State of New York OPINION
Court of Appeals This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision
before publication in the New York Reports.
No. 17
In the Matter of Save America's Clocks, Inc.,
et al.,
Respondents,
v.
City of New York, &c., et al.,
Appellants.
Diana Lawless, for appellants City of New York, et al.
James P. Rouhandeh, for appellant Civic Center Community Group Broadway LLC.
Michael S. Hiller, for respondents.
City Club of New York, et al., amici curiae.
GARCIA, J.:
New York City’s Landmarks Preservation Commission (LPC) is entrusted with the
“establishment and regulation” of the City’s landmarks (NYC Charter § 3020 [6]). On
respondents’ appeal in this CPLR article 78 proceeding, petitioners allege that the LPC’s
decision to approve the redevelopment of 346 Broadway—a historic building in Lower
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Manhattan that the LPC previously designated as a landmark —was irrational and affected
by errors of law.1 We disagree and hold that the LPC’s decision was proper. Accordingly,
we reverse.
I.
The Landmarks Preservation Law (Landmarks Law) was passed in 1965 as a
response “to the loss of a number of [New York City’s] significant buildings” (Teachers
Ins. & Annuity Assn of Am. v City of New York, 82 NY2d 35, 41 [1993]). The law is
“not” designed for public “acquisitions of historic properties”; rather it “provid[es]
services, standards, controls and incentives that will encourage preservation by private
owners and users” (Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v City of New York, 438 US 104, 110 [1978]).
In 1973, the law was amended to allow the LPC to designate an interior landmark, defined
as “[a]n interior, or part thereof, any part of which is thirty years old or older, and which is
customarily open or accessible to the public, or to which the public is customarily invited,
and which has a special historical or aesthetic interest or value” (Administrative Code of
City of NY § 25-302 [m]).
1
Petitioners include the following entities and individuals: Save America’s Clocks, Inc.,
The Historic Districts Council, Inc., Tribeca Trust, Inc., Marvin Schneider, Forest
Markowitz, Thomas Bernardin, Christopher DeSantis, Jeremy Woodoff, and Alanna Heiss.
Respondents include the following municipal and private entities: the Deputy Mayor for
Housing and Economic Development for the City of New York, the LPC, the DOB, and
the developer. Other entities associated with the developer were named as Respondents,
including The Peebles Corporation, 346 Broadway LLC, El Ad US Holding, Inc., El Ad
346 Development LLC, and Beyer Blinder Bell, Architects and Planners, LLP.
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“The primary responsibility for administering the law is vested in the [LPC]” (Penn
Cent, 438 US at 110). The Landmarks Law allows the LPC—whose 11 Commissioners are
appointed by the Mayor—to designate landmarks “[f]or the purpose of . . . furthering the
protection, preservation, enhancement, perpetuation and use” of such landmarks
(Administrative Code § 25-303 [a]). The LPC’s authority over landmarks does not end
with designation. Express “authoriz[ation]” from the LPC is required before “work” begins
on a “landmark site” or a structure “containing an interior landmark” (Administrative Code
§ 25-305 [a] [1]). The LPC’s approval may come in one of two forms. It may issue a
“certificate of no effect” if the “proposed work” does not “change, destroy or affect any
exterior architectural feature . . . or any interior architectural feature” of a landmark
(Administrative Code § 25-306). Such “feature[s]” are defined broadly to include “[t]he
architectural style, design, general arrangement and components” of a protected interior or
exterior (Administrative Code § 25-302 [g], [l]).
If an “application” does, however, seek to “alter” or “demolish” a landmark, the
LPC must issue a “certificate of appropriateness” (COA) before the “proposed work” can
begin (Administrative Code § 25-307). By statute, it is for the LPC to “determine whether
the proposed work would be appropriate for and consistent with the effectuation of the
purposes” of the Landmarks Law (id.). LPC’s discretion is broad given the Landmark
Law’s diverse statutory purposes, which range from the “protection, enhancement and
perpetuation” of landmarks to “strengthen[ing] the economy of the city” (Administrative
Code § 25-301 [b]). Unlike initial landmark designations, the LPC’s COA determinations
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are not reviewable by the City Council (compare Administrative Code § 25-303 [g] [2]
with Administrative Code § 25-307). If a COA is denied by the LPC, the applicant “may
submit . . . [a] modified plan for approval,” or “seek[] a certificate of appropriateness on
the ground of ‘insufficient return’”—a procedure designed “to ensure that designation does
not cause economic hardship” (Penn Cent., 438 US at 112).
II.
346 Broadway is the old New York Life Insurance Company headquarters. The
fifteen-story structure, completed in the late 1890s, was designed in part by the historically
significant architectural firm of McKim, Mead & White. The City acquired the building
in 1968, and it was during this period of City ownership, in 1987, that the LPC designated
the Building and parts of its interior as landmarks.
In its initial designation report, the LPC noted several of the building’s unique
features. The exterior of the “palazzo-like tower,” constructed in “the neo-Italian
Renaissance style,” was largely built with “white Tuckahoe marble.” The “interiors” were
also “designed using the finest craftmanship and lavish materials” including “marble,
bronze, [and] mahogany.” Among the interior spaces designated were the former “Banking
Hall,” a “grand and boldly scaled neo-Classical room” with “monumental freestanding
Corinthian columns, and “[t]he clock tower” which housed a “No. 4 Striking Tower
Clock”—a mechanical clock driven “by a thousand pound weight” which “strikes the
hours” with a hammer and a “5000 pound bell.” The clock was manufactured by E.
Howard Watch & Clock Company and “was specially equipped with a double three-legged
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gravity escapement”—a feature, petitioners claim, is shared by only one other tower clock:
the clock housed by Elizabeth Tower (also home to the bell known as Big Ben) in London.
In total, the LPC landmarked 20,000 square feet out of the building’s total interior space
of 420,000 square feet.
In December 2013, the City sold the building to Civic Center Community Group
Broadway LLC, a private developer. After purchasing the Building, the developer sought
approval from the New York City Department of Buildings (DOB) to convert the building
into private residences. The developer’s plan was approved by DOB in June 2014. In line
with the Landmarks Law, the developer next sought a COA from the LPC.
The developer’s initial proposal, presented to the LPC at a public hearing in
November 2014, included installation of new windows, removal of an outdated fire escape,
restoration of entrances to the building, addition of a new entrance, removal of a
deteriorating parapet that had been surrounded by scaffolding for ten years, and addition
of a fence and gate inspired by similar structures designed for other sites by the original
architectural firm. With respect to the interior, the owner proposed to, among other things,
restore the main lobby and the banking hall and restore and relocate the president’s office.
