FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
APR 15 2019
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
VOSKI CHALIKYAN, No. 16-70463
Petitioner, Agency No. A096-489-386
v.
MEMORANDUM*
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 11, 2019**
Pasadena, California
Before: GRABER and BYBEE, Circuit Judges, and HARPOOL,*** District Judge.
Petitioner Voski Chalikyan timely seeks review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals’ ("BIA") dismissal of her appeal from an immigration judge’s ("IJ") denial
of relief from removal. Applying the legal standards applicable to applications
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable M. Douglas Harpool, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Missouri, sitting by designation.
filed before passage of the REAL ID Act, Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026,
1031 n.2 (9th Cir. 2014), we deny the petition.
1. Substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility determination. See
Bhattarai v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that we review
adverse credibility determinations for substantial evidence). The IJ found—and
the BIA agreed—that Petitioner testified inconsistently about the location of an
August 2001 assault and abduction. That inconsistency goes to the heart of her
claim. See, e.g., Rivera v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 1271, 1275 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding
that "inconsistent testimony regarding the details of her abduction . . . go[es] to the
heart of her claim").
Petitioner initially testified, clearly and with elaboration, that the incident
occurred at her residence; but she later testified, with equal clarity, that the incident
occurred at her pharmacy. The location of the incident was integral to her account,
because the perpetrators destroyed the contents of the pharmacy and demanded that
she sell expired medications. Accordingly, the BIA was not required to believe her
implausible explanation that she was confused because her pharmacy and her
house were located within blocks of each other. Our decision in Soto-Olarte v.
Holder, 555 F.3d 1089, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2009), does not require a different result
because, unlike in Soto-Olarte, Petitioner’s explanation here was not plausible.
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See, e.g., Rizk v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2011) ("If the IJ
reasonably rejects the alien’s explanation, or if the alien fails to provide a plausible
explanation, the IJ may properly rely on the inconsistency as support for an
adverse credibility determination. An IJ is not obliged to provide a protracted
written or oral analysis of the alien’s proffered explanation." (emphasis added)
(citations omitted)).
Because one of the reasons for the adverse credibility determination goes to
the heart of Petitioner’s claim and is supported by substantial evidence, we do not
consider the remaining reasons. See Wang v. INS, 352 F.3d 1250, 1259 (9th Cir.
2003) ("So long as one of the identified grounds is supported by substantial
evidence and goes to the heart of [the petitioner’s] claim of persecution, we are
bound to accept the IJ’s adverse credibility finding.").
2. The BIA and the IJ applied the correct legal standards to Petitioner’s
claim under the Convention Against Torture, and substantial evidence supports the
denial of that relief. See Cerezo v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2008)
(holding that we review de novo claims of legal error); Riera-Riera v. Lynch, 841
F.3d 1077, 1079 (9th Cir. 2016) (reviewing for substantial evidence the denial of
CAT relief).
Petition DENIED.
3