MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Mar 11 2019, 7:31 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jerome Williams Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Michigan City, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Natalie F. Weiss
Patricia C. McMath
Deputy Attorneys General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jerome Williams, March 11, 2019
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CT-834
v. Appeal from the
LaPorte Superior Court
Ron Neal, et al., The Honorable
Appellees-Respondents. Michael S. Bergerson, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
46D01-1704-CT-833
Kirsch, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CT-834 | March 11 2019 Page 1 of 7
[1] Jerome Williams (“Williams”) appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his
complaint against nine employees of the Indiana State Prison, whom he claims
violated his rights under Article 1, Sections 3 and 9 of the Indiana Constitution.
Williams raises two issues, which we restate as:
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting the
State’s motion to stay discovery; and
II. Whether Williams’s complaint should have been dismissed
under Indiana Trial Rule 12(b)(6) for bringing an impermissible
private right of action under the Indiana Constitution.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On July 20, 2014, Williams sent a request to enter into a book publishing
contract to Warden William Wilson (“Warden Wilson”), the previous warden
at the Indiana State Prison. Appellant’s App. at 44. Warden Wilson denied the
request, and Williams filed a grievance. Id. Williams later sued Warden
Wilson in federal court. Id. at 45.
[4] After Williams sued Warden Wilson, nine Indiana State Prison employees took
actions adverse to Williams. Id. at 45-52. On April 22, 2015, Williams
petitioned for restoration of good time credit, but Warden Ron Neal (“Warden
Neal”), Warden Wilson’s successor, denied the petition. Id. at 42, 45-46.
Executive Assistants Long and Howard Morton prevented him from appealing
Warden Neal’s decision. Id. at 46.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CT-834 | March 11 2019 Page 2 of 7
[5] On July 29, 2015, Williams went to the law library to research issues related to
his federal lawsuit against Warden Wilson. Id. at 48. Williams asked law
library supervisor Bessie Leonard (“Supervisor Leonard”) to provide him with
an extended pass so that he could continue his research throughout the week.
Id. Supervisor Leonard denied the request, explaining that Williams could visit
the law library only once per week. Id.
[6] On July 30, 2015, another inmate who worked in the library approached
Williams and threatened to beat and rape Williams if he returned to the library.
Id. at 49. The next day, the same inmate, while brandishing a knife, intruded
into Williams’s cell. Id. Williams disarmed the inmate, chased him out of his
cell, and was “forced to stab him due to his continuous aggressions against
me.” Id. Lieutenant Pauline Williams had failed to protect Williams from the
other inmate and after the incident, Lieutenant Williams escorted Williams
through the correctional facility in full shackles. Id. at 50.
[7] Because of this incident, Captain Harrison Yancey placed Williams in a
“bubble cell.” Id. While Williams was under investigation, Captain Steven
Hough confiscated Williams’s typewriter. Id. Case Manager Victoria Taylor
presided over the hearing that addressed the stabbing incident and prevented
Williams from presenting a self-defense claim. Id. at 44. Case Manager Taylor
found Williams guilty of assault for stabbing the other inmate. Id. at 52.
[8] In September of 2015, Williams attempted to mail a package to the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People to get legal representation.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CT-834 | March 11 2019 Page 3 of 7
Id. at 51. Case Manager Jacqueline Mayes returned the package to Williams,
explaining he could not mail it because it was not considered legal mail. Id.
[9] Williams filed a complaint against the nine employees, claiming they violated
his right to freedom of speech under Article 1, Sections 3 and 9 of the Indiana
Constitution by retaliating against him for filing a lawsuit against Warden
Wilson. Id. at 41-52. In his January 3, 2018 Amended Complaint, Williams
sought compensatory damages in the amount of $376,000.00 and $180,000.00
in punitive damages and declaratory relief. Id. at 69-70.
[10] On January 2, 2018, the State received Williams’s interrogatories. Id. at 10.
The trial court granted the State to and including February 16, 2018 to respond
to Williams’s request. Id. at 90. On January 22, 2018, the State filed a motion
to dismiss Williams’s complaint, alleging that under Indiana Trial Rule
12(b)(6), Williams had failed to file a claim upon which he could obtain relief.
Id. at 92-100. On February 20, 2018, the State filed a motion to stay discovery
pending disposition of the motion to dismiss; the trial court granted the motion
to stay on February 20, 2018. Id. at 12; 110-14. On March 12, 2018, citing
Indiana Trial Rule 12(b)(6), the trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss.