The clock tower mechanism would be kept in its original location and the building and area
around it restored and weatherproofed. Under the proposal, the banking hall and lobby
would remain publicly accessible. Questions were raised, however, about access to the
clocktower, which was to be part of a private residence, as well as about the continued
operation of the clock. During the hearing, LPC’s General Counsel stated that “there’s no
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power under the Landmarks Law to require interior-designated spaces to remain public.”
Counsel also opined that the Commission was powerless to require that the clock
mechanism remain “operable,” but noted that the developer intended to keep the clock
running electrically.
After the public hearing, certain Commissioners and LPC staff members conducted
a site visit. Shortly after that, at a second public meeting in December 2014, the
Commission approved the proposal by a vote of 7-1. The dissenting commissioner voted
against the proposal because she “[could] not approve the changes to the [clock]
mechanism itself and to the interior of the clock tower gallery, as well as mechanical
room.”
Consistent with the Landmarks Law, the COA “set forth the reasons for [the LPC’s
determination]” in detail over seven single-spaced pages (Administrative Code § 25-315).
As articulated in the COA, the LPC found that the developer’s plan would have “the main
lobby, stair hall, clock tower rooms and banking hall . . . fully restored.” Additionally, it
would “allow accessibility by the public to the lobby and former banking hall.” The LPC
also found that “the clock mechanism and faces will be retained, thereby preserving these
significant features.” In sum, the LPC found that “the proposed restorative work will return
. . . the interior closer to [its] original appearance, and will aid in [its] long-term
preservation.”
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III.
This proceeding challenging the COA ensued. Petitioners—a self-styled coalition
of entities and individuals—agreed to “limit the scope of . . . litigation only to issues
pertaining to the Clocktower Suite,” specifically the decisions to limit public access to the
clock tower and to run the clock electrically. Supreme Court granted the petition and
annulled the COA. The Court concluded that decision to “eliminate public access to the
clock tower” was “irrational and arbitrary,” but that there was a rational basis for the
conversion of the clock from mechanical to electrical operation. Nevertheless, the Court
determined that the decision to electrify the clock was affected by an error of law because
LPC Counsel’s advice that the LPC could not regulate the functioning of the clock was
incorrect. Similarly, LPC Counsel’s advice on public access was wrong, according to the
court, because “the general provisions of the Landmarks Law vest the Commission with
the power to regulate an interior landmark.”
A divided Appellate Division affirmed (157 AD3d 133 [1st Dept 2017]). The
majority agreed with Supreme Court that the decision to discontinue public access to the
clock tower was irrational because “it is inconsistent with the statutory definition” of
interior landmark, but parted ways with Supreme Court by finding the decision to electrify
the clock irrational as well. The majority also agreed with Supreme Court that LPC’s
General Counsel gave incorrect advice during the public hearings about the LPC’s
authority to require public access and dictate how the clock functioned. That advice, the
majority found, affected the Commission’s vote on the COA—a determination the majority
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based on portions of the hearing transcript. The dissent concluded that based on the record,
the LPC’s decisions were rational, and that no error of law infected the proceedings
because: (1) counsel’s advice was correct; and (2) the LPC vote would not have been
affected even if the advice was incorrect (157 AD3d at 153 [Kahn, J., dissenting]).
Respondents appealed as of right to this Court (see CPLR 5601[a]).
IV.
Judicial review of the Commission’s findings is limited to whether “the
determination was made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law
or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion” (CPLR 7803 [3]; see Lutheran
Church in Am. v City of New York, 35 NY2d 121, 128, n 2 [1974] [explaining that the
“public hearing provided for in the Landmarks Law is not the sort of adversary hearing
involving cross-examination and the making of a record as is contemplated under CPLR
7803 (4), where substantial evidence is the test set forth”]). “This review is deferential for
it is not the role of the courts to weigh the desirability of any action or choose among
alternatives” (Matter of Friends of P.S. 163, Inc. v Jewish Home Lifecare, Manhattan, 30
NY3d 416, 430 [2017] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of Beck-
Nichols v Bianco, 20 NY3d 540, 559 [2013] [the “standard is, of course, an extremely
deferential one”]). “[T]he courts cannot interfere unless there is no rational basis for the
exercise of discretion” or “the action is without sound basis in reason . . . and taken without
regard to the facts” (Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of
Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222, 231 [1974]; see
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Matter of Society for Ethical Culture in City of N.Y. v Spatt, 68 AD2d 112, 116 [1st Dept
1979] [“our inquiry is directed to a determination of whether the commission’s (decision)
had a rational basis or, if, . . . it was arbitrary and capricious”]). It follows that “[i]f the
court finds that the determination is supported by a rational basis, it must sustain the
determination even if the court concludes that it would have reached a different result than
the one reached by the agency” (Matter of Peckham v Calogero, 12 NY3d 424, 431 [2009]).
A.
The COA described the approved proposal, including as it related to the clock tower
and clock mechanism, and found that, under the proposal, “the main lobby, stair hall, clock
tower rooms and banking hall w[ould] be fully restored, and the clock mechanism and faces
w[ould] be retained, thereby preserving these significant features.” The COA explains that
“[b]ased on these findings, the LPC determined the work to be appropriate to [the building]
and [the] [i]nterior [l]andmark[s] and voted to approve it.” The LPC made its
determination and these findings following an extensive deliberative process, including
multiple public hearings. The LPC “afford[ed] a reasonable opportunity for the
presentation of facts and the expression of views by those desiring to be heard” and, in an
exercise of its discretion, received “testimony of witnesses,” along with various
documentary submissions (Administrative Code § 25-313 [b]). The LPC staff engaged in
a dialogue with the owner concerning the project and staff members visited the building
site, along with certain Commissioners, to more fully understand the scope of the proposed
work and its potential impact on the designated interior landmarks.
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Petitioners argue that the LPC’s decision to close off the clocktower is inconsistent
with the statutory definition of interior landmark and is therefore facially irrational. It is
the LPC’s position that “public access is a threshold condition, not an ongoing one,” and
“public access at designation is no more than the foothold that allows the
the Commission to exercise the police power to regulate private property.” This is
consistent with our holding in Teachers. There, we said public access is a “jurisdictional
predicate” for an initial LPC designation (82 NY2d at 44). A designation, we noted, did
not foreclose the possibility of “private use in the future” (Teachers, 82 NY2d at 44).
