MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
Mar 29 2019, 8:14 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Donald E.C. Leicht Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Kokomo, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Ian McLean
Supervising Deputy Attorney
General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Brooke Meeks, March 29, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-1863
v. Appeal from the Howard Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable William C.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Menges, Jr., Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
34D01-1707-F4-812
34D01-1712-F6-1395
Pyle, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1863| March 29, 2019 Page 1 of 8
Statement of the Case
[1] Brooke Meeks (“Meeks”) appeals her termination from the Howard County
Drug Court Program. Meeks claims the trial court denied her due process
during her drug court termination hearing. Concluding that there was no due
process violation, we affirm Meeks’ termination from the Drug Court Program.
[2] We affirm.
Issue
Whether Meeks was deprived of due process during her drug court
termination hearing.
Facts
[3] In July 2017, the State charged Meeks with Level 4 felony dealing in
methamphetamine and Level 5 felony conspiracy to commit dealing in
methamphetamine in cause number 34D01-1707-F4-00812 (“F4-812”). In
December 2017, in cause number 34D01-1712-F6-01395 (“F6-1395”), the State
charged Meeks with Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine, Level 6
felony possession of a narcotic drug, Level 6 felony unlawful possession of a
syringe, and Level 6 felony unlawful possession or use of a legend drug.
[4] In April 2018, Meeks pled guilty to Level 5 felony conspiracy to commit
dealing in methamphetamine under F4-821 and Level 6 felony possession of
methamphetamine under F6-1395. Under the terms of the plea agreement, the
State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges, and Meeks’ sentence would be
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1863| March 29, 2019 Page 2 of 8
deferred so long as she participated in the Howard County Drug Court
Program.1 If Meeks failed to successfully complete drug court, the matter
would be set for sentencing, with the sentence length left to the trial court’s
discretion. The trial court accepted the plea agreement and referred Meeks to
Drug Court.
[5] The following month, in May 2018, Laura Rood (“Rood”), a Drug Court case
manager, filed a “Notice of Termination” from the Drug Court Program.
(App. Vol. 2 at 31). This notice alleged that Meeks had failed to follow the
rules of the Drug Court Program. Thereafter, the trial court held a drug court
termination hearing. The only witness called by the State was Rood. She
testified that Meeks had previously been sanctioned for missing a drug screen
and for having contact with an individual she was explicitly ordered not to
contact. Rood then testified that the notice of termination was filed because
Meeks was “going to [the drug testing facility] instead of calling, when she
should have been calling.” (Tr. 26).
[6] Meeks also testified at the termination hearing and admitted that she had
violated program rules. On direct examination, the following exchanges took
place:
[Defense Counsel]: Did you miss a drug screen?
1
“‘[D]rug court’ means a problem solving court focused on addressing the substance abuse issues of
defendants or juveniles in the criminal justice system[.]” IND. CODE § 33-23-16-5.
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[Meeks]: Yes, sir.
***
[Defense Counsel]: Ok. And did you have contact with
somebody that you were not supposed to?
[Meeks]: Yes, sir, I did.
***
[Defense Counsel]: Ok, so you went [to the drug testing facility]
rather than call in because you didn’t have your card to call in?
[Meeks]: Yes, sir.
(Tr. 33, 36). At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court terminated Meeks’
participation in the Drug Court Program. The trial court then held a sentencing
hearing and sentenced Meeks to consecutive terms of six (6) years under F4-812
and two and a half (2½) years under F6-1395. Meeks now appeals. Our
discussion of the issue includes additional facts.
Decision
[7] At the outset, we note that our Appellate Rules provide that each contention
made in the argument section of an appellant’s brief “must contain the
contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent
reasoning.” Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). This means that an appellant’s
argument section “must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes,
and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on.” Id. Meeks,
however, has failed to satisfy Indiana Appellate Rule 46’s requirement of
providing a cogent argument supported by citation to authority. This failure
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hinders our review and results in waiver of appellate review of this issue. See
Foutch v. State, 53 N.E.3d 577, 581 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (waiving a
defendant’s argument where he failed to provide a cogent argument).2
[8] Waiver notwithstanding, Meeks’ due process rights were not violated when she
was terminated from the Drug Court program. The drug court program is a
forensic diversion program akin to community corrections, and we will review
the termination of placement in a drug court program as we do a revocation of
placement in community corrections. Withers v. State, 15 N.E.3d 660, 663 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2014). Our Court has stated that:
For purposes of appellate review, we treat a hearing on a petition
to revoke a placement in a community corrections program the
same as we do a hearing on a petition to revoke probation. The
similarities between the two dictate this approach. Both
probation and community corrections programs serve as
alternatives to commitment to the [Department of Correction]
and both are made at the sole discretion of the trial court. A
defendant is not entitled to serve a sentence in either probation or
a community correction program. Rather, placement in either is
a matter of grace and a conditional liberty that is a favor, not a
right.
