FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
APR 24 2019
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
R. M., a minor student, by and through his No. 17-16722
parents S.M. and M.M.,
D.C. No. 2:16-cv-02614-JJT
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM*
GILBERT UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
John Joseph Tuchi, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 11, 2019
Pasadena, California
Before: GRABER and BYBEE, Circuit Judges, and HARPOOL,** District Judge.
Plaintiff R.M. appeals an adverse district court judgment in this action under
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"). The district court held
that the Gilbert Unified School District’s ("District") proposed January 2016
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable M. Douglas Harpool, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Missouri, sitting by designation.
individualized education program ("IEP") provided Plaintiff with a "free
appropriate public education" ("FAPE") in the least restrictive environment as
required by the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A), (5)(A). We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and determine de novo "[w]hether a proposed IEP
constitutes a FAPE," giving deference to the ALJ’s findings if "thorough and
careful." Baquerizo v. Garden Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 826 F.3d 1179, 1184 (9th
Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). We affirm.
1. Plaintiff argues that the District inappropriately increased his special
education service minutes by 20 minutes per day, reducing the time that he spends
in the general education classroom. Using the analysis set forth in Sacramento
City Unified School District v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994), we hold
that the school district appropriately increased Plaintiff’s special education service
minutes by 20 minutes per day. See Baquerizo, 826 F.3d at 1188 (stating that,
even when the other factors weigh in favor of mainstreaming, the student’s
academic needs "weigh[] most heavily against a mainstream environment");
Poolaw v. Bishop, 67 F.3d 830, 836 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he IDEA is primarily
concerned with the long term educational welfare of disabled students."); cf.
Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 137 S. Ct. 988, 1001 (2017) ("The IDEA
demands more [than de minimis progress]. It requires an educational program
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reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the
child’s circumstances.").
2. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that the District’s proposed move from
Ashland Ranch Elementary to Pioneer Elementary was a change in "placement"
that should be analyzed under our 1994 decision in Sacramento City Unified
School District v. Rachel H. First, we hold that this proposal was a change in
"location" only. See Rachel H. v. Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 868 F.3d 1085, 1090 (9th
Cir. 2017) (defining "location"); N.D. v. Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 600 F.3d 1104,
1115–16 (9th Cir. 2010) (defining "educational placement" and outlining when a
change in "educational placement" occurs); Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1403–04 (adopting the Rachel H. test to determine
compliance only with educational placement requirements, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(a)(5)(B)). Second, the great weight of the testimony offered during the
hearing established that Plaintiff’s needs could best be met at Pioneer Elementary
because of its Academic SCILLS classroom. Accordingly, the proposed change in
location did not violate Plaintiff’s rights under the IDEA.
AFFIRMED.
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