MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any Mar 28 2019, 8:53 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jose B. Rodriguez Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Michigan City, Indiana Attorney General
Caryn N. Szyper
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jose B. Rodriguez, March 28, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-PC-947
v. Appeal from the Elkhart Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Teresa L. Cataldo,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
20D03-1504-PC-16
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
[1] Jose B. Rodriguez was convicted of four counts of Class A felony child
molesting of his step-daughter, and the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-947 | March 28, 2019 Page 1 of 3
term of forty years. Rodriguez v. State, No. 20A05-1309-CR-491 (Ind. Ct. App.
Aug. 26, 2014), trans. denied. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief
arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective, and the post-conviction court
denied him relief. Rodriguez, pro se, now appeals.
[2] Rodriguez first argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in a variety of ways.
However, he fails to develop any of these arguments with cogent reasoning.
Rodriguez argues that his trial counsel failed to conduct any pretrial discovery,
but he does not tell us what discovery counsel should have conducted. He
argues that his trial counsel failed to conduct an investigation of the facts of the
case, but he does not tell us what investigation counsel should have conducted.
He argues that his trial counsel should have sought a limiting instruction “re:
evidence of prior bad acts of uncharged sexual conduct,” Appellant’s Br. p. 8,
but he does not tell us what those prior bad acts are or what the limiting
instruction should have said. He argues that his trial counsel should have
“investigated certain medical evidence,” id., but he does not identify that
medical evidence. He argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
investigate “a potential witness which [he] deemed to be exculpatory,” id., but
he does not identify this witness or what this witness would have testified to.
Finally, he argues that his trial counsel should have subpoenaed his work
records because they “would have proven conclusively that he was working at
the times of the alleged events,” id., but he fails to explain how his work records
would have done so. Moreover, Rodriguez does not provide any citations to
the record to support any of his allegations. In fact, there is not a single citation
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-947 | March 28, 2019 Page 2 of 3
to the record in his entire brief. For these reasons, we find that Rodriguez has
waived all of these arguments. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (providing
that arguments must be supported by cogent reasoning and citations to the
record).1
[3] Rodriguez next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present
him with a plea offer from the State. However, he does not allege that the State
actually made him a plea offer. See Appellant’s Br. p. 9 (“It could be concluded
that had [Rodriguez] been presented an offer . . ., he may have accepted and
spared the state the cost of a trial.” (emphasis added)).
[4] Finally, Rodriguez argues that the Indiana Supreme Court wrongly decided
Baum v. State, 533 N.E.2d 1200 (Ind. 1989), which holds that claims of
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel are not judged by the Strickland
v. Washington standard. This, however, is an argument that Rodriguez should
make to our Supreme Court.
[5] We therefore affirm the post-conviction court.
[6] Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Altice, J., concur.
1
Rodriguez makes similar claims about his post-conviction counsel, but these arguments are waived for the
same reasons.
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