While a community correction placement revocation hearing has
certain due process requirements, it is not to be equated with an
adversarial criminal proceeding. Rather, it is a narrow inquiry,
and its procedures are to be more flexible. This is necessary to
permit the court to exercise its inherent power to enforce
obedience to its lawful orders.
2
Meeks’ counsel also cited to a memorandum decision of this Court, in contravention of Indiana Appellate
Rule 65(D). We remind counsel that memorandum decisions “shall not be cited to any court except by
parties to the case to establish res judicate, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.” App. R. 65(D).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1863| March 29, 2019 Page 5 of 8
Id. at 663-64. (quoting Monroe v. State, 899 N.E.2d 688, 691 (Ind. Ct. App.
2009)).
[9] INDIANA CODE § 33-23-16-14.5 governs termination of an individual’s
participation in a problem solving court program.3 The statute provides:
(c) The problem solving court judge or other hearing officer shall
conduct a hearing concerning an alleged violation of a condition
of a problem solving court program as follows:
***
(3) The individual who is alleged to have committed the violation is
entitled to:
(A) receive written notice of the alleged violation;
(B) obtain the disclosure of evidence against the individual;
(C) confront and cross-examine witnesses; and
(D) be represented by counsel.
I.C. § 33-23-16-14.5.
[10] First, Meeks argues that her due process rights were violated because she “knew
neither the ‘claimed violations’ nor the ‘evidence against’ her,” which caused
her to “hit the fact-finding hearing blind.” (Meeks’ Br. 10). However, we note
that she does not dispute that she failed to follow program rules nor does she
contend that the violation of program rules is insufficient to justify her
termination. Rather, she appears to argue that her notice of termination from
3
“‘[P]roblem solving court’ means a court providing a process for immediate and highly structured judicial
intervention for eligible individuals[.]” I.C. § 33-23-16-8.
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the Drug Court Program was inadequate. We disagree. The notice provided as
follows:
Notice is hereby given that the Howard County Drug Court
Program intends to terminate Brooke Meeks participation in the
program for her failure to follow the rules of the Drug Court
Program.
(App. Vol. 2 at 31). This notice was sufficient to apprise Meeks of the claimed
violation, i.e., that she had failed to follow the rules of the Drug Court
Program. We acknowledge that the notice did not specify the exact rules she
failed to follow. However, it is reasonable to infer that Meeks knew and
understood what rules she failed to follow because she admitted to violating
program rules during the hearing. Additionally, Meeks signed a “Drug Court
Program Participation Agreement[,]” which listed the rules for successful
participation in the Drug Court Program. (App. Vol. 2 at 26). One of the
special conditions of Meeks’ participation agreement was that she had to abide
by all of the rules, regulations, or special conditions ordered by Drug Court.
We conclude that Meeks received adequate notice of the allegations against her.
[11] Next, Meeks’ contention that she was unaware of the “evidence against her” is
unsupported by the record. (Meeks’ Br. 10). Meeks’ counsel had the following
exchange with Rood on cross-examination:
[Defense Counsel]: So just so I can lay out the timeline, I don’t
want to just keep rehashing everything, in the first week that she
was out of jail, she missed a drug screen on a Saturday and she
had contact with her ex-boyfriend. She was then sanctioned to
do a night in jail and live in a sober living environment, is that
correct?
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[Rood]: Yes.
[Defense Counsel]: Then over the next 21 days it would seem,
she remained in compliance with her sober living environment,
remained in compliance with her treatment, but walked to one of
her drug screens rather than calling?
[Rood]: Yes.
[Defense Counsel]: And that has led to . . . the program seeking
her termination from the Drug Court Program?
[Rood]: That and the treatment provider said she was done
working with her.
(Tr. 27-28). Taken together, Meeks’ cross-examination of Rood and her own
admission to several violations exhibits a familiarity with the evidence
underlying the allegation in the notice of termination.
[12] Based on the foregoing, we are unpersuaded that the trial court violated Meeks’
due process rights. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision to
terminate Meeks from the Drug Court Program.
[13] Affirmed.
Najam, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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