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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
ROBERT ARENAS, :
:
Appellant : No. 3924 EDA 2017
Appeal from the PCRA Order November 3, 2017
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002104-2015
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED MARCH 12, 2019
Robert Arenas (Appellant) appeals from the order that dismissed his
petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.
§§ 9541-9546. Upon review, we affirm.
On April 5, 2016, Appellant entered a negotiated plea, under which he
pleaded guilty to robbery, aggravated assault, conspiracy, and possession of
a firearm by a person prohibited, in exchange for an aggregate sentence of
7½ to 15 years’ incarceration plus credit for time served. No direct appeal
was filed.
On January 23, 2017, Appellant timely filed a PCRA petition.
Counsel was appointed and filed an amended petition on May 9, 2017. On
September 29, 2017, the PCRA court issued a notice of its intent to dismiss
Appellant’s petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Appellant
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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did not file a response and on November 3, 2017, the PCRA court dismissed
Appellant’s petition. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal.1 On appeal,
Appellant argues that he is entitled to relief based upon his claim that his
guilty plea resulted from plea counsel’s ineffective assistance. Appellant’s
Brief at 8. The following legal principles apply to Appellant’s claim.
Our standard of review of a PCRA court order granting or denying relief
under the PCRA requires us to determine whether the decision of the PCRA
court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. The
PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the
findings in the certified record. Commonwealth v. Perez, 103 A.3d 344,
347 (Pa. Super. 2014) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
It is well-established that counsel is presumed to have
provided effective representation unless the PCRA petitioner
pleads and proves all of the following: (1) the underlying
legal claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel’s action or
inaction lacked any objectively reasonable basis designed to
effectuate his client’s interest; and (3) prejudice, to the
effect that there was a reasonable probability of a different
outcome if not for counsel’s error.
The PCRA court may deny an ineffectiveness claim if the
petitioner’s evidence fails to meet a single one of these prongs.
Moreover, a PCRA petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating
counsel’s ineffectiveness.
Commonwealth v. Franklin, 990 A.2d 795, 797 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal
citations omitted).
Allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the
entry of a guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief
1
Both Appellant and the PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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only if the ineffectiveness caused the defendant to
enter an involuntary or unknowing plea. Where the
defendant enters his plea on the advice of counsel, the
voluntariness of the plea depends on whether
counsel’s advice was within the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.
Thus, to establish prejudice, the defendant must show that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.
The reasonable probability test is not a stringent one; it merely
refers to a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.
Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 192-93 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(citations and quotation marks omitted).
In this case, in support of his sole claim on appeal, Appellant’s entire
argument is as follows:
Here, [plea] counsel [was] faced with a client who was having
mental health problems [and] failed to move the [trial court] for
a continuance; failed to move the [trial court] to have [Appellant]
examined that day; and failed to give otherwise proper advice to
[Appellant] with regard to all of the consequences of his plea.
[Appellant], not fully understanding the nature and consequences
of the plea cannot be said to have offered the plea in a knowing,
intelligent and voluntary fashion. Thus, [Appellant] should have
been granted an evidentiary hearing; [Appellant] should have
been granted the right to withdraw his guilty plea and go to trial.
Appellant’s Brief at 8.2 With the exception of case law, Appellant’s “argument”
is essentially bald assertions with no accompanying support or citations to the
record.
2
In addition to the aforementioned claim, in his concise statement, Appellant
averred plea counsel was “ineffective when he failed and refused to file a
motion to withdraw [Appellant’s guilty] plea[.]” Concise Statement,
12/26/2017, at 2 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). However, Appellant’s
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It is Appellant’s obligation to sufficiently develop arguments in his
brief by applying the relevant law to the facts of the case,
persuade this Court that there were errors below, and convince us
relief is due because of those errors. If an appellant does not do
so, we may find the argument waived.
Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d 274, 284 (Pa. Super. 2009). Here, we
find that Appellant has failed to develop his issues “in any meaningful fashion
capable of review.” Commonwealth v. Walter, 966 A.2d 560, 566 (Pa.
2009). Thus, Appellant’s claim is waived.
Even if we were to reach the merits of Appellant’s claim, he would not
prevail on appeal. Here, the PCRA court found Appellant, who bore the
responsibility of pleading and proving all three prongs of the test for
ineffectiveness, failed to meet his burden.
[W]ith regard to Appellant’s contention that counsel knew
or should have known that he was suffering from mental health
issues and was under the effects of medication that rendered him
incapable of entering a valid guilty plea, Appellant did not include
any evidence in his various post-conviction filings to substantiate
his claim such as medical records or evidence identifying and
describing the nature of his mental health problems and the
medication he was taking and how they impeded or impaired his
ability to enter a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea.
This was fatal to his claim because, under the PCRA, a litigant has
the burden of pleading grounds that support his or her allegations.
See Commonwealth v. Williams, 782 A.2d 517, 526 (Pa. 2001)
("[T]he PCRA requires a petitioner to plead and prove his claim,
and, therefore, the dismissal of claims is appropriate where the
argument omits any reference to this issue. Thus, Appellant has abandoned
this claim for purposes of appellate review. See Commonwealth v.
