[Cite as State v. Coulter, 2019-Ohio-1375.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-170669
TRIAL NO. B-1603938
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
O P I N I O N.
vs. :
JA’VON COULTER, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: April 12, 2019
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Scott M. Heenan,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Victoria Bader, Assistant State Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
BERGERON, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} A 14-year-old tragically shot and killed an individual, and ultimately he
pled guilty and received a 20-year sentence. He now challenges that sentence on
appeal, attacking the sentence for a lack of record support. But in the proceedings
below, his own attorney requested that the trial judge sentence him to 20 years and
the trial judge repeatedly assured the defendant throughout the plea hearing that she
would sentence him to no more than 20 years. Even if we could excuse the invited
error, the record reveals no flaws in the sentence or sentencing proceedings. We
accordingly affirm the trial court’s decision.
I.
{¶2} Defendant-appellant Ja’Von Coulter, along with two other individuals,
shot and killed Suliman Abdul-Mtakallim while he was walking home to his family
one evening. After shooting Mr. Abdul-Mtakallim, they rummaged through his
pockets and stole his personal property. Mr. Coulter, then just 14 years old, was
charged with aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, and tampering with evidence.
After competency evaluations and a bind over from the juvenile court, Mr. Coulter
pled guilty, two years later, to involuntary manslaughter and aggravated robbery,
each enhanced with firearm specifications.
{¶3} The record confirms that everyone at the plea hearing understood that
Mr. Coulter was going to receive a 20-year sentence. Throughout the hearing, the
trial judge continually assured Mr. Coulter that he would not receive more than 20
years in prison. Indeed, after presenting mitigating evidence, Mr. Coulter’s own
attorney requested a 20-year sentence:
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Judge, in mitigation, at the time this happened Javon I think
had just turned 14. He is just now 16. If I recall correctly, he had
minimal, if any, juvenile contacts before this. * * * We spent time
talking to him and his mom about the plea and the different options
that are available. And I would ask the Court to impose the
suggested sentence of 20 years.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶4} Mr. Coulter then apologized to the victim’s mother, who in turn
eloquently offered to help Mr. Coulter and visit him while he was in prison. The trial
court sentenced Mr. Coulter to nine years for involuntary manslaughter and eight
years for aggravated robbery, each with a consecutive three-year gun specification.
The trial court merged the gun specifications and mandated that the sentences run
consecutively, for a total of 20 years. Mr. Coulter now appeals the trial court’s
decision, raising a single assignment of error challenging the record support for the
trial court’s 20-year sentence.
II.
{¶5} This seems to us to be a quintessential case of invited error—a party
cannot request a certain result (here, a 20-year sentence) and then complain on
appeal that the judge did his bidding. Given the seriousness of the offenses, defense
counsel made what appears to be a reasonable strategic decision to request a 20-year
sentence when Mr. Coulter faced considerably more time. Regardless, even if we
could get past the invited error obstacle, Mr. Coulter’s claim fails on the merits.
{¶6} As provided by R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), on review of a felony sentence, a
court “may vacate or modify a felony sentence on appeal only if it determines by clear
and convincing evidence that the record does not support the trial court’s findings
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
under relevant statutes or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” State v.
Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 1. “Relevant
statutes” for present purposes include R.C. 2929.11 (the purposes and principles of
sentencing) and 2929.12 (the seriousness and recidivism factors), which trial courts
must consider. However, “the trial court is not required to note its consideration of
all the sentencing factors.” State v. Bedell, 2018-Ohio-721, 107 N.E.3d 160, ¶ 29 (1st
Dist.).
{¶7} Mr. Coulter first claims that the trial court failed to consider
appropriate mitigating evidence. In that regard, he emphasizes various mitigating
factors such as his expression of remorse, his age, minimal juvenile court contacts,
and psychiatric history. Yet, not only does Mr. Coulter fail to make any affirmative
demonstration that the trial court did not consider these factors, but the record also
demonstrates the contrary. Before defense counsel requested a 20-year sentence, he
offered mitigating evidence of Mr. Coulter’s age, his minimal juvenile history, and his
competency evaluations. And the trial judge certainly considered Mr. Coulter’s
remorse since she thanked him for apologizing.
{¶8} Even with Mr. Coulter’s guilty pleas, he faced potentially up to 28
years in prison. His age, remorse, and minimal juvenile court contacts evaluated in
conjunction with the seriousness of his crimes, suggests that the trial court
considered the purposes and principles of sentencing, as well as relevant mitigating
factors, by sentencing him to 20 years in prison, instead of some greater amount.
And had Mr. Coulter not pleaded guilty, he faced more serious offenses that, if he
were convicted, could subject him to life in prison.
{¶9} Relatedly, Mr. Coulter contends that the record did not support the
trial court’s finding for consecutive sentencing, pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4),
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
because the harm caused by Mr. Coulter’s multiple offenses was not “so great or
unusual” as to mandate the consecutive sentences.
{¶10} Under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), a trial court may impose consecutive
sentences if the court finds that (1) “the consecutive service is necessary to protect
the public from future crime or to punish the offender,” (2) the “consecutive
sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and
to the danger the offender poses to the public,” and (3) one or more of the conditions
outlined in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a) through (c) apply. In this case, the trial court
found R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b) applied:
At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of
one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more
of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no
single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of
the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the
offender’s conduct.
{¶11} If a trial court imposes consecutive sentences, the trial court must
“make the findings at the defendant’s sentencing hearing and incorporate its findings
in the sentencing entry,” but is “not required to state its reasons for imposing
consecutive sentences.” State v. Sergent, 148 Ohio St.3d 94, 2016-Ohio-2696, 69
N.E.3d 627, ¶ 41; State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d
659, ¶ 37.
{¶12} At sentencing, the trial court made explicit all the necessary findings
under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and incorporated its findings in the sentencing entry.
While the trial court did not elaborate upon the reasons for finding Mr. Coulter’s
offense to be “so great or unusual,” Bonnell does not command such an exposition,
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
and regardless, the record supports these findings. A killing of this nature coupled
with a robbery will normally support the necessary showing for consecutive
sentences.
{¶13} We accordingly overrule Mr. Coulter’s single assignment of error and
affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
CROUSE and WINKLER, JJ., concur.
Please note:
The Court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this
opinion.
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