NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 19 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FARID GHALEHTAK; SHIRIN No. 18-15722
TABATABAI,
D.C. No. 3:17-cv-05976-EMC
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. MEMORANDUM*
FAY SERVICING, LLC; MTC
FINANCIAL, INC., DBA Trustee Corps,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Edward M. Chen, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 12, 2019**
Before: LEAVY, BEA, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Farid Ghalehtak and Shirin Tabatabai appeal pro se from the district court’s
judgment dismissing their action alleging federal and state law claims arising from
foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
review de novo a district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th
Cir. 2011). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Franklin v.
Terr, 201 F.3d 1098, 1100 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm.
Dismissal of plaintiffs’ Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) claim
under 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6) was proper because plaintiffs failed to allege facts
sufficient to show that the entity on behalf of which defendants sought to foreclose
lacked “the present right to possession of the property claimed as collateral through
an enforceable security interest.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6)(A); Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in retaining jurisdiction over
plaintiffs’ state law claims after its dismissal of their FDCPA claims. See Satey v.
JPMorgan Chase & Co., 521 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining factors
governing determination of whether to retain jurisdiction over pendent state-law
claims).
The district court properly dismissed plaintiff’s state law claims because
plaintiffs failed to allege facts sufficient to support the theory underlying all of
their state law claims that FNBN I, LLC was not the true beneficiary under the
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loan. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by taking judicial notice of
certain public records and district court and bankruptcy court documents. See Lee
v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001) (setting forth standard
of review, and describing documents that a district court may take judicial notice
of when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Fay Servicing, LLC’s request for judicial notice (Docket Entry No. 15) is
granted.
AFFIRMED.
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