp’s injuries were subjective in nature,
rather than objective, because she perceived an injury and reported it to her
doctor, but the injury was not one the doctor could observe. Id. at 1033.
[14] The Court discussed the necessary burden of proof:
Because Topp’s injuries were subjective in nature, her testimony
alone was not sufficient to prove causation without expert
medical testimony. Daub, 629 N.E.2d at 877. Furthermore,
because of Topp’s pre-existing injuries, discerning the causal
connection between the November 2000 accident and Topp’s
resulting injuries is a complicated medical question that is not
within the understanding of a lay person. Id. at 877-78.
Therefore, it was necessary for Topp to introduce the testimony
of an expert medical witness on the issue of causation. Id. Here,
Topp did introduce testimony from expert witnesses[.] . . . A
plaintiff’s burden may not be carried with evidence based merely
upon supposition or speculation. Id. at 877. Evidence
establishing a mere possibility of cause or which lacks reasonable
certainty or probability is not sufficient evidence by itself to
support a verdict. Id.
Topp, 838 N.E.2d at 1033. Because Topp’s physicians could opine only that her
injuries “possibly” or “may” have been aggravated in the accident, or had noted
“apparent” aggravation, causation was not established. Id. at 1034.
[15] Martin asserts that his medical records indicate an objective injury – a “left
front post traumatic subarachnoid hemorrhage.” Statement of the Evidence at
2. The hemorrhage noted in Martin’s medical records was “observable by the
doctor” and discoverable independent of a patient report. See Topp, 838 N.E.2d
at 1033. As such, Martin documented an objective injury. The salient inquiry
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was then whether the “occurrence was a cause in fact of his injury.” Smith v.
Beaty, 639 N.E.2d 1029, 1033 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). In some circumstances,
causation may be demonstrated without a medical expert stating an opinion to
a degree of medical certainty. Id. at 1034.
[16] In Smith, Larry Smith (“Smith”) had been involved in a rollover of his work van
and he was trapped inside when a semi-tractor trailer impacted the van,
allowing Smith to extricate himself. See id. at 1031. Smith was treated for five
fractured ribs. His physician could not say whether the rollover or the impact
of the semi caused those injuries. On appeal from the grant of judgment on the
evidence to the semi driver, a panel of this Court examined the availability of
proving causation by circumstantial evidence:
Causation, or the requirement of a reasonable connection
between a defendant’s conduct and the damages which a plaintiff
has suffered, is an essential element in a negligence action. Daub
v. Daub (1994), Ind. App., 629 N.E.2d 873, 877, trans. denied. …
Causation in a negligence case need not always be proven by
expert testimony. See Barrow v. Talbott (1981), Ind. App., 417
N.E.2d 917, 923 n.3. Causation may be proven by circumstantial
evidence if the evidence has sufficient probative force to
constitute a basis for a legal inference rather than mere
speculation. Id. When the issue of causation is within the
understanding of a lay person, testimony of an expert witness is
not necessary. See Daub, 629 N.E.2d at 878 (causal connection
between permanent condition, injury and pre-existing condition
ordinarily a complicated medical question requiring expert
opinion).
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Smith, 639 N.E.2d 1033-34. In that case, Smith had been able to testify that,
after the rollover, he had been able to move his arm through a harness without
rib pain and had felt pain only after the semi impact. We concluded that a lay
person would be able to determine that the driver’s conduct “was a cause of
Smith’s injuries.” Id. at 1034 (emphasis in original).
[17] The question of proximate cause is generally one left to the factfinder. Rhodes v.
Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 388 (Ind. 2004). “This tends to be the case because the
question of causation often requires a weighing of disputed facts.” J.B. Hunt
Transport, Inc. v. Guardianship of Zak, 58 N.E.3d 956, 972 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
However, causation may be resolved as a matter of law when only a single
conclusion can be drawn from the facts. Id.
[18] Absent a jury, a trial court acts both as gatekeeper of the evidence to be
considered and the fact-finder. Martin testified that he experienced an increase
in pain after the vehicular collision. But here in addressing the question of
causation, the court foreclosed from its consideration evidence that was not
expert medical testimony. Yet, as we observed in Daub, the “temporal
congruity” between an event and experiencing pain is “admittedly some
evidence of causation.” 629 N.E.2d at 878. It was therefore error for the trial
court to conclude as a matter of law that Martin failed to present evidence on
the issue of causation.
[19] It is the plaintiff who determines the injuries for which he will seek
compensation. And, it is true that the more complex the causal relationship is
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to the injury claimed, the greater the need for expert testimony on the issue
presented in order for the plaintiff to meet his burden of proof. But Martin’s
claim was not for complex or permanent injuries – he simply sought
compensation for pain associated with the rear-end automobile accident.
[20] Martin had previously experienced pain in his neck and back. He testified that
he felt increased pain after the collision, and the degree and persistency of that
pain caused him to seek medical treatment at a hospital. Like the plaintiff in
Smith, Martin reported to Lutheran Hospital staff a pain that he had not
complained of before the accident (i.e., pain at the base of the skull). A CT
scan revealed a post traumatic subarachnoid hemorrhage. Martin’s medical
records included documentation that Martin was considered at medical risk
such that he could be discharged only under supervision. He was advised to be
alert to any neurological changes.
[21] In addition to his submitting medical records, Martin was a competent witness
to testify regarding his pain. Daub, 629 N.E.2d at 877. As in Smith, the
evidence of record in this non-complex claim for temporary injury is such that a
layperson could readily understand whether or not the collision was a cause of
injury to Martin.2 Martin presented circumstantial evidence having “sufficient
probative force to constitute a basis for a legal inference rather than mere
2
“The defendant’s act need not be the sole cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.” Smith, 639 N.E.2d at 1034.
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speculation.” Smith, 639 N.E.2d at 1034. Martin did not fail to meet his
burden of proof on causation.
[22] Martin testified and presented documentation regarding injury
contemporaneous with the collision for which Ramos was at fault. The lack of
complexity is such that a factfinder can determine issues of causation and
damages without expert testimony. We remand for such determinations by the
fact-finder.
Conclusion
[23] Martin was required to prove his negligence claim without deviation from the
substantive law. However, the trial court’s conclusion that Martin failed to
establish causation as a matter of law is contrary to the evidence. We remand
for further consideration consistent with this opinion.
[24] Reversed and remanded.
Bradford, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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