J-S19004-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
WILLIAM LAWSON :
:
Appellant : No. 1095 EDA 2018
Appeal from the PCRA Order March 9, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0609631-1997
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.
JUDGMENT ORDER BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED APRIL 22, 2019
William Lawson appeals, pro se, from the order, entered in the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, dismissing as untimely his fourth
petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546
(PCRA). We affirm.
On January 9, 1998, following a bench trial before the Honorable Lisa A.
Richette, Lawson was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life
imprisonment. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence,
but remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether counsel had
improperly prevented Lawson from testifying on his own behalf.
Commonwealth v. Lawson, 748 A.2d 772 (Pa. Super. 1998) (unpublished
memorandum). Following a hearing, the trial court concluded this claim was
meritless. On appeal, this Court affirmed. Commonwealth v. Lawson, 789
A.2d 252 (Pa. Super. 2001).
____________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S19004-19
Lawson filed his first PCRA petition, pro se, on October 30, 2002. The
PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition. On May 11,
2004, the PCRA court denied relief. On appeal, this Court affirmed and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on December 29,
2005. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 885 A.2d 578 (Pa. Super. Aug.15,
2005) (Table), allocatur denied, 892 A.2d 822 (Pa. Dec. 29, 2005) (Table).
Lawson filed a second pro se PCRA petition on February 15, 2008, and
an amended pro se petition on March 19, 2008. The PCRA dismissed this
petition as untimely. On appeal, this Court affirmed. See Commonwealth
v. Lawson, 990 A.2d 48 (Pa. Super. Dec. 24, 2009) (Table). Lawson did not
seek review in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
On April 21, 2010, Lawson filed filed a third pro se petition, and an
amended pro se petition on July 13, 2010. The PCRA court dismissed this
petition as untimely on February 6, 2010. Lawson did not file an appeal.
In his instant petition, filed pro se on March 25, 2016, Lawson claims
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana,
136 S.Ct. 718 (2016), renders his petition timely under the “newly-recognized
constitutional right” exception to the PCRA time bar. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9545(b)(1)(iii). In Montgomery, the Supreme Court held Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), which prohibited mandatory life sentences
without possibility of parole for juveniles as a violation of the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments,” applies
retroactively to cases on collateral review.
-2-
J-S19004-19
The PCRA court found Miller inapplicable because Lawson was not under
the age of eighteen at the time of his offense. Lawson was born on November
5, 1977; at the time of the murder, on November 7, 1996, Lawson was
nineteen years old. Lawson concedes Miller does not apply, but argues it
should extend to defendants who were over the age of eighteen at the time
of their crimes based on developments in neuroscientific research –the ”virtual
minor” or “immature brain” studies. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2005) and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
Because Lawson was over the age of eighteen at the time he committed
the murder, the PCRA court properly dismissed his petition as untimely. See
Commonwealth v. Lee, 2019 PA Super 64 (filed Mar. 1, 2019) (en banc)
(holding prohibition in Miller on mandatory life-without-parole sentences for
juvenile offenders as cruel and unusual punishment did not extend to
defendant who was over age of 18 at time of her commission of murder, but
who had alleged characteristics of youth that rendered her categorically less
culpable under Eighth Amendment, and thus defendant could not invoke
Miller as exception, for newly-recognized constitutional right, to timeliness
requirements of PCRA, despite argument that “immature brain” studies would
have established defendant’s brain was underdeveloped at time of her crime;
express age limit was essential to orderly and practical application of law).
Order affirmed.
-3-
J-S19004-19
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/22/19
-4-