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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
QUINN WILLIAMS :
:
Appellant : No. 3030 EDA 2017
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 21, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-1201401-1980
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED MARCH 21, 2019
Quinn Williams appeals from the trial court’s denial of his third petition
filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§
9541-9546. Williams maintains that the trial court should have granted his
PCRA petition based on the holding in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460
(2012) or should have granted him an evidentiary hearing regarding his claim.
We affirm.
On October 29, 1980, Williams was involved in the robbery and shooting
death of James Healy in Philadelphia. On April 22, 1981, a jury convicted him
of second-degree murder, robbery, and criminal conspiracy. The trial court,
on December 2, 1981, sentenced him to a mandatory term of life
imprisonment without parole for the second-degree murder conviction and
five to ten years for the criminal conspiracy conviction, to be served
concurrently. Williams filed a direct appeal and this Court affirmed his
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judgment of sentence on November 4, 1983. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
denied allocator.
On April 30, 1991, Williams filed a pro se PCRA petition. Appointed
counsel filed a Turner/Finley1 no-merit letter and the PCRA court ultimately
dismissed the petition on June 1, 1993. Williams did not file an appeal but did
file a second pro se PCRA petition in 1995. The PCRA court dismissed Williams
second petition as untimely, this Court affirmed the dismissal, and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allocator.
Williams filed the instant pro se PCRA petition, his third, on February 16,
2016. In July 2017, the PCRA court issued notice of intent to dismiss the
petition without a hearing, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. After Williams filed
a response, the PCRA court dismissed the petition as untimely on August 21,
2017. The instant timely appeal followed.
Williams raises the following issues for review:
1. Whether in reviewing the [propriety] of PCRA Court’s dismissal
of [Williams] third-PCRA filing, it was an abuse of discretion for
the PCRA court to determine that it was untimely. . . where the
petition was timely filed under title 42 PA.C.S.A. 9545(b)(1)(iii)
and 9545(b)(2) where [Williams] established an after discovered
constitutional right, that is retroactive?
2. Whether the PCRA court erred and denied [Williams] his federal
and state constitutional rights to due process of law by dismissing
[Williams’s] third-PCRA petition without conducting an evidentiary
hearing and appointment of counsel…where [Williams’]claims
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1Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v.
Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc).
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raised questions of disputed facts regarding the timeliness of his
PCRA petition?
Williams’ Br. at 4.
We begin by noting that when this Court reviews the denial of PCRA
relief, “our standard of review calls for us to determine whether the ruling of
the PCRA court is supported by the record and free of legal error.”
Commonwealth v. Williams, 196 A.3d 1021, 1026-27 (Pa. 2018) (quotation
omitted). Further, while the PCRA court’s credibility determinations, when
supported by the record, are binding on this Court, the PCRA court’s legal
conclusions are subject to a de novo standard of review. Commonwealth v.
Roney, 79 A.3d 595, 603 (Pa. 2013).
In his two interrelated issues presented on appeal, Williams claims that
the trial court erred by concluding that his PCRA petition was untimely.
Indeed, as a prefatory matter, we must determine whether Williams’ petition
is timely because “the PCRA’s time limitations implicate our jurisdiction and
may not be altered or disregarded in order to address the merits of a petition.”
Commonwealth v. Smith, 194 A.3d 126, 132 (Pa.Super. 2018).
A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief must file a petition within one
year of the petitioner’s judgment of sentence becoming final. Id.; see also
42 Pa.C.S.A. 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence becomes final “at the
conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme
Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the
expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). A court
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does not have jurisdiction to entertain a petition filed after the one-year time-
bar unless the petitioner pleads and proves one of the time-bar exceptions.
The exceptions include:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the
presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution
or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws
of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
provided in this Section and has been held by that court
to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). A petitioner claiming one of these
exceptions must file the petition “within 60 days of the date the claim could
have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).2
In this case, Williams’ judgment of sentence became final on December
18, 1984, after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allocator and the time
period for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme
Court expired. See 42 § 9545(b)(3); former U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 20. Thus, the
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2The Pennsylvania Legislature amended Section 9545(b)(2) on December 24,
2018, to extend the time of filing to one year. However, the amendment
applies only to claims raised one year prior to the amendment or thereafter.
See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). Here, the amendment does not apply since
Williams filed his petition more than a year before the amendment.
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instant petition, filed more than 30 years after Williams’ judgment of sentence
became final, is patently untimely.
Accordingly, Williams must plead and prove at least one of the
exceptions to the PCRA’s time-bar. In his PCRA petition, Williams invokes the
third exception, regarding a newly enacted constitutional right that applies
retroactively, by citing to Miller, which held that it was unconstitutional to
sentence a juvenile to mandatory life imprisonment without parole. See PCRA
Petition, filed February 16, 2016, at 8. Moreover, the United States Supreme
Court in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016), concluded that
Miller “announced a substantive rule that is retroactive in cases on collateral
review.” Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 732. However, Miller and Montgomery
are inapposite in this case because Williams was eighteen years old, and
therefore not a juvenile, at the time he committed the crime at issue. See
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 174 A.3d 1130, 1147 (Pa.Super.
2017)(holding Miller not applicable when the appellant was eighteen at the
time of the crime).
Moreover, although Williams concedes that he was eighteen at the time
of the crime in his PCRA petition by arguing that Miller should also apply to
appellant’s who were eighteen or older at the time of their crime, on appeal
he claims, for the first time, that he was only seventeen when he committed
the crime. As such, he asserts that the PCRA court erred by declining to grant
him an evidentiary hearing regarding the “material fact” of his age at the time
of the crime. However, Williams raises the subject of his chronological age for
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the first time on appeal. Therefore, the issue of his age is waived for purposes
of this appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower
court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).
Therefore, Williams’ argument that Miller applies to his case does not
warrant relief and thus his bid to plead and prove the third exception to the
PCRA’s time-bar fails. Accordingly, we conclude that the PCRA court lacked
jurisdiction to consider Williams’ petition and did not abuse its discretion by
dismissing his third PCRA petition as untimely. See Smith, 194 A.3d at 132.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/21/19
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