Underscoring this, the law contemplates that the LPC may issue a COA for “demol[ition]
of any improvement”—which is defined to include “building”—“containing an interior
landmark” (Administrative Code §§ 25-302 [k]; 25-307 [a]). As the LPC notes, the COA
“process presumes change, sometimes dramatic change.” At base, the Landmarks Law
makes plain that the LPC’s decision with respect to the clock tower was well within the
ambit of its discretion.
Contrary to petitioners’ claims, the LPC’s decision to allow the clock to be
electrified was similarly rational. As the dissenting opinion in the Appellate Division
noted, “the operation of the clock would be modernized by electrification, thereby assuring
its continued maintenance for the foreseeable future, and the visibility of exterior clock
faces to the public would be enhanced by LED or some other form of modernized lighting,
while the clock faces would remain in their original, pristine condition” (157 AD3d at 166
[Kahn, J, dissenting]). The COA also makes plain the LPC’s finding that the developer’s
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plan would ensure that “the clock mechanism and faces will be retained, thereby preserving
these significant features.” The LPC was well within its discretion to approve a plan that
included electrification of the clock.
The LPC’s determination to issue the COA following this extensive and inclusive
deliberative process, and to approve certain work to the clock tower and clock mechanism
on the basis that the proposed work would restore the clock tower rooms and both retain
and preserve the interior and exterior features of the clock mechanism and faces,
constituted a rational exercise of the LPC’s discretion based on its unique expertise.
Certainly, those determinations are consistent with the purposes of the Landmarks Law
(see Administrative Code § 25-307 [a] [requiring the Commission to “determine whether
the proposed work would be appropriate for and consistent with the effectuation of the
purposes of” the Landmarks Law, and mandating that, if this question is answered in the
affirmative, the Commission “shall grant a certificate of appropriateness”]; Administrative
Code § 25-301 [b] [stating that the express purpose of the Landmarks Law is to, among
other things, “effect and accomplish the protection, enhancement and perpetuation of . . .
(landmarks) which represent or reflect elements of the city’s cultural, social, economic,
political and architectural history,” and “safeguard the city’s historic, aesthetic and cultural
heritage”]). Moreover, in approving a project that would restore the clock tower and ensure
the clock’s continued operation along with the preservation of its components, it is manifest
that the Commission “consider[ed] the effects of the proposed work upon the protection,
enhancement, perpetuation and use of the interior architectural features of such interior
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landmark which cause it to possess a special character of special historical or aesthetic
interest or value” (Administrative Code § 25-307 [e]).
In short, it cannot be said that the Commission acted with “no rational basis” (Matter
of Pell, 34 NY at 231), and the Appellate Division erred in concluding otherwise.
B.
We also conclude that the LPC’s decisions were not affected by an error of law.
Petitioners rely solely on statements concerning the LPC’s authority found in the transcript
of the public hearings. “It is the settled rule,” however, “that judicial review of an
administrative determination is limited to the grounds invoked by the agency” (Matter of
Scherbyn v Wayne-Finger Lakes Bd. of Co-op Educ Servs, 77 NY2d 753, 758 [1991]).
Here, the Landmarks Law makes plain that the COA must “set forth the reasons” for the
LPC’s action (Administrative Code § 25-315). And the COA in this case did exactly that
by setting forth in detail why the LPC “determined the work to be appropriate.” There is
no need to “surmise or speculate as to how or why [the LPC] reached a particular
conclusion” (Montauk Imp, Inc v Proccacino, 41 NY2d 913, 914 [1977]). The Landmarks
Law gives the LPC the authority to “grant” a COA or “deny” one after it evaluates the
“proposed work” (Administrative Code § 25-307). The LPC appropriately exercised that
authority in this case.
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V.
At bottom, the Landmarks Law invests the LPC with broad discretion. The law
“textually . . . commit[s]” a “policy” decision—determining whether an individual project
“is appropriate for and consistent with the effectuation of the purposes of” the Landmarks
Law (Administrative Code § 25-307 [a])—to the LPC alone (Matter of New York State
Inspection, Sec. & Law Enforcement Employees v Cuomo, 64 NY2d 233, 240 [1984]).
Because of this “very wide discretion” we do not “have the power to substitute [our]
judgment in place of the judgment of the properly delegated administrative officials”
(Matter of Marburg v Cole, 286 NY 202, 208 [1941]).
Based on the foregoing, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed,
with costs, and the proceeding dismissed.
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Matter of Save America’s Clocks v City of New York
No. 17
RIVERA, J. (dissenting):
New York City is an architectural wonder; home to hundreds of landmarked
structures and areas with unique cultural and historical value to the public. Some structures
illustrate the grandeur and majesty of the City—Grand Central Terminal, the Empire State
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Building, the Chrysler Building, and the Brooklyn Bridge. Others depict the City’s vibrant
social and cultural life—the Coney Island Cyclone, the Rainbow Room in Rockefeller
Center, the Apollo Theatre in Harlem, and the Paradise Theatre in the Bronx. Some are
visible to the public from the street and fully appreciated in contrast to their surroundings,
like the Sidewalk Clock at 161-11 Jamaica Avenue; others, like the Sailors’ Snug Harbor
on Staten Island, provide a more intimate view of life and invite us to enjoy the internal
settings of the past. Varying in size, fame, and use, these structures and spaces root the
City in its complex and diverse history and embody its indelible soul.
The New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission (“LPC”) is authorized to
designate these structures for preservation in furtherance of the City’s Landmarks
Preservation and Historic Districts Law (“Landmarks Preservation Law”) (Administrative
Code § 25-301 et seq.; NYC Charter § 3020 [6]).1 In order to effectuate the Law’s
conservancy purposes, the LPC must approve only those changes and alterations that do
not imperil the integrity of a designated structure (Administrative Code § 25-305 [a] [1]).
Here, we must determine whether the LPC exceeded its authority when it approved a
developer’s proposal to alter and privatize one of the last functioning mechanical public
clocks in the City. Far from an ordinary clock, this is a centuries old timepiece, that sits
1
I refer to the Landmarks Preservation and Historic Districts Law as the “Landmarks
Preservation Law” to accurately reflect the statute’s purpose, which is to protect and
preserve the exteriors, interiors, scenic landscapes, and districts that are landmarked by the
LPC.
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atop one of the City’s first skyscrapers and is driven by a rare mechanism that exists in just
a few other clocks in the world.
