NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 23 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GAVIN B. DAVIS, No. 18-56202
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:17-cv-00654-JLS-BGS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
SAN DIEGO DISTRICT ATTORNEY; et
al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Janis L. Sammartino, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 17, 2019**
Before: McKEOWN, BYBEE, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Gavin B. Davis appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and based on absolute immunity.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir. 2001). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Davis’s action as barred by
prosecutorial immunity because Davis failed to allege facts sufficient to show that
defendants’ alleged conduct was not “intimately associated with the judicial phase
of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976); Garmon
v. County of Los Angeles, 828 F.3d 837, 842-43 (9th Cir. 2016) (explaining the
application of absolute prosecutorial immunity).
To the extent Davis’s action alleged claims against the office of the San
Diego County District Attorney, the district court correctly found that defendant is
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755,
767 (9th Cir. 2014) (district attorney’s office acts as a state office as to actions
taken in its prosecutorial capacity and is not subject to suit under § 1983).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Davis further leave
to amend because amendment would have been futile. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp.
of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 725-26 (9th Cir. 2000) (setting forth standard of review and
explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper when amendment would
be futile).
All pending motions and requests, including Davis’s request set forth in his
reply brief to “quash” the answering brief, are denied.
AFFIRMED.
2 18-56202