MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any May 15 2019, 8:46 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Troy D. Warner Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
South Bend, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Evan Matthew Comer
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jeffrey Lamont Reid, May 15, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-1829
v. Appeal from the St. Joseph
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Paul Singleton,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
71D06-1706-CM-2390
Tavitas, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1829 | May 15, 2019 Page 1 of 12
Case Summary
[1] Jeffrey Reid appeals his convictions for battery resulting in bodily injury, a
Class A misdemeanor, and intimidation, a Class A misdemeanor. We affirm.
Issues
[2] Reid raises two issues, which we restate as:
I. Whether the evidence is sufficient to convict Reid of
battery resulting in bodily injury.
II. Whether the evidence is sufficient to convict Reid of
intimidation.
Facts
[3] Karagh Brennan manages Joe’s Tavern and Catering (“Joe’s Tavern”) in South
Bend. On June 7, 2017, several children from the neighborhood rode their
bicycles to the corner in front of Joe’s Tavern, where they stopped on the
sidewalk. Brennan encountered Reid when she went outside to give the
children popsicles, as she had on more than one occasion. Subsequently, a
series of events occurred causing Brennan and Reid to argue; however, the
exact details were recounted differently by each witness.
[4] According to Brennan, while she was outside, Reid and Joseph Panetti were
walking down the street outside Joe’s Tavern, when the men began “cuss[ing]”
at her. Tr. p. 18. Brennan had never met Reid before that day. Reid asked
Brennan if she had a problem with the children, to which Brennan responded
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that she did not. 1 Reid then grabbed Brennan and slammed her against the
building. Brennan believed Reid slammed her against the building twice, but
she could not recall the exact number of times. Brennan was able to return
inside Joe’s Tavern to call 911. Reid followed Brennan into Joe’s Tavern,
carrying Brennan’s hat that she had been wearing when she went outside. 2
[5] In telling a different version of events, Panetti testified that he overheard
Brennan tell one of the children, his younger sister, to get off the Joe’s Tavern
property using profane language, and overheard Brennan call the children
“retards” while the children were eating popsicles. Id. at 93. Reid and Brennan
began to argue, and at that point, Panetti left the property before any physical
interaction occurred. Panetti stated that Reid stayed behind outside Joe’s
Tavern.
[6] According to Reid’s mother, Tammy Reid (“Tammy”), who witnessed the
entire incident from her car down the street, 3 Reid and Brennan were arguing
and Brennan “shove[d]” Reid. Id. at 112. At that point, Reid turned around
and “slapped [Brennan’s] hat off.” Id. at 113. Subsequently, Brennan “took off
1
There was some testimony later, by the responding officer, that perhaps one of the children was harassing
Brennan while she was giving them popsicles.
2
Donald Splawski, a witness inside Joe’s Tavern who testified later at the trial, agreed that there was a
“scuffle” in the entry-way of Joe’s Tavern. He noticed that a man had his hand on Brennan’s face and
“smacked her hat off her head.” Tr. p. 64. Carla Jenkins, another witness inside Joe’s Tavern who testified
later at the trial, also stated that Reid “had [Brennan’s] face [ ] up in the door and her head against the
window.” Id. at 48.
3
Tammy was waiting for Reid to give him a ride home.
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into the bar,” and Reid picked up Brennan’s hat and walked into Joe’s Tavern.
Id. at 113.
[7] Carla Jenkins, who was inside Joe’s Tavern, testified that she stood up and tried
to stop Reid. Jenkins testified that Reid grabbed Jenkins by the arm, telling her
that he would “f*** [Jenkins] right there on the bar” and referred to Jenkins as
an “old b****.” Id. at 52-53. Jenkins became scared that Reid was going to
hurt or sexually assault her. Donald Splawski, another patron of Joe’s Tavern,
also testified that he heard Reid say to Jenkins that he would “f*** you right
here and now, b****.” Id. at 68. Splawski, however, testified that Jenkins did
not stand and get in Reid’s way. Splawski testified that he saw Reid throw
Brennan’s hat on the bar and leave.
[8] Brennan was able to escape out the back door of Joe’s Tavern. Reid then left
Joe’s Tavern, and the police arrived five to ten minutes later. Officer Bruno
Martinsky with the South Bend Police Department responded to Brennan’s 911
call. When Officer Martinsky arrived, Reid was standing outside Joe’s Tavern.
Reid told Officer Martinsky that the people inside Joe’s Tavern called him, and
Reid’s hands were trembling when he spoke to Officer Martinsky. Reid told
Officer Martinsky that Reid accidentally knocked the hat off Brennan’s head
and that he tried to go back inside to return the hat.
[9] Officer Martinsky spoke with Brennan who was “visibly upset, shaking, [and]
crying.” Id. at 77. Officer Martinsky also took photographs of Brennan’s
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injury, which consisted of a tiny red spot on her face. Brennan testified her
injuries included knots on her head, as well as a red spot on her face.