Notwithstanding the historical significance of the clock to the City, the LPC
approved the building owner’s request to convert this interior landmark into a luxury
apartment. The former is a rare horological masterpiece; the latter is a typical, now-
commonplace, development for the wealthy by the wealthy. Although the LPC has great
latitude to decide whether to approve an alteration to an interior landmark, it cannot
approve an alteration that, by its very nature, amounts to a de facto rescission of a landmark
designation. So, the question is, when is an interior landmark no longer an interior
landmark? The answer is contained in the plain language of the Landmarks Preservation
Law, which defines an interior landmark as accessible to the public for the people’s benefit
and welfare. Transforming an interior landmark into a private residence such that it is
completely closed off from the public, annuls its designation and is inconsistent with the
purpose of the Landmarks Preservation Law.
I.
New York City’s Landmarks Preservation Law
The City Council first enacted the Landmarks Preservation Law in 1965 to preserve
the City’s “historical and architectural heritage” (id. § 25-301). The statute was, in part, a
response to the public’s dismay of the destruction of Pennsylvania Station, a Beaux Arts-
Style railway station that was demolished to construct Madison Square Garden (John
Nivala, The Future of Our Past: Preserving Landmark Preservation, 5 NYU Envtl L J 83,
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83–85 [1996]). However, more than sentimentality animates the City’s commitment to
preserving symbols of the past. Historic preservation laws serve a pragmatic interest in the
public welfare. As the United States Supreme Court explained, the Landmarks
Preservation Law is part of “nationwide legislative efforts” to use “historic conservation”
to address “one aspect of the much larger problem, basically an environmental one, of
enhancing—or perhaps developing for the first time—the quality of life for people” (Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v City of New York, 438 US 104, 108 [1976], quoting Frank Gilbert,
Precedents for the Future, 36 Law & Contemp. Prob. 311, 312 [1971]). It is understood as
reflecting the “widely shared belief that structures with special historic, cultural, or
architectural significance enhance the quality of life for all,” not merely the few (id.; see
Administrative Code § 25-301 [b]).
New York City’s Landmarks Preservation Law expressly guards against the loss of
cultural assets vital to the City’s world stature and economy, for the benefit of the general
public, not any individual interest. As detailed in the statute’s purpose and public policy
declaration, the City Council—the City’s governing body—recognized that many sites of
“a special character or a special historic or aesthetic interest or value” had been “uprooted
. . . without adequate consideration of the irreplaceable loss to the people of the city of the
aesthetic, cultural and historic values represented” in these structures (Administrative Code
§ 25-301 [a]). The Council acknowledged that the “standing of the city as a world wide
tourist center and world capital of business, culture and government cannot be maintained
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or enhanced by disregarding the historical and architectural heritage of the city and by
countenancing the destruction of such cultural assets” (id.).
Based on these findings, the Council “declared as a matter of public policy that the
protection, enhancement, perpetuation and use of improvements . . . of special character or
special historical aesthetic interest or value is a public necessity and is required in the
interests of the health, prosperity, safety and welfare of the people” (id.). The express
purpose of the Landmarks Preservation Law is to protect the spaces that represent the
City’s “historic, cultural, and aesthetic history”; enhance the City’s economy; foster civic
pride in the City’s past accomplishments; and “promote the use of historic districts,
landmarks, interior landmarks and scenic landmarks for the education, pleasure and welfare
of the people of the city” (id. § 25-301 [b]). As the City Council and the United States
Supreme Court have recognized, landmark designation economically benefits both the
municipality and the owner, as it enhances the City’s stature and quality of life.
The Landmarks Preservation Law adopts a designation framework for the
preservation of historically and culturally significant sites and districts. Since 1973, the
Landmarks Preservation Law has protected interior landmarks, defined as:
“An interior, or part thereof, any part of which is thirty years
old or older, and which is customarily open or accessible to the
public, or to which the public is customarily invited, and which
has a special historical or aesthetic interest or value as part of
the development, heritage or cultural characteristics of the city,
state or nation, and which has been designated as an interior
landmark pursuant to the provisions of this chapter”
(Administrative Code § 25-302 [m]).
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An interior architectural feature is “[t]he architectural style, design, general arrangement
and components of an interior, including, but not limited to, the kind, color and texture of
the building material and the type and style of all windows, doors, lights, signs and other
fixtures appurtenant to such interior” (id. § 25-302 [l]).
Landmark designation is a rigorous process, involving the LPC, City Council,
mayor, various administrative agencies, and local communities. The LPC is responsible
for initially designating landmarks through a public hearing process that provides a
reasonable opportunity for the public to present facts and views on the proposed landmark
(id. §§ 25-303[b]; 25-313 [b]). Notice of the hearing must be given to the City Planning
Commission, affected community boards, the president of the borough where the landmark
is located, and the owner of the landmark (id. § 25-303 [a], [j]). If the LPC adopts the
proposal to designate a landmark, it must then file the designation with the City Council,
Department of Buildings, City Planning Commission, Board of Standards and Appeals,
Fire Department and Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (id. § 25-303 [e], [f]). The
City Planning Commission also must hold a public hearing on the designation and submit
a report to the Council outlining the impact of the designation (id. § 25-303 [g] [1]). The
City Council then issues its final vote on the designation, which is subject to the mayor’s
veto (id. § 25-303 [g] [2]). Likewise, the LPC has the authority to rescind a landmark
designation but may only do so after notice and public hearings and approval from the City
Council and mayor (id. § 25-303 [h]).
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Once designated, a landmarked site may not be altered without the LPC’s approval.
An owner who desires to “construct, reconstruct, alter or demolish any improvement on a
landmark . . . or containing an interior landmark” must file an application for a certificate
of appropriateness (id. § 25-307 [a]). Upon submission of a request for such certificate,
“the [LPC] shall determine whether the proposed work would be appropriate for and
consistent with the effectuation of the purposes of [the Landmarks Preservation Law]”
(id.). If the LPC determines that the proposed work furthers the statute’s purposes, then
the LPC “shall grant” the certificate (id.). If it determines to the contrary, “it shall deny
the applicant’s request” (id.). While an applicant can modify its proposal to address
concerns raised during this process, the LPC cannot approve actions in contravention of
the statutory purposes and public policy of the Landmarks Preservation Law. In other
words, the LPC has no discretion other than in its determination as to whether the proposed
work is appropriate; it is wholly without power to grant a request that does not satisfy the
criteria set forth in the Landmarks Preservation Law or to deny a request that does. The
Council has further cabined the LPC’s decision-making authority by requiring that the LPC
“consider the effects of the proposed work upon the protection, enhancement, perpetuation
and use of” the exterior and interior architectural features “which cause it to possess a
special character or special historical or aesthetic interest or value” (id. § 25-307 [d], [e]).
