FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D18-2399
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THERON SAPP,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.
James C. Hankinson, Judge.
April 22, 2019
PER CURIAM.
Theron Sapp was convicted in 2006 of aggravated battery on
a law enforcement officer. Because the victim was an officer, the
aggravated battery charge was a first-degree felony.
§ 784.07(2)(d), Fla. Stat. And because Sapp was a habitual felony
offender, the trial court could sentence him “for life.”
§ 775.084(4)(a)1., Fla. Stat. The trial court sentenced Sapp to
forty years with a thirty-year mandatory for being a prison
releasee reoffender. See § 775.082(9)(a)3., Fla. Stat. Sapp filed a
motion to correct illegal sentence arguing that, although he could
be sentenced to life imprisonment as a habitual felony offender,
he could not be sentenced to forty years. Like the trial court, we
disagree. *
The trial court “may sentence” a habitual felony offender
convicted “of a life felony or a felony of the first degree, for life.”
§ 775.084(4)(a), Fla. Stat. As Sapp could have been sentenced to
life imprisonment, he likewise could be sentenced to forty years
imprisonment. See Guy v. State, 632 So. 2d 1085, 1086 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1994) (interpreting a habitualization provision permitting a
sentence “for life” and concluding that “the trial court in this case
had the discretion to impose any sentence up to life
imprisonment for appellant’s commission of the first degree
felony”). Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order denying Sapp’s motion
to correct illegal sentence.
MAKAR, WINOKUR, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.
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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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Theron Sapp, pro se, Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Sharon Traxler, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
* We reject without further comment Sapp’s argument
regarding the other ground raised in his motion.
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