[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-11515
June 13, 2005
________________________
THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 01-01025-CV-WBH-1
JAVIER VILLEGAS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
DEERE & COMPANY,
A Delaware Corporation,
JOHN DEERE CONSTRUCTION
EQUIPMENT COMPANY, A
foreign corporation,
Defendants-Third Party-
Third Party Plaintiffs,
versus
HARLO PRODUCTS CORPORATION,
Third Party Defendant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(June 13, 2005)
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, and MARCUS and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Javier Villegas appeals the summary judgment granted in favor of Deere &
Company and John Deere Construction Equipment Company (Deere) on Villegas’s
claims of negligent design, negligent testing, and failure to warn, under Georgia
products liability law. Because there is evidence that Deere was actively involved
in the design of the 482C forklift that caused Villegas’s injury, we reverse the
summary judgment regarding negligent design. We affirm the summary judgment
regarding negligent testing and failure to warn, because Georgia does not recognize
a cause of action for negligent testing and there is insufficient evidence of a failure
to warn.
I. BACKGROUND
On December 14, 1999, Villegas was injured when the right fork slid off of
a John Deere 482C forklift and struck him. Villegas suffered serious injuries as a
result of the accident, including a severed spinal cord that left him paralyzed. On
April 19, 2001, Villegas sued Deere and alleged that the 482C forklift was
designed and manufactured defectively. In his complaint, Villegas asserted claims
of strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty. Deere denied any liability
and sought indemnity from Harlo Products, Inc., which constructed the forklift.
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The district court ordered the parties to mediate. Although Villegas had not
amended his complaint to include claims against Harlo, after mediation, he settled
with Harlo for half of the estimated damages for his lost earnings and medical
expenses. As part of the settlement, Villegas moved to dismiss his claim for strict
liability against Deere. Deere then moved for summary judgment on the remaining
claim of negligence. The district court granted summary judgment for Deere on
the negligence claim and dismissed the indemnity claim without prejudice.
Villegas appealed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Three Palms Pointe, Inc.
v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 362 F.3d 1317, 1318 (2004). Summary judgment
is appropriate where “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
III. DISCUSSION
The question in this appeal is whether Deere can be held liable in negligence
to Villegas for the failure of the 482C forklift, which the parties agree was
constructed by Harlo. To resolve this question, we must determine whether the
involvement of Deere in the design of the forklift was sufficient to subject it to
liability for negligent design under Georgia law.
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The district court erroneously concluded that Deere could not be liable in
negligence because it had not breached a duty to Villegas. Under Georgia law, a
company actively involved in the design of a product undertakes a duty to protect
users of the product from unreasonable risks of harm and is, therefore, potentially
liable for negligent design. See Buchan v. Lawrence Metal Prods. Inc., _ S.E.2d _,
2004 WL 2453343, *4 (Ga. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2004); Dean v. Toyota Indus. Equip.
Mfg. Inc., 540 S.E.2d 233, 237 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); Ga. Code Ann. § 51-1-2
(2004); Charles R. Adams, Georgia Tort Law § 3-1 (2004). So long as Deere was
involved in the design of the forklift that injured Villegas, then Deere is potentially
liable for negligent design.
Villegas presented evidence that Deere was extensively involved in the
design of the 482C forklift. Specifically, John Van Spronsen, a Harlo engineer,
testified that Harlo employees worked directly with Deere’s engineers to design
and produce the final products, and that whenever Deere wanted to change a model
number, Deere would tell Harlo which components Deere wanted to use, and the
product was redesigned according to Deere’s specifications. Van Spronsen also
testified that during the years Harlo manufactured the 482C forklift, he met in
person with Deere engineers approximately six to eight times annually to discuss,
among other things, the cost of the forklift that caused Villegas’s injuries. Van
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Spronsen further testified that Deere approached Harlo with design drawings for a
frame that Deere wanted to use for the forklift. Daniel Griswold, a Deere
employee, described the relationship between Deere and Harlo as “cooperative.”
Villegas also presented testimony that a Deere employee had to give the final
approval of the design plans. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to
Villegas, a fact finder could determine that Deere had substantial input into the
design and manufacture of the forklift and, therefore, assumed a legal duty to
protect others against unreasonable risks of harm. The evidence that Deere was
actively involved in the design of the 482C forklift precluded summary judgment.
Villegas also asserts that Deere is liable in negligence for failure to test the
fork retention system and failure to warn about the use of grease on the mast plate.
We find no error in the grant of summary judgment on these claims. First, Georgia
does not recognize a cause of action for negligent testing. Second, Villegas’s
failure to warn claim fails because he did not present evidence that there was
grease on the mast plate at the time of the accident, and Villegas has not created a
genuine issue of fact whether the failure of the fork retention system was
proximately caused by grease on the mast plate.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because under Georgia law Deere could be liable to Villegas under a
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negligent design theory, we REVERSE the summary judgment on the negligent
design claim and REMAND to the district court for trial. We AFFIRM the
summary judgment as to the negligent testing and failure to warn claims, because
Georgia does not recognize a cause of action for negligent testing and the evidence
is insufficient to support a failure to warn claim.
REVERSED in part, AFFIRMED in part, and REMANDED.
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