Significantly, and in line with the legislative intent to protect and preserve
landmarks for future use and enjoyment by the public, an owner may request permission
to demolish a designated landmark in whole or in part under limited circumstances. For
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instance, under the Law’s hardship provision, an owner may assert that work is necessary
for the building to provide a “reasonable return” (id. § 25-309).
II.
The Interior Landmark Clock
New York City is home to the former New York Life Insurance Company building,
located at 346 Broadway in the borough of Manhattan. Constructed in 1898, the building
was part of the first wave of skyscrapers that heralded the dawn of the twentieth century
(Cromwell Childe, New York’s High Buildings, NY Times, Feb 6, 1898 [discussing the
novel appearance of skyscrapers, “(i)n the place of the old(,) the new looms—forever
skyward”]). Designed by the renowned architectural firm McKim, Meade & White, which
would later build Pennsylvania Station, and with construction costs that were expected to
exceed $1.5 million, the building was described as “one of the most striking projected
improvements” in lower Manhattan (For A Modern Building. The New-York Life
Insurance Company’s New Home, NY Herald-Tribune, Aug 29, 1895). Its planning and
assembly were noteworthy and garnered significant public attention (see In the Real Estate
Field: Plans for an Addition to the New-York Life Building and for a Theatre, NY Times,
Dec 27, 1895 [noting the filing of plans with the City’s building department]; Race
Between Buildings: Interesting Contest In Which Sky Scrapers Take Part, NY Times, Oct
18, 1896 [describing a “race” to construct the building before completion of the nearby
Central National Bank Building]).
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The building stands 13 stories and encompasses an entire block, bounded by
Broadway, Leonard Street, Lafayette Street, and Catherine Lane, in what was once referred
to as the “mercantile section” or “dry-goods district” of Manhattan (New York Life
Insurance Company, A Temple of Humanity 5 [1909]). As the LPC describes in its
designation report, the exterior is made of white Tuckahoe marble in the neo-Italian
Renaissance style, with a “monumental portico entrance,” attractive cornices, and a
decorative balustrade at the fourth floor. At the top of the 13th floor of the Broadway face
of the building is a parapet with four impressive stone eagles, above which, rises a
clocktower topped by a statute. The interior of the building reflects a similar sense of
majesty, with a long hall on the first floor that spans the length of the building, composed
of terrazzo floors and marble walls. One end of the hall, the “Banking Hall,” stands two
stories tall and has large round-arched windows, two rows of Corinthian columns, and a
deeply coffered ceiling.
The building’s clocktower is impressive both for its external magnificence and
internal architectural and mechanical features (Ernest H. Morgan, Clocks, Clock-Making,
and Clock-Makers, 60 The Journal of Education 225, 225 [1904] [noting the “enormous
four-dial clock is one of the sights of the metropolis”]). As the LPC’s designation report
describes, the four large faces of the clock are visible from the street and accented by a
statue of “four-kneeling men supporting a skeletal globe surmounted by an eagle.” An
1898 New York Times article describing the upper stories of the City’s significant
buildings such as the Mutual Life Building and American Tract Society Building—the
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newly termed skyscrapers—saw fit to include the clocktower (Childe, New York’s High
Buildings). The author highlighted its aesthetic elements:
“The clock here and the tower itself are modern ornaments of
Broadway. From the point mentioned they are superb. The
eagles with outstretched wings marking the tower’s base, the
heroic figures of an Atlas type holding the globe on their back,
all carved out of fine white stone, are the features that at once
strike the eye and that the man in the street can only dimly see.
The tower’s base on the rook is balconied. The tower itself is
square at its foot, and then runs up in the rounding form of a
watchtower of old” (id.).
The clock was manufactured by the E. Howard Watch & Clock Company and
operates with a particularly rare double three-legged gravity escapement that is manually
wound once a week. The mechanism was once praised as “the best time-keeping system
used in buildings in the world” (Morgan at 225). Petitioners explain that only one other
tower clock possesses such a mechanism: “Big Ben,” the clock at the northern end of the
Houses of Parliament in Westminster Palace, London.2 The clock mechanism is driven by
a 1,000-pound weight and operates with a 5,000-pound bell, twice the size of the Liberty
Bell, that was designed to toll the hour with the assistance of two 800-pound hammers.
In 1968, the City acquired the building. In 1987, the LPC designated the building’s
exterior and parts of its interior as landmarks. The LPC’s interior designation report
2
Edmund Beckett Denison was appointed to design Big Ben, and in doing so, invented the
revolutionary double three-legged gravity escapement (Building the Great Clock,
parliament.uk, https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/building/palace/big-
ben/building-clock-tower/building-great-clock/). Completed in 1859, Big Ben is now a
UNESCO World Heritage Site, and is “instantly recognizable” (Palace of Westminster and
Westminster Abbey including Saint Margaret’s Church, UNESCO,
http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/426).
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highlights various aspects of the building that give it special aesthetic and cultural value,
including the clock and clocktower. The report notes that the “clock and clocktower
interior, which have not been altered, are a rarity in New York City.” It describes features
of the clock mechanism as well: its manufacture by the E. Howard Watch & Clock
Company, its 1,000-pound weight, and its need to be wound on a weekly basis. In
particular, the report emphasizes the functioning mechanism’s import, stating “[t]he clock
is one of the few remaining in New York which has not been electrified.”
The designation concludes:
“[a]ccordingly, pursuant to the provisions of [the Landmarks
Preservation Law], the Landmarks Preservation Commission
designates as an Interior Landmark the . . . thirteenth floor
interior . . . ; fourteenth floor interior consisting of the
clocktower machinery room; . . . and the fixtures and interior
components of these spaces, including but not limited to . . .
clock machinery”
Years later, recognizing that the clock mechanism needed regular maintenance, the
LPC urged the City to appoint a City Clock Master. The LPC called the six remaining
mechanical public clocks in the City “public treasures,” that “are not simply decorative
elements on distinguished buildings, [but] truly urban amenities.” The mayor agreed and
stated at the appointment ceremony of the Clock Master of the City of New York that the
clocks were “works of art,” with extraordinary designs and “mechanical ‘innards.’” The
mayor further acknowledged “[i]t is crucial that we carefully preserve and safeguard our
City’s architectural heritage and [that] the large mechanical clocks are an especially public
and important part of that heritage.” For 35 years, the clock in the former New York Life
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Insurance Company building worked without disruption; the Clock Master, Marvin
Schneider, wound and maintained the clock, giving weekly public tours of the clocktower.
