NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 19 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ARDREDA JOHNSON, No. 18-55945
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 5:17-cv-02506-JGB-SHK
v.
MEMORANDUM*
PENNYMAC LOAN SERVICES, LLC; et
al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Jesus G. Bernal, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 12, 2019**
Before: LEAVY, BEA, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Ardreda Johnson appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing her action alleging Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and
state law claims arising out of foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under Federal
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,
656 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Johnson’s FDCPA claims against
PennyMac Mortgage Opportunity Fund Investors, LLC and Crosby Capital USA,
LLC because Johnson failed to allege facts sufficient to show that these defendants
were “debt collectors.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(ii) (excluding from definition
of “debt collector” a creditor collecting debts on its own behalf); Afewerki v. Anaya
Law Grp., 868 F.3d 771, 774 n.1 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Under the FDCPA, a creditor
collecting debts on its own behalf is not a ‘debt collector.’”).
The district court properly dismissed Johnson’s FDCPA claim under 15
U.S.C. § 1692f(6) because Johnson failed to allege facts sufficient to show that
defendants sought to foreclose on behalf of an entity that did not have the present
right to possession of the property through an enforceable security interest. See 15
U.S.C. § 1692f(6); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678(2009) (to avoid dismissal,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed Johnson’s FDCPA claims under
§§ 1692d, 1692e, 1692j, and 1692i because Johnson failed to allege facts sufficient
to state plausible claims for relief. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d, 1692e, and 1692i and
2 18-55945
1692j; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Contrary to Johnson’s contention, the district court did not rule on
defendants’ request for judicial notice, and in any case, it would have not abused
its discretion by taking judicial notice of state court records. See United States v.
Woods, 335 F.3d 993, 1000-01 (9th Cir. 2003) (standard of review); U.S. ex rel.
Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir.
1992) (explaining that a court “may take [judicial] notice of proceedings in other
courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings
have a direct relation to matters at issue” (citation omitted)).
Defendants’ joint motion for summary affirmance (Docket Entry No. 7) is
denied.
AFFIRMED.
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