[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-16562 JUNE 15, 2005
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 03-00539-CV-J-32MCR
DANIEL C. MEDBERRY,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
JAMES CROSBY,
Respondent-Appellee.
__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(June 15, 2005)
Before HULL, WILSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Florida state prisoner Daniel C. Medberry appeals pro se the denial by the
district court of his pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
section 2254. Because the petition was moot when filed and the “capable-of-
repetition” exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply, we affirm the
dismissal of his petition by the district court.
In his habeas petition, Medberry challenged his placement on close
management status from September 21, 2000, until December 18, 2001, because of
disciplinary problems. The district court dismissed Medberry’s petition as moot
because his placement in close management was completed before Medberry filed
his habeas petition on March 4, 2003. The court granted a certificate of
appealability as to whether it erred “in dismissing this action as moot because the
‘capable repetition but evading review’ exception to the mootness doctrine applies
in this case.” We review questions of mootness de novo. See Crown Media, LLC
v. Gwinnett County, Ga., 380 F.3d 1317, 1323 (11th Cir. 2004).
“[I]t is proper for a district court to treat a petition for release from
administrative segregation as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus” because
“[s]uch release falls into the category of ‘fact or duration of . . . physical
imprisonment.’” Medberry v. Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049, 1053 (11th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Krist v. Ricketts, 504 F.2d 887, 887-88 (5th Cir. 1974)). In Medberry,
we concluded that when “a prisoner has completed an imposed term of
administrative segregation before he files his petition, . . . the ‘petition is moot
when filed and cannot be revived by collateral consequences.’” Id. (quoting
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McCollum v. Miller, 695 F.2d 1044, 1048 (7th Cir. 1982)). Because Medberry
was released from close management in December 2001, a year and three months
before he filed his habeas petition, the petition was moot when filed in March
2003.
There is a recognized “exception to the general rule [of mootness] in cases
that are ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review.’” Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S.
478, 482, 102 S. Ct. 1181, 1183 (1982). “[T]he capable-of-repetition doctrine
applies only in exceptional situations, and generally only where the named
plaintiff can make a reasonable showing that he will again be subjected to the
alleged illegality.” Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109, 103 S. Ct. 1660, 1669
(1983) (citation omitted). To qualify for the exception, two elements must be
simultaneously present: “(1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to
be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable
expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action
again.” Murphy, 455 U.S. at 482, 102 S. Ct. at 1183. “[T]here must be a
‘reasonable expectation’ or a ‘demonstrated probability’ that the same controversy
will recur involving the same complaining party.” Id. at 482, 102 S. Ct. at 1184
(emphasis added).
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This exception does not apply to Medberry’s petition. As to the first
element, the challenged action is not too short in duration to be fully litigated.
Although Medberry’s placement in close management was completed by the time
he reached federal court, the Florida district and appellate courts considered the
merits of his claim. As to the second element, Medberry has not established that
there is a reasonable expectation that he will be subjected to the same action again.
Although Medberry has presented numerous administrative reports that detail his
interaction with prison authorities and his placement in close management, these
reports and grievances do not show that the same circumstances about which
Medberry complained in his habeas petition were the impetus for any later
placement of Medberry in close management. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105-06, 103
S. Ct. at 1667; Murphy, 455 U.S. at 484, 102 S. Ct. at 1181. Instead, the various
reports and grievances show that Medberry often receives discipline; they do not
show that the same circumstances repeatedly give rise to the discipline.
Because the exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply, the district
court properly dismissed Medberry’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus as moot.
AFFIRMED.
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