In 2013, the City sold the building to respondent, Civic Center Community Group
Broadway LLC (“Developer”), for $145 million. At the time of the transfer, the deed
expressly stated that the purchase was subject to “Notice of Landmark Designation,
recorded May 25, 1989.” Developer thus knowingly purchased more than a building with
an artistic interior; it bought a historically significant structure, protected by law and
intended to be preserved for public enjoyment. Indeed, Developer and its partner now seek
to capitalize on the designation by advertising the building as a “Renaissance-Revival
palace,” whose exterior and interiors were “designated as New York City landmarks” and
will soon house luxury condominium residences and possibly a boutique hotel (The
Peebles Corporation, 108 Leonard Street, http://peeblescorp.com/project/108-leonard-
street [last visited March 18, 2019]).
Approximately 10 months later, Developer applied for a certificate of
appropriateness with a 103-page proposal. Developer had acquired the necessary
Department of Building permits and sought the LPC’s approval to restore the exterior and
interior of the building. Developer planned to replace much of the exterior with new
fixtures in the style of the original architecture, renovate the Banking Hall, and convert the
rest of the building into residential properties.
As relevant to this appeal, the proposed alterations to the clock were the topic of
heated debate at two public hearings LPC held in 2014. At the first hearing, Developer
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made clear that the clocktower, with its unique clock mechanism, would be sold as part of
the private triplex apartment that would occupy the top floors of the building, rendering
the clock inaccessible to the public. When asked whether it would be feasible to allow the
public to access the clock mechanism from the roof, the Developer’s architect stated, “it is
possible, but it is not our intention to do that.” During this exchange, counsel for the LPC
interjected: “there’s no power under the Landmarks [Preservation] Law to require interior-
designated spaces to remain public.” When the discussion turned to the operation of the
clock, Developer did not state whether the clock would continue to run with the original
mechanism. However, counsel for the LPC advised “there’s nothing in the Landmarks
[Preservation] Law that requires or gives the Commission the power to require that this
mechanism remains operable.”
During the first hearing, the LPC also heard from members of community groups,
preservation societies, and Clock Master Schneider, who all expressed concern that the
clocktower would no longer be accessible to the public and that the mechanism would not
function. Schneider also stated that the 1987 designation was intended to preserve the
clock’s mechanism and that disconnecting it would fundamentally alter the clock as a
whole.
After a visit to the site, the LPC held a second public hearing one month later. There,
Developer explained that it would disconnect the mechanism, electrify the clock, and
weatherproof the part of the clocktower that housed the mechanism. While Developer’s
architect did not know all the details of the electrification process, he surmised that the
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mechanism would “be available at any time for anybody to look at or come back in some
day and wind it up, who knows.” Developer made clear, however, that the reason the
mechanism would be disconnected was to ensure the privacy of the future owners of the
triplex. Although there were questions from several commissioners regarding the LPC’s
authority to require public access and the maintenance of the original mechanism, LPC
counsel repeated his opinion that the LPC was without authority to regulate the functioning
of the clock or to require public access. The LPC Chair echoed counsel’s position, stating
that the “law does not require, again, that it remain open to the public and used.” At the
end of the hearing, the LPC voted to issue the certificate of appropriateness with one
commissioner dissenting.
The certificate approved work that would renovate the exterior of the building and
the Banking Hall. It also approved work that Developer had not initially proposed, which
would involve “disconnecting, retaining, and protecting the existing clock mechanism and
the restoration of the wood and glass mechanism enclosure; and electrifying the clock
operation.” In a single sentence, the LPC reasoned that such work will “fully restore[]”
the clocktower and will ensure that the “clock mechanism and faces will be retained,
thereby preserving these significant features.”
III.
The LPC Decision to Approve the Clock’s Privatization and Alteration
Save America’s Clocks, a national horological preservation organization; the
Historic District Council; Tribeca Trust; and other individuals involved in the preservation
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of the clock successfully challenged the LPC’s approval of the certificate in the courts
below. The majority now reverses, concluding that the LPC’s decision was rational. I
disagree, first, because the LPC permitted Developer to transform the clocktower, an
interior landmark, from a publicly accessible space to a private luxury residence in
contravention of the plain language of the Landmarks Preservation Law. The LPC’s
decision effectively rescinds the clock’s landmark designation, an act which may only be
accomplished by holding a public hearing, proposing rescission to the City Planning
Commission, and obtaining approval of the rescission from the City Council and mayor.
Second, the decision contravenes the LPC’s statutory mandate to permit only those
alterations that effectuate the purposes of the Landmarks Preservation Law. Such
alterations do not include the conversion of a public treasure to a private apartment in a
manner that irrevocably damages the unique and defining historic characteristic of the
interior landmark.
In reviewing the LPC’s decision, this Court must determine whether it “was affected
by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion” (CPLR 7803
[3]). An agency’s action is arbitrary and capricious where it lacks a rational basis and is
taken without regard to the facts (Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School
Dist., 34 NY2d 222, 231 [1974]). An agency decision in excess of its authority is ultra
vires, infected by an error of law, and cannot stand (see CPLR 7803; Matter of DeVera v
Elia, 32 NY3d 423 [2018]).
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By approving alterations that rendered the clock mechanism inaccessible to the
public, the LPC effectively rescinded the clock’s designation. Public access is an essential
characteristic of an interior landmark (Administrative Code § 25-303 [m]). Nothing in the
statute requires unlimited round-the-clock access, but the opportunity for the public to view
those features that warrant landmark designation is fundamental to the statute’s purposes.
Indeed, the Landmarks Preservation Law was enacted because the destruction of historic
sites wrought “irreparable loss to the people of the city,” and damaged the City’s position
as a destination for visitors and tourists (id. § 25-301 [a]).
That an interior landmark’s designation requires some degree of public accessibility
is evident from the language of the Landmarks Preservation Law. We begin with the well-
established rules of construction that we may not interpret a statute in contravention of its
plain language or in a manner that leads to incongruous results (McKinney’s Statutes § 94).
