IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 18-1470
Filed March 20, 2019
IN THE INTEREST OF A.G.,
Minor Child,
B.G., Father,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Decatur County, Monty Franklin,
District Associate Judge.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Jenna K. Lain of The Law Office of Jenna K. Lain, PLLC, Corydon, for
appellant father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Bryan J. Tingle of Tingle Law Office, Des Moines, attorney and guardian ad
litem for minor child.
Considered by Vogel, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Doyle, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, Judge.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child, born in
2015. He contends (1) the State failed to prove the ground for termination cited
by the district court and (2) termination is not in the child’s best interests. We find
the first issue dispositive.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
The child came to the attention of the department of human services in early
2017 on information that the mother was using methamphetamine while caring for
her. The father also admitted to illicit drug use. The district court ordered the child
removed from the parents’ care and later adjudicated her in need of assistance.
The child was placed with the father’s sister.
The department afforded the father supervised visits with the child twice
each week. According to the department social worker assigned to the case, his
participation was initially “inconsistent,” but within two months of the child’s
removal, his attendance became “more regular.”
The department recommended that the father “complete[] a substance
abuse and a mental health evaluation and follow[] all recommendations, including
drug testing.” Again, the father was slow to comply but, within five months of the
child’s removal, the department reported he had scheduled a substance-abuse
evaluation. The department also reported the father’s participation in visits and
services had “increased and been more consistent over time” and he “appear[ed]
to be bonded” with his child.
The father completed a substance-abuse evaluation in short order, which
culminated in a recommendation “that he attend [a] Substance Abuse Extended
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Outpatient Program.” The father agreed to do so. He initially tested negative for
all substances, later had two positive tests for benzodiazepines, and finally tested
negative for all tested substances.
Shortly thereafter, the district court granted the father six additional months
to work toward reunification. The court conditioned reunification on “consistent
participation” in services and “continued participation . . . with mental health and
substance abuse treatment and continued participation in visits.” The court also
ordered the parents to “abstain from the use of all mind altering substances.”
In time, the department reported that the father secured employment,
attended visits that did not interfere with his work schedule, and saw his therapist
and substance-abuse counselor “on a consistent basis.” Nonetheless, the
department recommended changing the permanency goal from reunification to
termination of parental rights on the ground the father had “not fully engaged in
services or showed any consistency or desire to have [the child] returned to his
care.” The department also noted the father’s sister could no longer care for the
child on a long-term basis, requiring the child’s transfer to foster care.
Less than one month after the department filed this report, the father’s
substance-abuse counselor reported that the father “completed his treatment
goals” and met the requirements “for a successful discharge” from the outpatient
program. The counselor stated the father’s previous two drug tests “were negative
for all tested substances” and the father elected to “attend[] outpatient sessions on
a voluntary basis to continue working on relapse prevention.”
Despite this progress, the department persisted in its recommendation of
termination, expressing concern about two missed mental-health appointments,
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loss of employment, and apparent cancellation of certain supervised visits. The
district court ruled it was “no longer confident that reunification could occur”
because the father “has not been consistent and committed with mental health
treatment, substance abuse treatment, or visitations with the child.” The court
changed the permanency goal from reunification to termination of parental rights
and ordered visits with the child to remain supervised. At the same time, the court
stated, “[I]f the parents commit to services, the department” could ask for
reconsideration “and move towards semi-supervised or unsupervised visits.”
The State filed a petition to terminate parental rights. Following a
termination hearing that spanned two days over a two-month period, the district
court granted the petition. The father appealed.1
II. Ground for Termination
The district court terminated the father’s parental rights pursuant to Iowa
Code section 232.116(1)(h) (2018), which requires proof of several elements,
including proof by clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot be returned
to the parent’s custody. On our de novo review, we are not persuaded the State
proved this element.
The father was afforded six additional months to work toward reunification.
During that period, he successfully completed outpatient substance-abuse
treatment, agreed to continue in the program on a voluntary basis, participated in
six of eight mental-health sessions during an eleven-week period, secured other
employment, and attended supervised visits with the child.
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The mother’s parental rights were also terminated. She did not appeal.
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At the termination hearings, the department caseworker conceded she had
“no concerns that [the father was] using illegal substances.” Although she stated
he made insufficient progress in his mental-health treatment, she acknowledged
he reengaged in mental-health services during the last three months of the six-
month extension period. She testified, “Through those three months, his
attendance was consistent for the most part.”
The father’s mental-health counselor confirmed his attendance at three-
fourths of the scheduled sessions and stated he was unaware “of any anger
difficulties experienced by” the father since he reengaged in services three months
earlier. The counselor also stated he observed “no indications that [the father]
would be a danger to his daughter if he should receive custody of his daughter.”
As for visits with the child, the caseworker acknowledged the father was
forced to cancel one because of work orientation and another because it was his
first day at a new job. She also conceded one of the visits reported to have been
missed was in fact canceled by the service provider. Finally, she agreed the father
contacted her about rescheduling visits and about seeking accommodation of his
four-day-on-four-day-off work schedule. She stated the service provider could not
facilitate weekend visits and notice was too short to accommodate other requests.
She did not explain why the department failed to adjust future visits after learning
of the work schedule.
Despite the father’s significant progress on all fronts, the department
caseworker testified the father had not shown he could be a “committed and
capable” caretaker. On our de novo review, we are convinced he was not afforded
the opportunity. As the father testified, “I have done what they wanted me to. I did
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drag my feet a little bit in the beginning, took a backseat . . . and I regret that. I’m
working on it.”
We conclude the State failed to prove the child could not be returned to the
father’s custody. We reverse the order terminating the father’s parental rights to
the child and remand for the entry of an order dismissing the termination petition
as to him.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.