UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 18-4506
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ANTHONY MILES, a/k/a Antmoe,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
Catherine C. Blake, District Judge. (1:16-cr-00078-CCB-5)
Submitted: March 29, 2019 Decided: April 5, 2019
Before MOTZ and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
Dismissed in part and affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael F. Smith, THE SMITH APPELLATE LAW FIRM, Sykesville, Maryland, for
Appellant. Michael Clayton Hanlon, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Anthony Miles appeals his conviction and 72-month sentence imposed following
his guilty plea to possession with intent to distribute a quantity of heroin, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012). On appeal, Miles’ counsel has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds
for appeal but questioning the validity of Miles’ guilty plea and the reasonableness of
Miles’ sentence. Miles has filed a pro se supplemental brief in which he likewise
challenges his sentence. The Government has moved to dismiss the appeal based on the
appeal waiver contained in Miles’ plea agreement. For the reasons that follow, we
dismiss in part and affirm in part.
We review de novo the validity of an appeal waiver. United States v. Thornsbury,
670 F.3d 532, 537 (4th Cir. 2012). An appeal waiver “preclude[s] a defendant from
appealing a specific issue if the record establishes that the waiver is valid and the issue
being appealed is within the scope of the waiver.” United States v. Archie, 771 F.3d 217,
221 (4th Cir. 2014). A defendant validly waives his appeal rights if he agreed to the
waiver “knowingly and intelligently.” United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 627 (4th
Cir. 2010). “To determine whether a waiver is knowing and intelligent, we examine the
totality of the circumstances, including the experience and conduct of the accused, as
well as the accused’s educational background and familiarity with the terms of the plea
agreement.” Thornsbury, 670 F.3d at 537 (internal quotation marks omitted). Generally,
if a court questions a defendant regarding the waiver of his right to appeal during the Fed.
R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy, the waiver is both valid and enforceable. Id.
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Our review of the Rule 11 colloquy and the plea agreement confirms that Miles
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal whatever sentence the district court
imposed. We therefore conclude that the valid appeal waiver bars any challenge to
Miles’ sentence, which is within the applicable 20-year statutory maximum, see 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (2012), and consistent with the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) plea
agreement entered into by the parties. Accordingly, we grant the Government’s motion
in part and dismiss the appeal as to Miles’ sentencing claims.
Because a defendant cannot waive a colorable claim that his plea was not knowing
and voluntary, see, e.g., United States v. Attar, 38 F.3d 727, 732-33 & n.2 (4th Cir. 1994),
we consider the validity of Miles’ guilty plea. Before accepting a guilty plea, the district
court must conduct a colloquy in which it informs the defendant of, and determines that
he understands, the nature of the charge to which he is pleading guilty, any mandatory
minimum penalty, the maximum penalty he faces, and the rights he relinquishes by
pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1); United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116
(4th Cir. 1991). The court also must ensure that the defendant’s plea is voluntary and
supported by an independent factual basis. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), (3). Because Miles
did not move to withdraw his guilty plea or otherwise preserve any error in the plea
proceedings, we review the adequacy of the plea colloquy for plain error. United States
v. Lockhart, 917 F.3d 259, 262 (4th Cir. 2019). Based on our review of the Rule 11
hearing, we conclude that the plea was knowing, voluntary, and supported by an
independent basis in fact, and that the district court therefore committed no error in
accepting Miles’ valid guilty plea.
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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and
have found no meritorious grounds for appeal that fall outside the scope of Miles’ valid
appeal waiver. To the extent Miles suggests that his lawyers provided ineffective
assistance, we conclude that ineffective assistance of counsel does not conclusively
appear on the face of this record and, thus, we decline to address this claim on direct
appeal. * United States v. Baptiste, 596 F.3d 214, 216 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010). Accordingly,
we dismiss the appeal in part and affirm in part.
This court requires that counsel inform Miles, in writing, of the right to petition
the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Miles requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Miles. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED IN PART,
AFFIRMED IN PART
*
Miles’ ineffective assistance of counsel claim is more appropriately raised, if at
all, in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. See United States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233,
239 & n.4 (4th Cir. 2006). We express no opinion as to the merits of such a claim.
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