17-1299
Wei Zhang v. Barr
BIA
Zagzoug, IJ
A205 883 110
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
New York, on the 25th day of April, two thousand nineteen.
PRESENT:
GERARD E. LYNCH,
CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
WEI ZHANG,
Petitioner,
v. 17-1299
NAC
WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Louis H. Klein, The Kasen Law
Firm, PLLC, Flushing, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant
Attorney General; Janette L.
Allen, Senior Litigation Counsel;
Jessica D. Strokus, Trial
Attorney, Office of Immigration
Litigation, United States
Department of Justice, Washington,
DC.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioner Wei Zhang, a native and citizen of the
People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an April 4, 2017,
decision of the BIA affirming a September 1, 2016, decision
of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Zhang’s application
for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Wei Zhang, No. A
205 883 110 (B.I.A. Apr. 4, 2017), aff’g No. A 205 883 110
(Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Sep. 1, 2016). We assume the parties’
familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
in this case.
Because the BIA affirmed the IJ’s adverse credibility
ruling, we have reviewed both the BIA’s and IJ’s decisions.
See Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir.
2005). We review the agency’s findings of fact under the
substantial evidence standard. See Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions,
891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018). Under this standard, “[w]e
treat factual findings as ‘conclusive unless any reasonable
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adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’”
Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).
The governing REAL ID Act credibility standard provides
as follows:
Considering the totality of the circumstances, and
all relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a
credibility determination on the demeanor, candor,
or responsiveness of the applicant or witness, . .
. the consistency between the applicant’s or
witness’s written and oral statements . . . , the
internal consistency of each such statement, the
consistency of such statements with other evidence
of record . . . , and any inaccuracies or falsehoods
in such statements, . . . or any other relevant
factor.
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s
credibility determination unless . . . it is plain that no
reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility
ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.
2008). Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse
credibility determination.
First, Zhang has waived any challenge to the IJ’s
reliance on inconsistencies in his testimony and between his
testimony and documentation. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales,
426 F.3d 540, 541 n.1, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that
petitioner abandons issues and claims not raised in his
brief). Second, Zhang has waived and failed to exhaust any
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challenge to the agency’s demeanor finding because he did not
challenge that finding before the BIA and he does not
challenge it in his brief in this Court. See Lin Zhong v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 122 (2d Cir. 2007)
(explaining that petitioner generally must exhaust issues
before the BIA); Yueqing Zhang, 426 F.3d at 541 n.1, 545 n.7.
That finding provides substantial evidence for the adverse
credibility determination.
Furthermore, the agency reasonably concluded that Zhang
failed to rehabilitate his credibility with reliable
corroborating evidence. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d
268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An applicant’s failure to
corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility,
because the absence of corroboration in general makes an
applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already
been called into question”). Zhang alleged that he was
detained and beaten by the police for protesting a “quasi-
public” company’s loss of his investment. But Zhang did not
provide any evidence to corroborate his involvement with the
company or his investment, such as a copy of his own contract
with the company or other financial documentation of his
investment. And the agency reasonably declined to give
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weight to affidavits from Zhang’s father and friend given
their lack of detail. See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 334
(2d Cir. 2013) (deferring to agency’s decision to give little
weight to letter from applicant’s spouse in China). Although
Zhang submitted a fine receipt relating to his arrest and
detention, the fine receipt itself contained little detail,
and once again Zhang provided no corroboration or
authentication, such as a letter from his brother who paid
the fine. Id. (“We defer to the agency’s determination of
the weight afforded to an alien’s documentary evidence.”).
Given the agency’s inconsistency and demeanor findings,
which Zhang has not challenged, and the lack of reliable
corroborating evidence to rehabilitate his testimony, the
totality of the circumstances supports the adverse
credibility determination. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.
Because Zhang’s claims were all based on the same factual
predicate, the adverse credibility determination is
dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT
relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir.
2006).
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For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
Clerk of Court
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