The Landmarks Preservation Law’s definition of an interior landmark must apply
throughout the life of the designated site—otherwise it is not an interior landmark. The
statute defines an interior landmark in the present, not the past: an interior landmark is one
“customarily open or accessible to the public or which the public is customarily invited,
and which has a special historical or aesthetic interest or value as part of the development,
heritage or cultural characteristics of the city, state or nation” (Administrative Code § 25-
302 [m]). It also requires that the site “has been designated as an interior landmark
pursuant” to the Landmarks Preservation Law (id.). The use of the present tense and the
requirement of a present designation make clear that an interior landmark is one that
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presently allows for customary openness. If the Council intended the definition to describe
only a prospective interior landmark, then it would have used the past tense and not referred
to a completed designation process.
Even if the plain text did not make clear that public access is an essential
characteristic of an interior landmark, it would be a nonsensical interpretation of the statute
that would permit a landmarked interior space to be closed off to the public indefinitely. If
an interior landmark is defined, in part, as a site open to the public, it cannot be stripped of
that characteristic and still retain its statutory designation. Otherwise, the definition would
be rendered wholly meaningless. This reading of the Landmarks Preservation Law would
allow for the absurd result where a space could be designated an interior landmark one day
and shortly thereafter entirely closed off from the public. What would be the purpose of
preserving a space for the public that the public will never enjoy?
The legislative history of the Landmarks Preservation Law also supports the
conclusion that public access is a requirement for continued designation. While the plain
language of a statute is “the best evidence of legislative intent, ‘the legislative history of
an enactment may also be relevant and is not to be ignored’” (Kimmel v State, 29 NY3d
386, 397 [2018], quoting Matter of Tompkins County Support Collection Unit v
Chamberlin, 99 NY2d 328, 335 [2003]). As that history reveals, when the Council was
considering whether to amend the Landmarks Preservation Law to protect interior
landmarks, the LPC threw its full support behind the amendment, agreeing with the
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Council’s intended purpose to expand the statutory coverage only to those interiors
permanently open to the public. As the LPC’s letter to the Council explained:
“New York City’s buildings contain many architecturally
notable interiors. Some buildings are actually more
distinguished for certain of their great rooms than for their
facades. Under the proposed expansion of its powers, the
[LPC] will be able, after due notice and public hearing, to
provide the same sort of protection to these interior spaces as
it now provides to exteriors. The [LPC] agrees that this
protection should be limited to interiors that are permanently
available for public enjoyment” (LPC, Statement before the
New York City Council Committee on Charter and
Government Operations, [Nov. 1, 1973] [emphasis added]).
Once passed, the amendment codified the Council’s intention to ensure that interior
landmarks provided a degree of permanent public access. Accordingly, the only
interpretation supported by the Landmarks Preservation Law’s plain text and its legislative
history is that an interior landmark must be open and available for the public’s welfare,
enjoyment, and education. When the LPC designated the clock mechanism, it did so with
the understanding that the mechanism was and would continue to be available for the public
to view. The LPC’s own words confirm the error of the current decision to permit
privatization of the clocktower without public access and the majority’s fundamentally
flawed analysis in this regard.
Contrary to the majority’s view (majority op at 10), an interior landmark cannot
retain its designation if the complete denial of public access is part of the approved
alteration. The majority’s analysis is based on its erroneous reading of Matter of Teachers
Inc. & Annuity Ass. of Am. v City of New York (82 NY2d 35 [1993]) as defining the
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public access requirement solely as “a ‘jurisdictional predicate’ for an initial LPC
designation” (majority op at 10). Teachers required the Court to consider the LPC’s
authority to designate the interior of the historic Four Seasons restaurant.3 The owner
sought to distinguish what it called “‘inherently’ public interiors, such as railroad stations,
lobbies and theaters, which are intrinsically dedicated to public use by their public
assemblage purpose,” from the restaurant interior, which, although previously open to the
public, did not have a “distinctively public purpose” (Teachers, 82 NY2d at 43). The Court
rejected this argument based on the plain language of the statute which made no such
distinction. As the Court explained, “[t]he crux of [the interior landmark definitional
provision’s public access requirement] is customary openness, accessibility, invitation to
the public—words that are readily understood to require usual, ordinary or habitual (rather
than rare or occasional) availability to the public” (id.). The Court similarly rejected the
owner’s argument that the space fell outside the LPC’s designation jurisdiction as a matter
of law because it could be adapted for private use. In so doing, the Court acknowledged
the uncontroversial fact “that any structure . . . can be converted to private use in the future;
that potential cannot preclude the landmarking of appropriate interiors” (id. at 44). This
statement and the Court’s holding merely recognize that the then-extant potential to convert
3
Designated in 1989, the Four Seasons interior is recognized as an uncommon example of
International Style architecture (LPC, Designation List 221 at 6, Oct. 3, 1989, http://s-
media.nyc.gov/agencies/lpc/lp/1666.pdf). Constructed in 1958, it was one of the costliest
restaurants ever constructed at the time and was completed with rich materials and expert
craftmanship (id.). The restaurant also features numerous works of acclaimed modern art
including Pablo Picasso’s “The Three-Cornered Hat” (id.).
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public space to private space does not foreclose landmark designation because otherwise,
no space could ever be landmarked.
Properly understood, and in context, Teachers does not, as the majority contends,
conclude that the public access requirement of the Landmarks Preservation Law is only
relevant at the initial designation stage. In fact, the Court in Teachers had no reason to
address the question of post-designation public access because the owner’s challenge was
limited to the LPC’s jurisdictional power to designate an interior space in the first instance.
The LPC’s decision was also irrational and ultra vires because it permitted
Developer to disconnect the clock from its mechanism, resulting in the destruction of an
essential characteristic of the clock that warranted its interior landmark designation. The
designation report describes the clock and the mechanism as “a rarity” and the interior
components and all fixtures appurtenant to the interior are landmarked because of their
“special character, special historical and aesthetic interest and value as part of the
development, heritage and cultural characteristics of New York City.” The mechanism’s
continued operation is part of the clock’s unique character as the report explains that “[t]he
clock is one of the few remaining in New York which has not been electrified.” The fact
that electrification of the clock will not affect the external appearance of the tower is
irrelevant. It is the master design and detail of its interior mechanism and the fact that is
not electrified that sets it apart from other clocktowers.
