MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2019 ME 49
Docket: Pen-18-189
Argued: December 12, 2018
Decided: April 4, 2019
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
AMANDA BENNETT-ROBERSON
HUMPHREY, J.
[¶1] The State of Maine appeals from an order of the trial court
(Penobscot County, Budd, J.) suppressing evidence obtained during a traffic
stop after a Maine State Police trooper stopped and ordered Amanda
Bennett-Roberson out of the motor vehicle she was driving so that he could
administer field sobriety tests to her. Because we conclude that the motion
court erred in restricting its legal analysis to evidence of the events and
circumstances occurring at and prior to the moment that the trooper realized
that the operator was not the person who was the subject of the complaint that
led to the traffic stop, we vacate the suppression order and remand for the court
to determine whether the trooper’s subsequent actions were reasonably
related in scope to the purpose of the initial stop.
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I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] Viewed in the light most favorable to the court’s order, the following
facts are supported by the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.
State v. Blier, 2017 ME 103, ¶ 3, 162 A.3d 829. On the evening of August 2, 2017,
the trooper received a report that a caller, who identified himself by name, had
observed a “visibly intoxicated” man walking around the parking lot in front of
a store and repeatedly getting in and out of a vehicle, which the caller described.
The trooper believed that the caller’s self-identification added to the credibility
of the report. The trooper responded to the location and, from a distance,
observed three or four individuals in the store’s parking lot milling around a
vehicle matching the description provided by the caller, several of whom were
getting in and out of the vehicle.
[¶3] At the suppression hearing, the trooper testified that, from his
vantage point, he was unable to determine the gender or discern any identifying
characteristics of the individuals around the vehicle because of the glare from
the setting sun. After several minutes, the trooper observed three people get
into the vehicle, which then exited the parking lot onto a public way.
[¶4] The trooper did not observe any erratic operation or traffic
infractions, but immediately activated the cruiser’s blue lights to stop the
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vehicle because he believed that it was being operated by the intoxicated male.
The vehicle pulled over promptly and appropriately.
[¶5] When the trooper approached the vehicle, he “immediately”
realized that the driver was a female, not a male. There were two male
passengers in the vehicle—one was seated in the front, the other in the rear. At
the trooper’s request, the operator produced the vehicle’s registration, but she
did not have her license and said it was at her home. The operator appeared to
have a “droopy” look to her face and her speech was slurred. The trooper, who
is a certified drug recognition expert, testified that his observations suggested
possible drug impairment. The operator of the vehicle, Bennett-Roberson,
denied consuming alcohol but admitted that she had taken prescription
medication. She did not identify the medication she had taken. The trooper
then asked her to exit the vehicle to conduct field sobriety tests.1
[¶6] Bennett-Roberson was arrested for operating under the influence
(Class D), 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(A)(1) (2018), and operating a motor vehicle
without a license (Class E), 29-A M.R.S. § 1251(1)(A) (2018).
1 The court noted in its order that the “parties agree that this was the last interaction between the
Defendant and [the trooper] that is of relevance to the Defendant’s motion.”
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[¶7] On February 28, 2018, Bennett-Roberson filed a motion to suppress
all evidence stemming from the stop of her vehicle. She argued that the trooper
lacked a reasonable and articulable suspicion to initiate the stop and did not
have a reasonable and articulable suspicion to order her out of the vehicle to
conduct further investigation—including field sobriety testing—because his
suspicion that an intoxicated male was operating the vehicle dissipated as soon
as he realized that the operator was a female.2 The State argued that the
trooper was justified in initiating the stop and in ordering Bennett-Roberson
out of the vehicle because his order was reasonably related to the basis for the
initial stop.
[¶8] The court granted Bennett-Roberson’s motion, concluding that the
initial seizure—the vehicle stop—was valid, but the subsequent investigatory
seizure—the license check and the trooper’s order that she exit the vehicle—
was not, and suppressed “[a]ll evidence gathered from the point at which the
[trooper] determined the driver of the vehicle to be a female.” The court
reasoned that, as soon as the trooper realized that the driver was female, the
“basis for the stop ceased to exist” because his concerns that an intoxicated
2 Bennett-Roberson challenged the validity of the initial stop at the suppression hearing but
concedes on appeal that the stop was valid.
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male was operating the vehicle under the influence were “no longer supported”
by the facts then available to him. The State filed a timely notice of appeal with
the approval of the Attorney General, pursuant to 15 M.R.S. § 2115-A(1), (5)
(2018) and M.R. App. P. 21(b).
II. DISCUSSION
[¶9] Neither party challenges the facts found by the court. The State
disputes only the court’s legal conclusion that the trooper’s investigation after
the stop was not reasonable because it was not supported by the information
underpinning the trooper’s justification for the initial stop—that an intoxicated
male was operating the vehicle. When a court grants a motion to suppress
based on undisputed facts and the only question involves a legal conclusion, we
review the motion court’s decision de novo. State v. Stade, 683 A.2d 164, 165
(Me. 1996).
[¶10] Determining the legitimacy of an investigatory seizure requires a
two-part analysis: (1) whether the stop was justified at its inception and, if so,
(2) whether the officer’s actions taken after the initial stop were “reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place.” State v. Hill, 606 A.2d 793, 795 (Me. 1992) (quoting Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)); see also State v. Huether, 2000 ME 59, ¶ 8, 748 A.2d 993.
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Because neither party challenges the validity of the initial stop on appeal, we
address only the second part.
