MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
FILED
court except for the purpose of establishing Apr 18 2019, 9:53 am
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jennifer L. Koethe Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Navarre, Florida Attorney General of Indiana
Samuel J. Dayton
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Darrell Davis, April 18, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-2338
v. Appeal from the LaPorte Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Michael S.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Bergerson, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
46D01-1609-F3-884
Bradford, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2338 | April 18, 2019 Page 1 of 6
Case Summary
[1] One evening in August of 2016, then-sixteen-year-old Darrell Davis went into
the bedroom of his then-eleven-year-old cousin, restrained her, and forced her
to fellate him. Davis subsequently pled guilty to Level 3 felony child molesting.
At sentencing, Davis requested that the trial court withhold judgment and
transfer the matter to the juvenile court pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-30-
1-4(c). Davis appeals the denial of this request. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] One evening in August of 2016, Davis entered the bedroom of then-eleven-year-
old L.F., confined her with his arms and legs, and forced her to fellate him until
he ejaculated. L.F. subsequently reported Davis’s actions to her mother who
notified the police.
[3] On September 29, 2016, the State charged Davis with Level 3 felony rape. On
May 3, 2018, the State amended the charging information to include a charge of
Level 3 felony child molesting. That same day, Davis agreed to plead guilty to
the Level 3 felony child molesting charge. In exchange for Davis’s guilty plea,
the State agreed to dismiss the Level 3 felony rape charge and the parties agreed
that the trial court “shall consider withholding the judgment, and transferring
the matter for adjudication and disposition in the juvenile court, based on the
standard set forth in [Indiana Code section] 31-30-1-4(c).” Appellant’s App.
Vol. II p. 135.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2338 | April 18, 2019 Page 2 of 6
[4] The trial court conducted a hearing on August 30, 2018, during which the State
called juvenile probation officer Thomas LaShawn O’Neil. O’Neil had
previously served as Davis’s juvenile probation officer in another matter. With
regard to his prior contacts with Davis, O’Neil testified that in August of 2012,
Davis was alleged to be delinquent for committing what would have been
battery and sexual battery if committed by an adult. Davis was placed on a
nine-month informal adjustment during which he participated in individual and
family counseling and completed an anger replacement training program. With
regard to the instant matter, O’Neil testified that because the juvenile system’s
treatment and placement options are limited for individuals like Davis who are
adjudicated to be delinquent after turning eighteen, “accountability would be an
issue if [Davis’s case] would be transferred to the juvenile division.” Tr. p. 11.
Given the accountability issues, O’Neil testified that the juvenile probation
department would not recommend transferring the matter to the juvenile court.
[5] In denying Davis’s request for the trial court to withhold judgment and transfer
the matter to the juvenile court, the trial court stated:
The Court has considered the information that’s been provided in
the Presentence Investigation Report, as well as the evaluations.
And as required by Indiana Code 31-30-1-4(c), the Court has
considered withholding judgment and transferring this matter for
adjudication and disposition to the juvenile court based on the
standards set forth in the previously indicated statute. However,
the Court’s gonna deny that transfer.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2338 | April 18, 2019 Page 3 of 6
Tr. p. 16. The trial court retained jurisdiction, accepted Davis’s plea and
sentenced him to a term of ten years, with eight years executed in the
Department of Correction and two years suspended to probation.
Discussion and Decision
[6] Davis contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request
for the trial court to withhold judgment and transfer the matter to the juvenile
court. We disagree. Indiana Code section 31-30-1-4 provides, in relevant part,
as follows:
(a) The juvenile court does not have jurisdiction over an
individual for an alleged violation of:
****
(4) IC 35-42-4-1 (rape);
****
if the individual was at least sixteen (16) years of age but less than
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the alleged violation.
****
(c) If:
(1) an individual described in subsection (a) is
charged with one (1) or more offenses listed in
subsection (a);
(2) all the charges under subsection (a)(1) through
(a)(9) resulted in an acquittal or were dismissed; and
(3) the individual pleads guilty to or is convicted of
any offense other than an offense listed in subsection
(a)(1) through (a)(9);
the court having adult criminal jurisdiction may withhold
judgment and transfer jurisdiction to the juvenile court for
adjudication and disposition. In determining whether to transfer
jurisdiction to the juvenile court for adjudication and disposition,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2338 | April 18, 2019 Page 4 of 6
the court having adult criminal jurisdiction shall consider
whether there are appropriate services available in the juvenile
justice system, whether the child is amenable to rehabilitation
under the juvenile justice system, and whether it is in the best
interests of the safety and welfare of the community that the child
be transferred to juvenile court. All orders concerning release
conditions remain in effect until a juvenile court detention
hearing, which must be held not later than forty-eight (48) hours,
excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, after the order
of transfer of jurisdiction.
(Emphasis added). The plain language of the statute indicates that the trial
court may withhold judgment and transfer the matter to the juvenile court, not
that the trial court must do so.
The term “may” in a statute ordinarily implies a permissive
condition and a grant of discretion. It logically follows that a
trial court’s ruling on a reverse transfer request would be
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion
occurs when a trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic
and effect of the facts and circumstances, or when the trial court
misinterprets the law.
Tibbs v. State, 86 N.E.3d 401, 404–05 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (internal quotations
omitted), trans. denied.
[7] Davis committed a serious offense when he forced his then-eleven-year-old
cousin to fellate him. Davis committed this offense after having previously
been subjected to an informal adjustment for allegedly committing what would
have been sexual battery if committed by an adult, suggesting that the prior
attempts to rehabilitate Davis and reform his sexually aggressive behavior were
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2338 | April 18, 2019 Page 5 of 6
unsuccessful. Further, while Davis correctly notes that the Indiana Risk
Assessment System Community Supervision Tool found him to be a low risk to
reoffend, the psychosexual assessment completed in connection to the case
“indicates that he is in the medium to high range to be reconvicted for a sexual
offense.” Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 8. In light of these facts coupled with the
fact that the juvenile probation department “would not be in agreement with
transferring [Davis’s case] back to” the juvenile court, tr. p. 12, Davis has failed
to convince us that either (1) the trial court’s denial of his request to withhold
judgment and transfer the matter to the trial court is clearly against the logic
and effect of the facts and circumstances of this case or (2) the trial court
misinterpreted the law. As such, we conclude that the trial court acted within
its discretion in denying Davis’s request.
[8] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Crone, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.
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