MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any Apr 24 2019, 10:09 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Cara Schaefer Wieneke Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Wieneke Law Office, LLC Attorney General of Indiana
Brooklyn, Indiana
David E. Corey
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the Termination April 24, 2019
of the Parent-Child Relationship Court of Appeals Case No.
of K.G. & C.G. (Minor 18A-JT-2621
Children) Appeal from the Spencer Circuit
Court
and The Honorable Lucy Goffinet,
Temporary Judge
Kr.G. (Father),
Appellant-Respondent, Trial Court Cause Nos.
74C01-1807-JT-193
v. 74C01-1807-JT-194
Indiana Department of Child
Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-2621 | April 24, 2019 Page 1 of 7
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] K.G. and C.G. (collectively, “the Children”) were twice removed from their
parents’ care following instances of domestic violence between Ka.G.
(“Mother”) and Kr.G. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”). The Children were
eventually determined to be children in need of services (“CHINS”) and Father
was ordered to complete certain services.1 Father, however, failed to
successfully do so and the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) petitioned to
terminate Father’s parental rights to the Children. Father appeared pro se at the
fact-finding hearing after rejecting court-appointed counsel. Father appeals the
termination of his parental rights to the Children, arguing that the juvenile court
denied him due process by denying him the right to counsel. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] DCS first became involved with the Children and Parents after receiving a
report that on March 30, 2015, Parents engaged in an episode of domestic
violence during which K.G. was injured when he was hit by a door, Father’s
hand was cut, and Mother’s face was injured. Parents were arrested and the
1
Mother has voluntarily relinquished her parental rights in the Children and does not participate in this
appeal.
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Children were removed from their care. The case was closed in January of
2016, with Father being named the Children’s primary caregiver.
[3] DCS again became involved with the family after receiving a report that on
March 17, 2016, Parents “were engaged in domestic violence and there was
alcohol involved and [Mother] was injured and sent to the hospital and [Father]
had fled the scene with the [C]hildren in his care.” Tr. p. 69. Soon thereafter,
Father was arrested and the Children were removed from his care.
[4] On March 21, 2016, DCS filed petitions alleging that the Children were CHINS
due to Parents engaging in domestic violence in front of the Children and
Father being arrested. The juvenile court issued an order adjudicating the
Children to be CHINS on June 10, 2016. Three days later, the juvenile court
ordered Father to complete certain services.
[5] Approximately twenty-five months later, on July 24, 2018, DCS petitioned to
terminate Father’s parental rights to the Children. The juvenile court
conducted an initial hearing on August 13, 2018, during which it informed
Father that he had a right to counsel and that he could either (1) hire an
attorney, (2) request a court-appointed attorney, or (3) choose to proceed
without an attorney. Father indicated that he understood this right, rejected a
court-appointed attorney, and stated that he intended to hire an attorney.
Father again indicated that he understood that he had the right to an attorney
during an August 27, 2018 status hearing, during which he also asked questions
seemingly clarifying his responsibilities if he were to proceed without counsel.
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[6] The juvenile court conducted a fact-finding hearing on October 1, 2018. At the
outset of this hearing, the juvenile court noted that Father appeared pro se and
questioned Father about whether he was ready to proceed. Father answered
affirmatively, saying “We can proceed.” Tr. p. 30. Father then participated in
the fact-finding hearing, testifying on his own behalf and cross-examining
DCS’s witnesses. At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court issued an
order granting DCS’s petitions to terminate Father’s parental rights to the
Children.
Discussion and Decision
[7] At the outset, we note that in challenging the termination of his parental rights,
Father does not challenge the juvenile court’s findings or conclusions thereon.
Father’s sole contention is that he was denied the right to assistance of counsel
during the fact-finding hearing.
Due process protections bar state action that deprives a person of
life, liberty, or property without a fair proceeding. It is
unequivocal that the termination of a parent-child relationship by
the State constitutes the deprivation of an important interest
warranting deference and protection, and therefore when the
State seeks to terminate the parent-child relationship, it must do
so in a manner that meets the requirements of due process.
In re G.P., 4 N.E.3d 1158, 1165 (Ind. 2014) (internal quotations omitted).
Indiana Code sections 31-32-4-1 and 31-32-2-5 provide that a parent is entitled
to be represented by counsel in proceedings to terminate the parent-child
relationship. Indiana Code section 31-32-4-3 further provides that the juvenile
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court “shall appoint counsel for the parent at the initial hearing or at any earlier
time” if the parent “does not have an attorney who may represent [him]
without a conflict of interest” and “has not lawfully waived [his] right to
counsel.” A parent lawfully waives his right to counsel if he does so
“knowingly and voluntarily.” Ind. Code § 31-32-5-5.
[8] Father’s actions in this case demonstrate that he knowingly and voluntarily
waived his right to counsel. During the initial hearing, the following exchange
occurred with regard to Father’s right to counsel:
[The Court]: Sir, you are entitled to be represented by an attorney
with regards to these matters. You may hire your own attorney
to represent you or the Court will appoint counsel to represent
you in this (sic) proceedings or if you wish, you may proceed
without counsel.… Do you intend to hire your own attorney sir?
[Father]: No, Your Honor. I would like to have the same
attorney that I had on the other cause numbers in the other
CHINS matters. He has been – Walter Hagedorn has been
sending me information on this – on these proceedings today. I
would –
[The Court]: Sir, not to interrupt you but Mr. Hagedorn has filed
a Motion to Withdraw from your matters and so he has asked
not to be appointed on these cases. Are you asking for court
appointed counsel sir?
[Father]: No, I am not. I will obtain my own counsel.
[The Court]: Okay. I’ll show that [Father] is going to hire his
own attorney to represent him in this matter.
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Tr. pp. 14–15. During a subsequent status hearing, the juvenile court informed
Father that the next step was a fact-finding hearing and that “You absolutely, if
you’re going to have an attorney, need to have one by this date.” Tr. p. 22.
Father indicated that he understood, saying “Okay.” Tr. p. 22. Father further
clarified that “Everything else is pretty much then on me as far as getting ahold
of witnesses and stuff like that.” Tr. p. 23. The juvenile court indicated “That’s
correct.” Tr. p. 23. Father appeared pro se at the October 1, 2018 fact-finding
hearing. When the juvenile court inquired into whether Father was prepared to
proceed with the fact-finding hearing, Father responded “Yes” and “We can
proceed.” Tr. p. 30. Father then participated in the fact-finding hearing,
testifying on his own behalf and cross-examining DCS’s witnesses.
[9] Although Father claims that he took no affirmative action to forego his right to
counsel, his actions prove otherwise. Father was informed by the juvenile court
that he had a right to counsel and that he could either hire his own counsel,
request court-appointed counsel, or proceed without counsel. At his initial
hearing, Father explicitly rejected court-appointed counsel and indicated that he
would hire counsel. He subsequently acted in a manner consistent with a
decision to represent himself rather than hiring counsel. Further, nothing in the
record suggests that Father communicated any desire for the court to appoint
counsel after his explicit rejection of court-appointed counsel. Father argues
that the juvenile court should have taken further action to verify his waiver of
counsel prior to the beginning of his final hearing. While this might have been
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the better practice, we do not believe this was necessary given Father’s waiver
of counsel at his initial hearing.
[10] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Crone, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-2621 | April 24, 2019 Page 7 of 7
In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of K.G. & C.G. (Minor Children) and Kr.G. (Father) v. Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.)
Combined Opinion