17-1088
Li v. Barr
BIA
A070 895 084
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
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At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
New York, on the 15th day of May, two thousand nineteen.
PRESENT:
ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
GERARD E. LYNCH,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
CHUAN MING LI,
Petitioner,
v. 17-1088
NAC
WILLIAM P. BARR,
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Yee Ling Poon; Deborah
Niedermeyer, Law Office of Yee
Ling Poon, New York, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler Acting Assistant
Attorney General; Carl McIntyre,
Assistant Director; Gregory A.
Pennington, Jr., Trial Attorney,
Office of Immigration Litigation,
United States Department of
Justice, Washington, DC.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioner Chuan Ming Li, a native and citizen of the
People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a March 27, 2017,
decision of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re
Chuan Ming Li, No. A 070 895 084 (B.I.A. Mar. 27, 2017). We
assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
procedural history in this case.
We review the agency’s denial of a motion to reopen for
abuse of discretion. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d
Cir. 2006). It is undisputed that Li’s 2016 motion to reopen
was untimely filed more than 13 years after his 2003 removal
order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (providing 90-day
deadline for motions to reopen). Li does not challenge the
timeliness ruling or argue that any exception applies. And
there is no statutory or regulatory exception to the time
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limitation for motions to reopen to apply for adjustment of
status. See Matter of Yauri, 25 I. & N. Dec. 103, 105 (BIA
2009).
Accordingly, the only basis for reopening was the BIA’s
authority to reopen sua sponte. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).
Sua sponte reopening is “an extraordinary remedy reserved for
truly exceptional situations.” In re G-D-, 22 I. & N. Dec.
1132, 1134 (BIA 1999). We generally lack jurisdiction to
review the BIA’s “entirely discretionary” decision not to
reopen sua sponte. Ali, 448 F.3d at 518. Although there is
an exception if the agency “misperceived the legal background
and thought, incorrectly, that reopening would necessarily
fail,” Mahmood v. Holder, 570 F.3d 466, 469 (2d Cir. 2009),
the BIA did not misperceive the law in this case because it
did not reach Li’s eligibility to adjust status; it simply
concluded that Li’s case was not an “exceptional situation.”
Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial
of sua sponte reopening. Ali, 448 F.3d at 518.
Because Li does not advance any arguments demonstrating
that his untimely motion to reopen was subject to one of the
statutory or regulatory exceptions to the filing deadline,
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and we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of sua
sponte reopening, Li cannot show that the BIA abused its
discretion. Because the BIA’s findings on these threshold
issues were dispositive, it was not required to consider any
additional arguments. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24,
25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not
required to make findings on issues the decision of which is
unnecessary to the results they reach.”).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
Clerk of Court
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