Montalvo, 641 A.2d 1176, 1184 (Pa. Super. 1994) citing Commonwealth
v. Rodgers, 605 A.2d 1228, 1239 (Pa. Super. 1992) (“[W]e must deem an
issue abandoned where it has been identified on appeal but not properly
developed in the brief.”).
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pleadings are insufficient to state a claim for post-conviction relief)
(emphasis in original).
In addition, th[e PCRA court] found the issue lacking in merit
because Appellant averred during the guilty plea hearing that
although he was taking medication for an unidentified mental
health problem, the medication helped him sleep and did not
affect his ability to understand what was then occurring.
Therefore, even though Appellant allegedly was suffering from
some unidentified mental health issue and may have been under
the influence of medication at the time, he, by his responses
during the guilty plea colloquy, manifested that he could enter a
valid plea. Thus, because the record shows that Appellant entered
his plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, th[e PCRA court]
correctly determined that counsel was not ineffective for the
reasons proffered by Appellant.
The claim is also lacking in merit because to obtain relief on
this claim, Appellant had to disavow what he averred to by signing
the guilty plea colloquy form and his testimony before th[e trial
court] whereby he indicated that he understood what he was
doing and the ramifications of entering a guilty plea. The law is
clear that
The longstanding rule of Pennsylvania law is that a
defendant may not challenge his guilty plea by
asserting that he lied while under oath, even if he
avers that counsel induced the lies. A person who
elects to plead guilty is bound by the statements he
makes in open court while under oath and he may not
later assert grounds for withdrawing the plea which
contradict the statements he made at his plea
colloquy. A criminal defendant who elects to plead
guilty has a duty to answer questions truthfully. We
[cannot] permit a defendant to postpone the final
disposition of his case by lying to the court and later
alleging that his lies were induced by the prompting
of counsel.
Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 524 (Pa. Super.
2003).
In order for Appellant to obtain relief he necessarily had to allege
that he lied to the [trial court] under oath when he testified that
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he understood what he was doing and the nature and
circumstances of the proceedings. As the above [] indicate[s], the
law does not permit it and, therefore, th[e PCRA court] properly
concluded that Appellant was not entitled to relief on this claim.
PCRA Court Opinion, 3/13/2018, at 5-7 (some citations omitted).
Our review of the certified record confirms the PCRA court’s
determination. In this case, Appellant signed a lengthy written colloquy and
was subjected to a detailed oral colloquy, in which he stated under oath and
on the record that he, inter alia, understood the rights he was giving up by
pleading guilty, and that he had spoken to his attorneys, was satisfied with
their representation, and was not threatened or promised anything in
exchange for entering a plea. N.T., 4/5/2016, at 6-8. Of particular importance
in light of Appellant’s argument on appeal, during his oral colloquy, Appellant
made the trial court aware that he was currently taking medication for an
unspecified mental disorder, but stated unequivocally that the medicine,
prescribed to aid sleeping, did not hinder his ability to participate in the
proceedings.
THE COURT: Have you ever been treated in the past or diagnosed
with any kind of mental health issues that I should be aware of?
[APPELLANT]: Currently I'm receiving medication for mental
health.
THE COURT: Do you know what the diagnosis is?
[APPELLANT]: No.
THE COURT: What kind of medication are you taking?
[APPELLANT]: To sleep.
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THE COURT: Help you sleep?
[APPELLANT]: Uh-huh.
THE COURT: Does it affect your ability to understand what it is
you’re doing?
[APPELLANT]: No.
Id. at 5-6.
In light of the foregoing, Appellant cannot now claim that his mental
health issues or prescribed medication, which he acknowledged on the record
did not impede his ability to understand the proceedings, interfered with his
capability to enter a knowing and voluntary plea. See Commonwealth v.
Willis, 68 A.3d 997, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“While [Willis] admitted to the
trial court he was being treated for ‘sleeping disorders,’ and taking prescribed
medication, he specifically denied the medication affected his abilities or
judgment. [Willis] is bound by these statements, which he made in open court
while under oath, and he may not now assert[] grounds for withdrawing the
plea which contradict the statements.”). Lastly, as noted by the PCRA court,
Appellant failed to provide any documentation or evidence regarding the
nature of his mental illness and prescribed medication and how either
purportedly affected his abilities to enter cogently a plea. See id. (“Simply
put, the mere fact [Willis] was taking prescribed psychotropic medication at
the time of his plea does not, of itself, result in the conclusion he was unable
to enter a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent guilty plea.”).
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For these reasons, Appellant has failed to convince this Court that the
PCRA court erred by dismissing his petition without a hearing. See
Commonwealth v. Jones, 942 A.2d 903, 906 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“There is
no absolute right to an evidentiary hearing on a PCRA petition, and if the PCRA
court can determine from the record that no genuine issues of material fact
exist, then a hearing is not necessary.”).
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/12/19
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