J. S06041/19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
LLOYD T. REID, : No. 1563 EDA 2018
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the PCRA Order, May 2, 2018,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0405461-1991
BEFORE: BOWES, J., DUBOW, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
JUDGMENT ORDER BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 06, 2019
Lloyd T. Reid appeals pro se from the May 2, 2018 order dismissing his
petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 9541-9546, as untimely. After careful review, we affirm.
Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of life imprisonment after
a jury found him guilty of first-degree murder1 and related offenses in
connection with the March 1991 shooting death of James Boswell. On
March 7, 1996, a panel of this court affirmed appellant’s judgment of
sentence, and our supreme court denied allowance of appeal on July 21,
1997.2 See Commonwealth v. Reid, 678 A.2d 832 (Pa.Super. 1996)
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2501.
2 We note that the PCRA court opinion incorrectly states that appellant did not
file a direct appeal in this matter. (See PCRA court opinion, 8/30/18 at 1.)
J. S06041/19
(unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 698 A.2d 593 (Pa. 1997).
Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition on August 23, 2012, and an amended
pro se PCRA petition on March 28, 2016. David Rudenstein, Esq., was
appointed to represent appellant on October 5, 2017, but was subsequently
granted permission to withdraw pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544
A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213
(Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc). Following the issuance of a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1)
notice on April 2, 2018, the PCRA court dismissed appellant’s petition without
a hearing on May 2, 2018. This timely appeal followed on May 17, 2018.
All PCRA petitions, including second and subsequent petitions, must be
filed within one year of when a defendant’s judgment of sentence becomes
final. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). “[A] judgment becomes final at the
conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme
Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the
expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).
Here, the record reveals that appellant’s judgment of sentence became
final on October 19, 1997, 90 days after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
denied allowance of appeal and the deadline for filing a petition for writ of
certiorari in the United States Supreme Court expired. Accordingly, appellant
had until October 19, 1998, to file a timely PCRA petition. Appellant’s petition
was filed on August 23, 2012, almost 14 years after his judgment of sentence
became final, and is patently untimely, unless appellant can plead and prove
-2-
J. S06041/19
that one of the three statutory exceptions to the one-year jurisdictional time-
bar applies.3
Appellant contends that his sentence of life imprisonment is
unconstitutional in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana,
136 S.Ct. 718 (2016). (Appellant’s brief at 7-18.) In Miller, the Supreme
Court recognized a constitutional right for juveniles, holding that “mandatory
life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes
violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against ‘cruel and unusual
punishments.’” Miller, 567 U.S. at 465. In Montgomery, the Supreme Court
3 The three statutory exceptions to the PCRA time-bar are as follows:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the
result of interference by government officials
with the presentation of the claim in violation of
the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated
were unknown to the petitioner and could not
have been ascertained by the exercise of due
diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that
was recognized by the Supreme Court of the
United States or the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania after the time period provided in
this section and has been held by that court to
apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).
-3-
J. S06041/19
recently held that its rule announced in Miller applies retroactively on
collateral review. Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 736. However, as appellant
concedes in his brief, he was 24 years old at the time he committed the
crimes in question. (See appellant’s brief at 6, 11.) As such, Miller and
Montgomery are inapplicable. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Furgess, 149
A.3d 90, 91-94 (Pa.Super. 2016) (holding that petitioners who were older than
18 at the time they committed murder are not within the ambit of the Miller
decision and, therefore, may not rely on that decision to invoke a PCRA
time-bar exception).
Accordingly, we discern no error on the part of the PCRA court in
dismissing appellant’s PCRA petition as untimely.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/6/19
-4-