[10] The State charged Reid with Count I, battery resulting in bodily injury, a Class
A misdemeanor; Count II, intimidation, a Class A misdemeanor; and Count
III, criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor. On July 25, 2018, a bench trial
was held, where witnesses testified to the foregoing facts.
[11] At the close of the State’s case in chief, the trial court granted Reid’s motion for
directed verdict on Count III, criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor. The
trial court found Reid guilty of Count I, battery resulting in a bodily injury, a
Class A misdemeanor, and Count II, intimidation, a Class A misdemeanor.
Reid now appeals.
Analysis
[12] Reid challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of both convictions. When there
is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “[w]e neither reweigh evidence
nor judge witness credibility.” Gibson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 204, 210 (Ind. 2016)
(citing Bieghler v. State, 481 N.E.2d 78, 84 (Ind. 1985), cert. denied), cert. denied.
Instead, “we ‘consider only that evidence most favorable to the judgment
together with all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.’” Id. (quoting Bieghler,
481 N.E.2d at 84). “We will affirm the judgment if it is supported by
‘substantial evidence of probative value even if there is some conflict in that
evidence.’” Id.; see also McCallister v. State, 91 N.E.3d 554, 558 (Ind. 2018)
(holding that, even though there was conflicting evidence, it was “beside the
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point” because that argument “misapprehend[s] our limited role as a reviewing
court”). Further, “[w]e will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-
finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017) (citing Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d
144, 146 (Ind. 2007)).
I. Battery Resulting in Bodily Injury
[13] First, Reid challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of his conviction for
battery resulting in bodily injury. Specifically, Reid contends that he was acting
in self-defense outside the bar. The State argues Reid’s self-defense claim is
waived because Reid failed to raise it in the trial court. We agree. Reid did not
claim self-defense to the trial court. 4 Accordingly, Reid’s self-defense argument
on appeal is waived.
[14] Waiver notwithstanding, we will address the merits of Reid’s self-defense claim.
“‘A valid claim of self-defense is legal justification for an otherwise criminal
act.’” Ervin v. State, 114 N.E.3d 888, 895 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Wallace
v. State, 725 N.E.2d 837, 840 (Ind. 2000)), trans. denied. Pursuant to Indiana
Code Section 35-41-3-2(c), “[a] person is justified in using reasonable force
against any other person to protect the person or a third person from what the
person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force.” “‘When
a claim of self-defense is raised and finds support in the evidence, the State
4
During closing argument, the State argued that Reid did not claim self-defense, and Reid did not object.
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bears the burden of negating at least one of the necessary elements.’” Id.
(quoting King v. State, 61 N.E.3d 1275, 1283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied).
“‘The State may meet this burden by rebutting the defense directly, by
affirmatively showing the defendant did not act in self-defense, or by simply
relying upon the sufficiency of its evidence in chief.’” Id. (quoting King, 61
N.E.3d at 1283). “If a defendant is convicted despite his claim of self-defense,
we will reverse only if no reasonable person could say that self-defense was
negated beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citations omitted).
[15] Although Reid did not argue self-defense, in reaching its decision, the trial court
stated, “with respect to self-defense, at least it has been mentioned I think a slap
would be too force[ful], an unnecessary amount of force based on the push.
And I think the slap did cause bodily injury.” Tr. p. 146. The trial court found
that Reid exerted more force than reasonably necessary under the
circumstances. See Weedman v. State, 21 N.E.3d 873, 883 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)
(finding “[a] claim of self-defense will also fail if the person uses more force
than is reasonably necessary under the circumstances”) (citations omitted). We
cannot reweigh the evidence to reach a different conclusion. Accordingly, the
evidence is sufficient to convict Reid of battery resulting in bodily injury, a
Class A misdemeanor.
II. Intimidation
[16] Second, Reid challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of his intimidation
conviction. To prove intimidation, a Class A misdemeanor, the State was
required to prove: “A person who communicates a threat to another person,
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with the intent: . . . (2) That the other person be placed in fear of retaliation for
a prior lawful act . . . commits intimidation, a Class A misdemeanor.” Ind.
Code § 35-45-2-1(a)(2). As the State argues, the threat was Reid’s statement
that he would “f***” Jenkins at the bar, while calling Jenkins a “b****.” Tr.
pp. 52-53. The lawful action Reid retaliated against was Jenkins’ attempt “to
get in the way of [Reid] and [Brennan],” so that Jenkins could prevent Reid
from chasing Brennan. Id. at 52. The deputy prosecutor argued in closing
arguments that the prior lawful act was Jenkins’ attempt “to prevent [Reid]
from continuing his pursuit of [Brennan].” 5 Id. at 133.
A. Threat
[17] Reid argues that the statements made to Jenkins do not fit the definition of a
true threat. Specifically, Reid contends that it would have been unreasonable
for Jenkins to think that Reid actually would sexually assault Jenkins in the bar
where other people were present. Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-45-2-
1(c), a threat is defined as:
an expression, by words or action, of an intention to:
(1) unlawfully injure the person threatened or another
person, or damage property;
5
The State went on to clarify, that “[w]hether [Jenkins] got up and moved ten feet, whether she turned her
chair, whether she just barely got out of it and directed her comments to him she made an attempt, a lawful
attempt to stop [Reid] from going after [Brennan] to which he responded by grabbing her arms and having a
few choice words about what he might do to her.” Tr. pp. 145-46.
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(2) unlawfully subject a person to physical confinement or
restraint;
(3) commit a crime;
(4) unlawfully withhold official action, or cause such
withholding;
(5) unlawfully withhold testimony or information with
respect to another person’s legal claim or defense, except
for a reasonable claim for witness fees or expenses;
(6) expose the person threatened to hatred, contempt,
disgrace, or ridicule;
(7) falsely harm the credit or business reputation of the
person threatened; or
(8) cause the evacuation of a dwelling, a building, another
structure, or a vehicle.
[18] “Our [S]upreme [C]ourt clarified in Brewington v. State that true threats depend
on two necessary elements: (1) that the speaker intend[ed] his communications
to put his targets in fear for their safety, and (2) that the communications were
likely to actually cause such fear in a reasonable person similarly situated to the
target.” Fleming v. State, 85 N.E.3d 626, 629 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citing
Brewington v. State, 7 N.E.3d 946, 964 (Ind. 2014), reh’g denied)). Here, there is
sufficient evidence of both prongs.
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[19] As to Brewington’s first prong, the evidence showed that Reid made these
statements to Jenkins when he was angry. Reid had just finished arguing with
Brennan outside of Joe’s Tavern and had followed Brennan inside while still
angry. The trial court heard the witness testimony 6 regarding Reid’s statements
and demeanor inside Joe’s Tavern, and it was reasonable for the fact finder to
conclude that Reid intended to put Jenkins in fear of her safety. See Fleming, 85
N.E.3d at 629 (concluding that the first prong of Brewington was satisfied when
Fleming “directly threatened to beat Mr. Kottkamp’s a[**]” and the threat was
made “while Fleming was angry”) (internal quotations omitted).
[20] As to Brewington’s second prong, the evidence indicates that Jenkins was scared,
and believed that Reid was going to hurt or sexually assault her. Even if we
accept as true Reid’s argument that it is unlikely he would have sexually
assaulted Jenkins in public, this fact is not determinative. Reid’s statements in
the context of the events in Joe’s Tavern clearly were statements of a threat of
violence. See e.g., Holloway v. State, 51 N.E.3d 376, 378 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)
(affirming Holloway’s intimidation conviction and noting that “Holloway cites
no authority for the proposition that a person must be capable of inflicting
injury when the statement is made . . .”), trans. denied. It was, therefore,
reasonable for the trial court, as factfinder, to determine that Reid’s statements
would cause fear in a reasonable person similarly situated to Jenkins. The
6
At the end of the trial, the trial court stated that it found “that the most credible witnesses that we have are
[Tammy] as well as Ms. Jenkins and Mr. Splawski. . . .” Tr. p. 146.
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evidence supports this conclusion, and thus, we cannot say there is insufficient
evidence to find that Reid communicated a true threat.
B. Prior Lawful Act
[21] Next, Reid argues the evidence does not suggest that Jenkins attempted to
intervene when Reid entered Joe’s Tavern and followed Brennan, which was
the prior lawful act articulated by the State for Reid’s intimidation conviction.
Reid’s argument focuses on the conflicting testimony between Jenkins and
Splawski. At the trial, Splawski testified that Jenkins did not actually stand up
between Reid and Brennan. Jenkins, however, testified that she did stand in
front of Reid, although she acknowledged that some physical issues limited the
speed with which she could do so. The determination of whether Jenkins
actually was able to get between Brennan and Reid was a question of credibility
for the trial court. The trial court ultimately weighed the credibility of the
witnesses and made a determination, as fact finder, of what occurred that day at
Joe’s Tavern. In order to disagree with the trial court, we would need to
reweigh the evidence and find a different version of the events more credible,
which we cannot do.7 Based on the foregoing, the evidence is sufficient to
convict Reid of intimidation, a Class A misdemeanor.
7
Regardless, as we have noted above, the State’s prior lawful act that it articulated at trial was not solely
based on a theory that Jenkins literally stood between Reid and Brennan, but instead that Jenkins attempted
to do so. See Tr. pp. 145-46.
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Conclusion
[22] The evidence is sufficient to convict Reid of battery resulting in bodily injury, a
Class A misdemeanor, and intimidation, a Class A misdemeanor. We affirm.
[23] Affirmed.
Baker, J., and May, J., concur.
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