[¶11] The reasonableness of an officer’s actions after an initial seizure is
measured by “a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the
seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the
severity of the interference with individual liberty.” Hill, 606 A.2d at 795
(quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979)). The reasonableness of an
officer’s post-seizure actions is not limited to the reason for the stop; if, during
an otherwise valid stop, an “officer discovers additional evidence of possible
wrongdoing, he may expand his inquiry as suggested by this new information.”
State v. Garland, 482 A.2d 139, 144 (Me. 1984).
[¶12] We have addressed similar questions about the reasonableness of
an officer’s actions following an otherwise valid traffic stop where the basis for
the stop dissipates after the stop. For example, in State v. Hill, an officer
observed a truck being driven with no rear bumper or discernible rear license
plate, which is a traffic violation. See 606 A.2d at 794. The officer followed the
vehicle into a parking lot. Id. As the officer approached the truck, he observed
that it did, in fact, have a license plate in the rear window. Id. at 794-95. The
officer nevertheless initiated contact with the operator and asked for his
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driver’s license and registration. Id. at 795. This interaction led the officer to
suspect that the operator was under the influence of alcohol. Id. We rejected
Hill’s contention that the police had an “affirmative duty” to discontinue the
investigation because the basis for the stop—a missing license plate—
dissipated before the officer contacted Hill, and held that, even though the
justification for the initial stop dissipated when the officer noticed the license
plate, a valid seizure had already occurred. Id. We explained that, had the basis
for the stop vanished before the seizure, the officer’s conduct would have been
unreasonable. See id. In determining whether this subsequent action was
reasonable, we weighed the State’s interests in policing unlicensed and
unregistered drivers against the minimal degree of intrusion a license check
presented to the driver once he was already subject to a valid seizure, and ruled
that a license check was reasonable under those circumstances. Id.
[¶13] Similarly, in State v. Huether, a police officer observed a driver
whom he believed to be a person he knew. 2000 ME 59, ¶ 2, 748 A.2d 993. The
officer checked the vehicle’s registration and learned that it was registered to
the person and that the person’s license was under suspension. Id. ¶ 3. The
officer made contact with the operator of the vehicle in a parking lot and asked
for identification, which revealed the operator to be a different person,
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John Huether. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. Huether’s license was also suspended. Id. ¶ 4. We
upheld Huether’s conviction for operating after suspension because the
officer’s request for identification was reasonably related to the circumstances
justifying the initial stop and the officer realized that he had been mistaken in
his identification of the operator only after he made a valid stop. Id. ¶ 7-8.
[¶14] In each case, we balanced the public interest served by the seizure
against the severity of the resulting interference imposed on the individual.
Id. ¶ 8; Hill, 606 A.2d at 795. And, in each case, we held that the officer’s
subsequent act of requesting the operator’s license and the vehicle’s
registration information was reasonably related to the circumstances justifying
the initial stop because there is a strong state interest in ensuring that drivers
are properly licensed and registered and the intrusion of asking a motorist for
such documentation is minimal. Huether, 2000 ME 59, ¶ 8, 748 A.2d 993; Hill,
606 A.2d at 795.
[¶15] Here, the motion court concluded that once the trooper realized
that the operator was not the male he initially suspected of operating under the
influence, the “basis for the stop ceased to exist” because the trooper’s concerns
were “no longer supported by any information” available to him at the time of
the stop. The court’s analysis was incomplete.
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[¶16] Contrary to the court’s determination, the basis for the stop did not
cease to exist the moment the trooper realized that the operator was a female.
As Bennett-Roberson acknowledges, the trooper’s request for her license and
registration was a “minimal further intrusion” in light of the valid traffic stop.
See Huether, 2000 ME 59, ¶ 8, 748 A.2d 993; Hill, 606 A.2d at 795. The court
erred in not determining the reasonableness of the prolonged detention by
considering the additional information obtained by the trooper during the
license and registration check after he initiated the valid stop.
[¶17] Further, because the “scope of a[n officer’s] inquiry and the
permissibility of continuing to press the on-going investigation necessarily
depend upon the continuing flow of information coming to the officer’s
attention after the start of the originally undertaken investigation,” the court
should have considered whether the trooper was entitled to “expand his
inquiry as suggested by [the] new information” he obtained from his
interactions with Bennett-Roberson during the license check. Garland,
482 A.2d at 144. This information is relevant to whether the trooper had
sufficient basis to order Bennett-Roberson out of the vehicle.3 See id.
3 We do not need to reach Bennett-Roberson’s alternative argument that, even if the trooper’s
order to exit the vehicle was valid, the trooper lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion to order
her to undergo field sobriety tests.
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[¶18] We therefore vacate the suppression order and remand for the
court to complete its suppression analysis by considering all of the evidence
presented at the suppression hearing, including evidence concerning what the
officer saw or heard up until he ordered Bennett-Roberson to exit her vehicle.
See State v. Hewes, 558 A.2d 696, 701 (Me. 1989). In this analysis, the court
must determine whether the trooper obtained any new information that gave
rise to a suspicion that justified his order to exit the vehicle and, after weighing
the public interest served by the investigative seizure against the severity of the
interference imposed on Bennett-Roberson’s liberty, whether the trooper’s
order was “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place.” Hill, 606 A.2d at 795 (quotation marks omitted);
Huether, 2000 ME 59 ¶ 8, 748 A.2d 993.
The entry is:
Judgment granting the motion to suppress
vacated. Remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
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R. Christopher Almy, District Attorney, and Mark A. Rucci, Asst. Dist. Atty.
(orally), Prosecutorial District V, Bangor, for appellant State of Maine
Tina Heather Nadeau, Esq. (orally), The Law Office of Tina Heather Nadeau, PLLC,
Portland, for appellee Amanda Bennett-Roberson
Penobscot County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2017-20438
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY