MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
Apr 26 2019, 8:57 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Kurt A. Young Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Nashville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Tiffany A. McCoy
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Delonce Williams II, April 26, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-2222
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Lisa F. Borges,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G04-1706-F3-21502
Brown, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2222 | April 26, 2019 Page 1 of 6
[1] Delonce Williams II appeals his conviction for attempted child molesting as a
level 3 felony. Williams raises one issue which we revise and restate as whether
the trial court committed fundamental error in instructing the jury. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Williams’s mother cared for G.W. while G.W.’s mother was at work. On one
occasion when G.W. was younger than nine years old, Williams placed his
wallet in his pocket and told G.W. to find it. G.W., with her eyes closed, used
her hands to find Williams’s wallet. G.W. said she had found it, and Williams
replied that it was just money in his pocket, moved her hand toward his penis,
and made her touch his penis over his clothes. On another occasion, Williams
told G.W. to lean over, and she complied. Williams pulled down G.W.’s pants
and placed his penis in her bottom. Williams removed his penis, leaned on a
bed, and looked out a window to make sure that no one was coming. Williams
leaned over the bed, “took [G.W.’s] head” and “pushed it down to his private
part,” and said “Suck it,” and G.W. said “No.” Transcript Volume 2 at 52.
Williams’s penis touched G.W.’s lips but did not enter her mouth.
[3] The State charged Williams with: Count I, attempted child molesting as a level
3 felony; Count II, child molesting as a level 3 felony; Count III, child
molesting as a level 4 felony; and Count IV, child molesting as a level 4 felony.
At Williams’s jury trial, the trial court gave Instruction No. 5A regarding the
crime of attempted child molesting. The State dismissed Count II, and the jury
found Williams guilty of Counts I, III, and IV. The court sentenced Williams
to an aggregate term of nine years with four years suspended.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2222 | April 26, 2019 Page 2 of 6
Discussion
[4] The issue is whether the trial court committed fundamental error in instructing
the jury regarding the crime of attempted child molesting. 1 Instruction No. 5A
provided:
The crime of Child Molesting is defined by law as a person who,
with a child under fourteen (14) years of age, performs or submits
to sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct, commits child
molesting, a Level 3 Felony. A person attempts to commit Child
Molesting when, acting with the culpability required for
commission of the crime, he engages in conduct that constitutes a
substantial step toward commission of the Child Molesting. The
crime of Attempted Child Molesting, as charged in Count I, is a
Level 3 Felony.
Before you may convict the Defendant, the State must prove
each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. The Defendant, Delonce Williams II
2. acting intentionally or knowingly with the culpability
required to commit the crime of Child Molesting, which is
defined as:
A. The Defendant
B. when [G.W.] was a child under fourteen (14)
years of age
C. knowingly or intentionally
D. performed or submitted to other sexual conduct
1
Williams does not present argument as to his other convictions.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2222 | April 26, 2019 Page 3 of 6
E. with [G.W.]
3. did lay down on the bed, pulled down his pants,
grabbed [G.W.’s] head and pulled it towards his penis
4. which was conduct constituting a substantial step
toward the commission of the crime of Child Molesting.
If the State failed to prove each of these elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, you must find the Defendant not guilty of the
crime of Attempted Child Molesting, a Level 3 Felony, charged
in Count I.
Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 124.
[5] Williams asserts that Instruction Number 5A “did not state, as it should have,
that in order to prove [him] guilty, the evidence must show beyond a reasonable
doubt that he attempted to ‘intentionally’ commit child molesting” and that,
“[i]nstead, it said merely that the evidence must show that he attempted to
‘knowingly or intentionally’ commit the crime.” Appellant’s Brief at 12-13. He
asserts the instruction was fundamentally erroneous. The State responds that
Williams failed to object to the jury instructions at trial and that the challenged
instruction was proper and did not mislead the jury as to a correct
understanding of the law.
[6] Williams does not point to the record to show that he objected to Instruction
No. 5A or offered an alternative instruction. Williams has waived his claim.
See Baker v. State, 948 N.E.2d 1169, 1178 (Ind. 2011) (observing the defendant
had neither objected to the trial court’s instruction nor offered an instruction of
his own and accordingly waived the issue), reh’g denied. We will review an issue
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2222 | April 26, 2019 Page 4 of 6
that was waived at trial if we find fundamental error occurred. Id. In order to
be fundamental, the error must be so prejudicial to the defendant’s rights as to
make a fair trial impossible. Id. In considering whether a claimed error denied
the defendant a fair trial, we determine whether the resulting harm or potential
for harm is substantial. Id. at 1178-1179.
[7] Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a) provides that a person who, with a child under
fourteen years of age, knowingly or intentionally performs or submits to sexual
intercourse or other sexual conduct commits child molesting, a level 3 felony.
Other sexual conduct includes an act involving a sex organ of one person and
the mouth of another person. See Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-221.5. Ind. Code § 35-
41-5-1(a) provides in part: “A person attempts to commit a crime when, acting
with the culpability required for commission of the crime, the person engages in
conduct that constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime. An
attempt to commit a crime is a felony or misdemeanor of the same level or class
as the crime attempted.” “[T]he culpability requirement of the child molesting
statute is ‘knowingly or intentionally.’” Amphonephong v. State, 32 N.E.3d 825,
832-833 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Louallen v. State, 778 N.E.2d 794, 798 (Ind.
2002)). The instruction challenged by Williams provided that “[a] person
attempts to commit Child Molesting when, acting with the culpability required for
commission of the crime, he engages in conduct that constitutes a substantial step
towards commission of the Child Molesting.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II
at 124. The instruction further provided that the State was required to prove that
Williams “acting intentionally or knowingly with the culpability required to
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2222 | April 26, 2019 Page 5 of 6
commit the crime of Child Molesting, which is defined as: . . . knowingly or
intentionally . . . performed or submitted to other sexual conduct . . . grabbed
[G.W.’s] head and pulled it towards his penis . . . .” Id. The instruction is not
inconsistent with the culpability provisions of Ind. Code § 35-41-5-1 or Ind.
Code § 35-42-4-3 and did not result in an unfair trial. 2 Williams has not
demonstrated that the trial court, in giving Instruction No. 5A, committed
fundamental error.
[8] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
[9] Affirmed.
May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
2
To the extent Williams argues the instruction should have stated that the evidence must show that he
attempted to intentionally commit child molesting, reversal is not warranted on that basis. See Noble v. State,
725 N.E.2d 842, 845 (Ind. 2000) (“[T]o establish attempted child molesting, the State must prove that Noble
knowingly or intentionally attempted to commit child molesting, and engaged in an overt act constituting a
substantial step toward the commission of the crime. Richeson v. State, 704 N.E.2d 1008 (Ind. 1998) (specific
intent not required in attempt crimes other than murder); Ward v. State, 528 N.E.2d 52, 54 (Ind. 1988)
(elements of attempted child molesting)”).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2222 | April 26, 2019 Page 6 of 6
Delonce Williams II v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Combined Opinion