[Cite as State v. Henderson, 2019-Ohio-1081.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 29090
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
JARVELL HENDERSON COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. CR 2018-01-0210
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: March 27, 2019
TEODOSIO, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, Jarvell Henderson, appeals the judgment of the Summit County Court
of Common Pleas denying his motion for specific enforcement of a plea agreement. This Court
affirms.
I.
{¶2} On the day after Christmas in 2017, Mr. Henderson shot and killed a convenience
store customer during his armed robbery of the store. A few hours earlier, he had fired at another
person multiple times at a gas station, although the victim was not hit. Both incidents were
captured on video. He was indicted for aggravated murder with firearm and repeat violent
offender specifications, along with a litany of other serious felonies.
{¶3} In May of 2018, the prosecutor texted defense counsel a plea offer that read,
“Murder 15 to life. Plus gun spec, Agg robbery, and felonious with gun spec for second Vic. PSI
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or 25 to life.” Defense counsel later informed the prosecutor that Mr. Henderson accepted the
plea offer, and a change of plea hearing was set.
{¶4} Prior to that hearing, Mr. Henderson filed a motion for specific enforcement of
the plea agreement and argued that “the prosecutor informed [d]efense counsel that the plea offer
changed and the prosecutor now wanted a sentence of 35 years to life.” In its response, the State
argued that while the parties discussed different offers during plea negotiations, “no plea was
ever entered into on the record and accepted by the [c]ourt.” The prosecutor had further
researched Mr. Henderson’s prior criminal record and the circumstances surrounding the case,
then decided to revise her plea offer “to reflect the gravity of [Mr. Henderson’s] crimes.” The
trial court denied Mr. Henderson’s motion and confirmed his trial date.
{¶5} Prior to trial, Mr. Henderson pled guilty to an amended count of murder, one
count of aggravated robbery, and one count of felonious assault, all with attendant firearm
specifications. The trial court accepted his guilty pleas as knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily made, found him guilty, and dismissed the remaining counts and specifications. The
court sentenced him to an aggregate total of 35 years to life in prison.
{¶6} Mr. Henderson now appeals the trial court’s judgment denying his motion for
specific enforcement of a plea agreement. He raises two assignments of error for this Court’s
review. Mr. Henderson also filed a notice of supplemental authority pursuant to Loc.R. 8(E) for
this Court’s consideration.
{¶7} For ease of analysis, we will consolidate Mr. Henderson’s assignments of error.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT SPECIFICALLY ENFORCING THE
PLEA AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND JARVELL.
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO
JARVELL’S PLEA WAS NOT KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY, OR
VOLUNTARILY ENTERED INTO[.]
{¶8} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Henderson argues that the trial court erred in
denying his pretrial motion and not specifically enforcing the plea agreement. In his second
assignment of error, he argues that his guilty pleas were not made knowingly, intelligently, or
voluntarily because the State coerced him to plead guilty and the trial court interfered with plea
negotiations. We disagree with both propositions.
{¶9} “‘Plea agreements are an essential and necessary part of the administration of
justice.’” State v. Billingsley, 133 Ohio St.3d 277, 2012-Ohio-4307, ¶ 24, quoting State v.
Carpenter, 68 Ohio St.3d 59, 61 (1993). “The Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized that the
‘[p]rinciples of contract law are generally applicable to the interpretation and enforcement of
plea agreements.’” Akron v. Schafer, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27194, 2014-Ohio-5814, ¶ 6, quoting
State v. Bethel, 110 Ohio St.3d 416, 2006-Ohio-4853, ¶ 50. When either party breaches the plea
agreement, the non-breaching party is entitled to either rescission or specific performance of the
plea agreement. Id., citing State v. West, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 04CA008554, 2005-Ohio-990, ¶
29. “In felony cases, when a defendant offers a negotiated plea of guilty, ‘the underlying
agreement upon which the plea is based shall be stated on the record in open court.’” Billingsley
at ¶ 25, quoting Crim.R. 11(F). The trial court has discretion in the decision of whether to
implement a plea bargain. Peninsula v. Darulis, 9th Dist. Summit No. 15059, 1991 WL 199923,
*1 (Oct. 2, 1991).
{¶10} As a preliminary matter, and because Mr. Henderson ultimately pled guilty in this
case, we must first address his ability to challenge the trial court’s denial of his pretrial motion.
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See State v. Phillips, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 15CA010883, 2016-Ohio-8094, ¶ 7. “‘[A] defendant,
who admits guilt, waives the right to challenge the propriety of any action taken by a trial court
or trial counsel prior to that point in the proceedings unless it affected the knowing and voluntary
character of the plea.’” Id., quoting State v. Franco, 9th Dist. Medina No. 07CA0090-M, 2008-
Ohio-4651, ¶ 28, quoting State v. Gegia, 157 Ohio App.3d 112, 2004-Ohio-2124, ¶ 18 (9th
Dist.), quoting State v. Doak, 7th Dist. Columbiana Nos. 03 CO 15 and 03 CO 31, 2004-Ohio-
1548, ¶ 55. “Waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a right * * *.” State v.