Notice of Appeal at 5. Williams now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[11] Williams claims the trial court: 1) abused its discretion in granting the State’s
motion to stay discovery; and 2) erred in granting the trial court’s motion to
dismiss pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(b)(6).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CT-834 | March 11 2019 Page 4 of 7
[12] We review a ruling on a motion to stay under an abuse of discretion standard.
In re Stephen L. Chapman Irrevocable Trust Agreement, 953 N.E.2d 573, 577 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2011). A trial court abuses its discretion only if its decision is “clearly
erroneous, against the logic and effect of the facts before it and the inferences
which may be drawn from it.” Fry v. Schroder, 986 N.E.2d 821, 823 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2013). If there is any rational basis or evidence to support the trial court’s
decision, we will uphold it. Id. Courts in civil proceedings have an inherent
power to stay its proceedings. Hardiman v. Cozmanoff, 4 N.E.3d 1148, 1152
(Ind. 2014). In determining whether to impose a stay, courts may consider:
(1) the interest of the plaintiff in proceeding expeditiously with
the litigation or any particular aspect of it, and the potential
prejudice to the plaintiff of a delay; (2) the burden which any
particular aspect of the proceedings may impose on the
defendant; (3) the convenience of the court in the management of
its cases, and the efficient use of judicial resources; (4) the
interests of persons not parties to the civil litigation; and (5) the
interest of the public in pending civil and criminal litigation.
Fry, 986 N.E.2d at 823.
[13] Here, granting the motion to stay pending disposition of the motion to dismiss
served the trial court’s and the parties’ interest in judicial economy. Because
the State had filed a motion to dismiss, it was possible that Williams’s requests
for discovery would be rendered moot. Thus, the trial court sensibly granted
the State’s motion to stay pending disposition of the motion to dismiss. In
doing so, it streamlined the litigation and conserved judicial resources. Thus,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State’s motion to stay.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CT-834 | March 11 2019 Page 5 of 7
[14] Moving to Williams’s second issue, we find that the trial court did not err in
granting the State’s motion to dismiss because Williams was impermissibly
bringing a private right of action under the Indiana Constitution.
[15] A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
tests the legal sufficiency of the claims, not the facts supporting it. Charter One
Mortg. Corp. v. Condra, 865 N.E.2d 602, 604 (Ind. 2007); Caesars Riverboat Casino,
LLC v. Kephart, 934 N.E.2d 1120, 1122 (Ind. 2010). Accordingly, this court
reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion for failure to state a claim de novo.
Charter One Mortg. Corp., 865 N.E.2d at 604. The test a reviewing court applies
when ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted is whether the complaint is “sufficient to constitute any valid
claim.” Smith v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 871 N.E.2d 975, 982 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007),
trans. denied. The pleadings are viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, with every reasonable inference construed in the
nonmovant’s favor. Droscha v. Shepherd, 931 N.E.2d 882, 887 (Ind. Ct. App.
2010). A reviewing court will affirm a trial court’s decision if the facts alleged
in the underlying complaint are “incapable of supporting relief under any set of
circumstances.” Clifford v. Marion Cty. Prosecuting Attorney, 654 N.E.2d 805, 810
(Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
[16] The trial court did not err in granting the State’s motion to dismiss pursuant to
Indiana Trial Rule 12(b)(6) because Williams cannot, as a matter of law, bring a
private right of action under the Indiana Constitution. A private right of action
is an individual’s right to sue in a personal capacity to enforce a legal claim.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CT-834 | March 11 2019 Page 6 of 7
Private right of action, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). “[N]o Indiana
court has explicitly recognized a private right of action for monetary damages
under the Indiana Constitution.” City of Indianapolis v. Cox, 20 N.E.3d 201, 212
(Ind. Ct. App. 2014); see also Smith, 871 N.E.2d at 985 (“there is no express or
implied right of action for monetary damages under the Indiana
Constitution.”). Here, Williams filed a complaint seeking compensatory and
punitive damages under Article 1, Sections 3 and 9, of the Indiana Constitution.
Thus, he initiated a private right of action under the Indiana Constitution,
which our well-established precedent does not allow. This means that his
action, as pleaded, was incapable of obtaining relief under any circumstances.
Clifford, 654 N.E.2d at 810. Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting the
State’s Indiana Trial Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which claim may be granted.
[17] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Robb, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CT-834 | March 11 2019 Page 7 of 7