The majority asserts that the LPC’s approval of the work was permissible because
the Landmarks Preservation Law provides that a certificate of appropriateness may issue
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for the “demoli[tion] of any improvement . . . containing an interior landmark”
(Administrative Code § 25-307 [a]; majority op at 10). However, the Landmarks
Preservation Law cannot reasonably be understood as requiring the approval of both the
City Council and mayor for the rescission of an interior landmark’s designation, but not
for the destruction of the landmark itself. Nor is this point applicable here as Developer
did not seek to demolish the clock mechanism. Putting aside whether the LPC could
approve work that would demolish the clock mechanism, that is not what LPC ultimately
approved.
The LPC’s decision to allow Developer to deny public access to the clock and to
disconnect the clock mechanism is in direct contravention of the Landmarks Preservation
Law’s statutory purposes and public policy: the preservation of unique structures and
spaces that reflect the City’s aesthetic, cultural, and historic values for everyone’s
enjoyment (Administrative Code § 25-301; Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 US at 108). The
Law expressly provides that it is intended to “promote the use of [designated landmarks]”
(Administrative Code § 25-301 [b] [g]). It authorizes the LPC to issue certificates of
appropriateness where “the proposed work would be appropriate for and consistent with
the effectuation of the purposes of” the Landmarks Preservation Law and requires the LPC
to “consider the effects of the proposed work upon the protection, enhancement,
perpetuation and use of the interior architectural features of such interior landmark which
cause it to possess a special character or special historical or aesthetic interest or value”
(id. § 25-307 [a], [e]). These affirmative obligations require the LPC’s express attention
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to factors that impact a designated landmark, the public’s use of it, and its continued
viability as a public cultural asset. The Council mandated conservancy for the benefit of
present and future generations. The Landmarks Preservation Law is not, as Developer
would have it, for the benefit of those who can pay a high cost for private access. Nor is it
intended to facilitate the desires of those who would rather do away with the public’s
cultural assets because they pose an inconvenience to private interests. The Council’s
intention is crystal clear: to preserve these spaces “for the education, pleasure and welfare
of the people of the city” (id. § 25-301 [b] [g]). We cannot construe the Landmarks
Preservation Law in a manner that subverts this legislative intent and the statutory
rationale.4
Developer’s contention that public access would impede the economic viability of
landmarks, reduce funds for preservation, and discourage owners from seeking landmark
designation reveals its fundamental misunderstanding of the Landmarks Preservation Law.
The Council’s enactment was in response to the destruction of structures and spaces of
historical or aesthetic importance (Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 US at 108–109). As the
4
I have no occasion to opine on whether the Appellate Division properly considered
statements by the LPC Counsel that the LPC had no authority to require public access
because my conclusion that the LPC reached an erroneous decision is based on a pure legal
interpretation of the Landmarks Preservation Law and not dependent on whether the LPC
adopted counsel’s view of the statutory language (Kurcsics v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49
NY2d 451, 459 [1980]). However, Developer’s argument in this regard fails to address
well-established law that an agency’s decision must be unaffected by an error of law
(CPLR 7803). Developer fails to explain how the error discussed by the Appellate Division
could be reviewed without reference to counsel’s public hearing statements.
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United States Supreme Court recognized in Penn Central, New York City’s Landmarks
Preservation Law, like other urban landmark laws, seeks to “encourage preservation by
private owners and users” by ensuring owners “a ‘reasonable return’ on their investments
and maximum latitude to use their parcels for purposes not inconsistent with the
preservation goals” (id. at 109–110). The key is that private use cannot be inconsistent
with the public purposes and policy of the Landmarks Preservation Law. The Council
intended to make it economically attractive for the private sector to assist with preservation
and enacted legislation that would benefit both the public and private sector. However,
what Developer advocates as a regime in which private development is prioritized over
continued preservation is a far cry from the Landmarks Preservation Law’s conservancy
framework, which puts preservation front and center and fosters private interest in that
endeavor with a reasonable return on ownership. Where, as here, the LPC approves
alterations at odds with the preservation of the interior landmark’s unique features and the
public access requirement that justified designation in the first place, Developer’s private
use is wholly inconsistent with the goals and public policy of the Landmarks Preservation
Law.5 The LPC had no authority to permit what the Council forbids.
5
Regardless of the LPC’s approval of the renovations to the exterior and other portions of
the building’s interior, such as the Banking Hall, the Landmarks Preservation Law does
not permit the denial of public access to the clock mechanism. The statute does not suggest
that renovations of one designated landmark may justify the rescission of another. It would
be particularly inappropriate here, where it was Developer’s commercial interest in
commodifying the clocktower, and not the work on the Banking Hall and exterior, that
necessitated the alterations to the clock mechanism. Developer’s architect said as much
during the hearing when he explained the clock mechanism could be kept open to the public
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IV.
Conclusion
Soon after the demolition of Pennsylvania Station had commenced, acclaimed
architecture critic Ada Louis Huxtable described the work as an indictment of the City’s
values. “We want and deserve tin-can architecture in a tin-horn culture. And we will
probably be judged not by the monuments we build but by those we have destroyed” (Ada
Louis Huxtable, Farewell Penn Station, NY Times Oct. 30, 1963). Fundamentally, the
Landmarks Preservation Law, which grew from this fervor, recognized that the structures
and sites that embody the spirit of the City should be preserved even when commercial
interests seek their destruction. While it might be more profitable to disavow the clatter of
the Cyclone, the sight of the Navy Yard dry dock, or the pace of the retractile Carroll Street
Bridge, New York City appreciates these elements and the quality they add to public life.
The LPC designation here recognized that it was not just the elegant faces of the clock that
warranted protection, but also the less visible mechanism that gave it meaning and
historical significance. By approving Developer’s proposal to irrevocably alter the
mechanics that define the unique horological features of the clock and indefinitely deny
public access to this interior landmark in violation of the Landmarks Preservation Law, the
and that the purpose of electrifying the clock was to allow the clocktower to be sold as part
of the triplex.
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LPC’s decision was erroneous as a matter of law and cannot stand.6 I would affirm the
Appellate Division.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Order reversed, with costs, and proceeding dismissed. Opinion by Judge Garcia. Judges
Stein, Fahey and Feinman concur. Judge Rivera dissents and votes to affirm in an opinion
in which Judge Wilson concurs. Chief Judge DiFiore took no part.
Decided March 28, 2019
6
Although raised in the Appellate Division, there is no takings question presented before
this Court. In any event, such an argument would be meritless as Developer did not request
a certificate of appropriateness on the ground of insufficient return pursuant to the hardship
provision of the Landmarks Preservation Law (see Administrative Code § 24-309).
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