Dodson, 9th Dist. Medina No. 16CA0020-M, 2017-Ohio-350, ¶ 9. Moreover, “the Supreme
Court of Ohio has explicitly held that a guilty plea precludes a defendant from raising issues
pertaining to a trial court’s disposition of pretrial motions which neither implicate the trial
court’s jurisdiction nor the constitutionality of the statutes at issue.” Phillips at ¶ 9, citing State
v. Fitzpatrick, 102 Ohio St.3d 321, 2004-Ohio-3167, ¶ 77-79. Thus, as this Court previously
determined in Phillips, we conclude that Mr. Henderson has waived the right to challenge the
propriety of any action taken by the trial court prior to entering his guilty plea unless it affected
the knowing and voluntary nature of his plea. See id. at ¶ 10.
{¶11} As to the knowing and voluntary nature of his plea, Mr. Henderson first argues
that because the State made an initial plea offer and then “reneged” after he accepted it, the State
effectively coerced him into accepting a subsequent, less favorable offer. We first note that the
transcript of Mr. Henderson’s plea hearing refutes any claim that the State coerced him into
pleading guilty, and instead reveals that his guilty pleas were made voluntarily. See Akron v.
Hendon, 9th Dist. Summit No. 22791, 2006-Ohio-1038, ¶ 5 (“When a defendant claims he was
coerced into entering a guilty plea, conclusory allegations * * * are insufficient to rebut a record
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which shows the plea was voluntary.”). During the trial court’s Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy with
Mr. Henderson, the following questions were asked and answered:
THE COURT: Has anyone threatened you or forced you to enter a plea of guilty
today?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: Has anyone promised you anything other than what you’ve heard
today regarding the plea negotiations?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
Furthermore, because Mr. Henderson fails to develop any meaningful argument in support of his
conclusory allegation of coercion, we find no merit in it. See also App.R. 16(A)(7) (“The
appellant shall include in its brief * * * [a]n argument containing the contentions of the appellant
* * * and the reasons in support of the contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and
parts of the record on which appellant relies.”).
{¶12} Mr. Henderson also argues that the trial court interfered with the parties’ plea
negotiations by denying his pretrial motion for specific enforcement of the plea agreement. He
relies on the Supreme Court of Ohio’s holding in State v. Byrd, 63 Ohio St.2d 288, 293-294
(1980):
[A] trial judge’s participation in the plea bargaining process must be carefully
scrutinized to determine if the judge’s intervention affected the voluntariness of
the defendant’s guilty plea. Ordinarily, if the judge’s active conduct could lead a
defendant to believe he cannot get a fair trial because the judge thinks that a trial
is a futile exercise or that the judge would be biased against him at trial, the plea
should be held to be involuntary and void under the Fifth Amendment and
[Article I, Section 10] of the Ohio Constitution.
However, Mr. Henderson’s reliance on Byrd is misplaced, as he is only challenging the trial
court’s denial of a pretrial motion, not any active intervention by the court in the parties’ plea
negotiations. See Hendon at ¶ 12-13 (distinguishing the fact pattern in Byrd, where the trial court
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“engaged extensively in plea negotiations[,] * * * contacted the defendant’s relatives and
encouraged them to persuade him to plead guilty, spoke with the defendant in chambers without
his attorney present, and indicated that Byrd would be in for a long trial if [he] chose to plead not
guilty”). Mr. Henderson again fails to develop any meaningful argument here or cite to any
authority directly supporting his speculative claim that the mere denial of a pretrial motion
amounts to active interference with plea negotiations by the trial court, and we therefore find no
merit in it. See App.R. 16(A)(7). He directs us to nothing in the record demonstrating that the
denial of his pretrial motion led him to believe that proceeding to trial would be a futile exercise
or that he would not receive a fair trial. See Hendon at ¶ 13. With no evidence before us that the
trial court interjected itself into the plea negotiations, Mr. Henderson’s claim must fail. See id. at
¶ 14.
{¶13} Accordingly, we conclude that Mr. Henderson has failed to demonstrate that the
denial of his pretrial motion for specific enforcement of a plea agreement affected the knowing
and voluntary nature of his guilty pleas. He has therefore waived the right to challenge the
propriety of any action taken by the trial court prior to entering his guilty pleas. See Phillips at ¶
10.
{¶14} Mr. Henderson’s first and second assignments of error are overruled.
III.
{¶15} Mr. Henderson’s first and second assignments of error are overruled. The
judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
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There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
THOMAS A. TEODOSIO
FOR THE COURT
HENSAL, J.
CALLAHAN, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
WESLEY C. BUCHANAN, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and JACQUENETTE CORGAN, Assistant
Prosecuting attorney, for Appellee.