MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any May 09 2019, 9:22 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jennifer L. Koethe Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Navarre, Florida Attorney General of Indiana
Samantha M. Sumcad
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Erik Lee Minter, May 9, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-2312
v. Appeal from the LaPorte Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Thomas J.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Alevizos, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
46C01-1511-F5-929
Najam, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2312 | May 9, 2019 Page 1 of 5
Statement of the Case
[1] Erik Lee Minter appeals his sentence after he pleaded guilty to aggravated
battery, as a Level 3 felony, and neglect of a dependent, as a Level 3 felony.
Minter raises a single issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court
abused its discretion when it sentenced him. 1 We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In June of 2018, Minter pleaded guilty to aggravated battery, as a Level 3
felony, and neglect of a dependent, as a Level 3 felony. Minter pleaded guilty
under an open plea. The victim of both of Minter’s offenses was his sixty-eight-
year-old, physically disabled uncle, who died as a result of Minter’s acts.
[3] The trial court accepted Minter’s guilty plea and held a sentencing hearing. At
that hearing, the State argued that Minter’s criminal history, the age of the
victim, that the victim was physically disabled, that Minter was on pretrial
release for another offense at the time of the instant offenses, that Minter was in
a position of trust over the victim, 2 that Minter has repeatedly violated
probation or other early releases in the past, and the victim’s death were each
aggravating circumstances. Minter argued, among other things, that his guilty
1
Minter makes passing references to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) in his brief on appeal, but it is clear that
the substance of his argument is whether the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him, not
whether his sentence is inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B). We limit our review accordingly. Ind.
Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).
2
The State limited this factor to the battery offense.
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plea, his remorse, that “this crime is the result of circumstances that are
unlikely . . . to ever happen again,” and the hardship that his incarceration
would have on his wife, who was homeless, were mitigating factors. Tr. at 9.
In his expression of remorse, he stated that, “[h]ad I not been drinking . . . the
whole incident wouldn’t have happened,” and he noted adverse circumstances
from his childhood that lead him to becoming an alcoholic. Id. at 10.
[4] Following the parties’ arguments, the court found as follows:
Alcohol is not a defense to a crime . . . . Nor will it be used in
this instance as a mitigator for your defense. . . . I find that your
guilty plea is a mitigating factor. I do not find remorse
because . . . you always mitigate your culpability . . . . [T]he
mitigating factor that you pled guilty . . . is, in fact, mitigated
because you plead guilty to only two of the four counts.
On the aggravating side for the battery, we have criminal history,
the fact that you were on pretrial release, and that you were in a
position of trust, and that your victim was both over 65 and
disabled. . . . On the second count, . . . [h]e died. . . .
Id. at 17-19. The court further found that, “if I were not to impose consecutive
sentences, it would demean the seriousness of the . . . second offense . . . .” The
court then sentenced Minter to an aggregate term of twenty-two years in the
Department of Correction. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[5] Minter asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him.
Sentencing decisions lie within the sound discretion of the trial court. Cardwell
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v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). An abuse of discretion occurs if the
decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn
therefrom.” Gross v. State, 22 N.E.3d 863, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citation
omitted), trans. denied.
[6] A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing if it does any of the following:
(1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all;” (2) enters “a
sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a
sentence—including a finding of aggravating and mitigating
factors if any—but the record does not support the reasons;” (3)
enters a sentencing statement that “omits reasons that are clearly
supported by the record and advanced for consideration;” or (4)
considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.”
Id. (quoting Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490-491 (Ind.), clarified on reh’g
other grounds, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)). Here, Minter asserts that the trial
court abused its discretion when it omitted reasons that, according to Minter,
were clearly supported and advanced for consideration in the trial court,
namely, his remorse, his assertion that the circumstances of the instant offenses
were unlikely to recur, and the hardship his incarceration would have on his
wife.
[7] We cannot agree with Minter’s assessment. His purported assertions of
remorse in the trial court were, as the trial court accurately noted, couched in
terms of mitigating his own culpability. His bald and self-serving assertions that
his actions were unlikely to recur had no support aside from Minter’s own
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opinion. And, even if Minter’s incarceration were to cause a hardship on his
wife, Minter does not demonstrate on appeal why that outcome, or the other
purported mitigating circumstances, was significant for purposes of sentencing.
See, e.g., Sandleben v. State, 22 N.E.3d 782, 796 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (stating that
a “trial court need not state in the record those mitigating circumstances that it
considered insignificant”), trans. denied. Finally, insofar as Minter argues that
the trial court erred in the weight it assigned, or did not assign, to the mitigating
circumstances, that argument is not available for appellate review. Anglemyer,
868 N.E.2d at 491.
[8] In sum, Minter has not met his burden on appeal to show that the trial court
abused its discretion when it sentenced him. Accordingly, we affirm his
sentence.
[9] Affirmed.
Baker, J., and Robb, J., concur.
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