MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2019 ME 39
Docket: Pen-18-402
Submitted
On Briefs: February 20, 2019
Decided: March 12, 2019
Panel: ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
IN RE CHILD OF AMANDA H.
PER CURIAM
[¶1] Amanda H. appeals from a judgment of the District Court (Bangor,
Jordan, J.) terminating her parental rights to her child. 22 M.R.S.
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii) (2018).1 She argues that the court erred in
concluding that she is unfit to parent and that it is in the best interest of the
child to terminate her parental rights. We affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] On April 26, 2017, when the child was three days old, the
Department of Health and Human Services filed a child protection petition and
a request for a preliminary protection order. See 22 M.R.S. § 4032 (2018). The
petition alleged that the mother, who has an extensive history with the
1 The statute was amended twice during the pendency of this case, but not in any way that affects
this appeal. P.L. 2017, ch. 402, § C-69 (effective July 1, 2019); P.L. 2017, ch. 407, § A-85 (effective
Aug. 1, 2018).
2
Department with her other children, failed to address her untreated mental
health issues, was unable to identify and continued to associate with unsafe
persons, and maintained an unsanitary home that was hazardous to children.
The court (Lucy, J.) entered an order transferring custody of the child to the
Department on the same day.
[¶3] On September 28, 2017, the court (Jordan, J.) held a jeopardy
hearing and, thereafter, issued an order finding jeopardy based, in part, on the
mother’s past behavior and her untreated mental health issues. See 22 M.R.S.
§ 4035(1)-(2) (2018). The Department then petitioned for termination of the
mother’s parental rights on December 27, 2017. See 22 M.R.S. § 4052 (2018).
The court held a two-day hearing2 on the petition and, on September 19, 2018,
found by clear and convincing evidence that the mother is unwilling or unable
to protect the child from jeopardy or take responsibility for the child within a
time which is reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs and that
termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child.
See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii).
2 The father consented to termination of his parental rights on the first day of the hearing and is
not a party in this appeal.
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[¶4] The court based its decision on the following factual findings, all of
which are supported by competent evidence in the record.
[The mother] does not take responsibility for her conduct.
She repeatedly blames others for her situation. She also does not
seem to recognize unsafe individuals . . . which is supported by the
numerous protection from abuse and protection from harassment
complaints she has filed against various people.
. . . .
. . . [The mother] has never acknowledged being an unsafe
parent.
. . . .
. . . [U]ntil recently, [the mother’s] life was chaotic. Her
involvement with unsafe people and her extremely filthy housing
continued. . . . [T]he combination of [the mother’s] untreated
mental health problems and low intellectual functioning have
rendered her unable to correct the jeopardy regarding her child. . . .
[T]he evidence is clear and convincing that those same
circumstances are what lead to the jeopardous situation.
[The mother] has apparently made some progress regarding
her living conditions and has been receiving mental health
treatment. However, the Court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that her progress is too little and comes too late for the
Court to allow more time to pass before [the child] gets the
permanency [the child] deserves and is entitled to under law.
Although sparse, these findings were sufficient to “inform the parties and this
Court of the basis of the court’s decision.” In re David G., 659 A.2d 859, 862
(Me. 1995). Nonetheless, because much of the judgment consisted of a
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recitation of the testimony and evidence, we take this opportunity to again
“reiterate the necessity of trial courts making specific findings of fact in
judgments terminating parental rights.” In re Sara K., 611 A.2d 71, 74 (Me.
1992); see also Adoption of Shayleigh S., 2018 ME 165, ¶ 3, 198 A.3d 791.
“Because a court's findings will be affirmed on appeal if they are supported by
any evidence in the record, the recitation of testimony in a judgment is
unnecessary and could be viewed as limiting the support for certain findings to
the recited testimony. If a court accepts a fact stated in testimony and the fact
is important to the judgment, it is best stated as an affirmative finding rather
than as a reference to testimony.” Adoption of Shayleigh S., 2018 ME 165, ¶ 3,
198 A.3d 791 (citation omitted).
II. DISCUSSION
[¶5] Based on the court’s actual findings, all of which have evidentiary
support, the court did not err in determining that, despite the mother’s efforts,
she is unable to protect her child from jeopardy or take responsibility for the
child within a time that is reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.
22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii); In re Thomas D., 2004 ME 104, ¶ 21, 854
A.2d 195. The mother’s arguments, many of which address the weight of the
evidence and the credibility of witnesses, are unavailing. See In re Child of
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Daniel Q., 2018 ME 45, ¶ 2, 182 A.3d 735. There was competent evidence in the
record to support the court’s determination of parental unfitness, including the
mother’s extensive history of mental health issues and the termination of her
parental rights to her other children. See In re Kafia M., 1999 ME 195, ¶ 12, 742
A.2d 919 (“While our inquiry as to ability to protect from jeopardy is
prospective, the evidence we consider is retrospective.”); In re David W., 568
A.2d 513, 515 (Me. 1990) (a finding of jeopardy as to one child can be based on
evidence of a parent’s actions toward another child); see also 22 M.R.S.
§ 4055(1-A)(D) (2018). Although the mother has made some progress in
recent months prior to the termination, the court did not err in concluding that
her progress is “too little and comes too late” for her child. See In re Child of
Eric K., 2018 ME 32, ¶ 3, 180 A.3d 666 (noting that “the time frame which the
court is gauging must be seen from the child’s perspective”) (quotation marks
omitted)). Moreover, the court did not err or abuse its discretion in
determining that the termination of the mother’s parental rights was in her
child’s best interest. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a); In re Thomas H., 2005
ME 123, ¶¶ 16-17, 889 A.2d 297. Title 22 favors permanency; the court,
therefore, did not err in concluding that the termination of the mother’s
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parental rights to allow the child to achieve some permanency was in the child’s
best interest. See id. ¶ 23; 22 M.R.S. § 4050 (2018).
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Robert E. Meggison, Esq., Belfast, for appellant mother
Janet T. Mills, Esq., and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney
General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human Services
Bangor District Court docket number PC-2017-55
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY