People v. Lopez

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Appellate Court Date: 2019.03.26
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People v. Lopez, 2019 IL App (3d) 170798

Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption JAMIE L. LOPEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. Third District
Docket No. 3-17-0798

Filed January 4, 2019

Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Rock Island County, No. 94-CF-782;
Review the Hon. Richard A. Zimmer, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on Jeffrey J. Neppl and Theresa L. Sosalla, of Neppl & Zhang Law Firm
Appeal LLC, of Rock Island, for appellant.

John L. McGehee, State’s Attorney, of Rock Island (Patrick Delfino,
David J. Robinson, and Gary F. Gnidovec, of State’s Attorneys
Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

Panel JUSTICE CARTER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Holdridge and Wright concurred in the judgment and opinion.
 OPINION

¶1 Defendant, Jamie L. Lopez, appeals the third-stage denial of his successive
postconviction petition, arguing that the court erred in denying his postconviction petition
where the sentencing court failed to consider defendant’s youth when determining his
sentence. We affirm.

¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 In 1995, defendant was convicted of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West
1994)) and aggravated battery (id. § 12-4(b)(1)). The evidence at trial established that Chad
Van Klavern and Craig Jordan were attacked with a club. Our brief review of the facts is
based on our order in People v. Lopez, No. 3-95-0421 (1996) (unpublished order under
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). Van Klavern died due to multiple craniocerebral injuries; a
police officer testified that he was able to observe Van Klavern’s brain through a golf ball
sized hole in his skull. Jordan survived but suffered a head wound requiring 11 staples. The
Moline Police Department questioned Augustin Torres about the incident based on an
anonymous tip. During questioning, Torres implicated himself, defendant, and Anthony
Olvera. The police conducted an investigation and recovered the club and clothing allegedly
worn by defendant during the attack. The blood on the clothing matched Van Klavern’s
blood. Olvera and Torres testified that it was defendant’s idea to attack Van Klavern and
Jordan. Torres testified that defendant alone attacked Van Klavern with the club. Defendant
told them to deny that he was with them at the time of the incident if they were questioned by
police.
¶4 A sentencing hearing was held on May 9, 1995. In mitigation, a pastor testified that
defendant did some volunteer work. As a result, the pastor developed a positive opinion of
defendant. Defendant’s mother testified that she and defendant’s father got divorced and
remarried twice, which had a negative impact on defendant. She stated that defendant’s sister
was diagnosed with “manic depressive illness” and defendant was worried and concerned
about her. Defendant’s father testified that he had a good relationship with defendant,
revolving particularly around baseball. He said defendant had a strong faith.
¶5 The presentence investigation report (PSI) established that defendant was 16 years old at
the time of the PSI. He completed the tenth grade but dropped out “because there were too
many kids that he was afraid to be around.” He had earned three credits of the 21.5 required
for graduation, had a grade point average of 0.167, and was ranked 567 out of 576.
According to the school, defendant was dropped from school due to lack of attendance.
¶6 Defendant told the police that he was not with Torres and Olvera on the day of the
incident but that the two of them “had been pressuring him to become involved in activities
that he did not wish to become involved in.” Defendant also said that the blood found on his
clothing could have come from a fight he had earlier, since he got into a lot of fights. He
further stated that he had loaned clothes to Torres and Olvera in the past. Defendant’s prior
juvenile record included disturbing the peace, two separate retail thefts, and a curfew
violation. Defendant reported that he had good relationships with his parents but that his
relationship with his mother changed when he became a teenager “and began being dragged
down by his peers.” Defendant’s parents reported that two of his sisters were diagnosed as
manic depressive. Defendant reported that he did not belong to a gang but was “involved

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 with” Gangster Disciples, Vice Lords, and the Bishops. Defendant first drank alcohol at age
14 and last drank in September 1994. He said drinking caused problems with his girlfriend,
friends, and at home. Defendant reported that he started smoking marijuana at age 15.
¶7 The PSI further included information regarding defendant’s time at the Mary Davis
Detention Home. At first, defendant had a number of “lock up offenses” because he had a
difficult time adjusting. However, it was reported that he had improved. A counselor reported
that the home had a grading process based on room neatness, behavior, peer interaction, and
authority problems. Defendant had been receiving C’s and D’s. He then improved and started
earning B’s and then A’s. Defendant started volunteering for chore assignments and was a
good worker, showed good sportsmanship, and wrote and performed a positive rap for teens
in a talent show. Defendant stopped retaliating when taunted by racial slurs. The PSI further
included multiple victim impact letters from friends and family of Van Klavern.
¶8 Defendant made a brief statement in allocution in which he stated that he was sad about
the tragedy and sorry for the families of the victims and his own family. The State asked the
court to sentence defendant to between 45 and 55 years, which was less than the maximum,
based on defendant’s potential for rehabilitation.
¶9 The court stated that it had considered the PSI and the evidence presented. The court then
stated:
“But factors in aggravation and mitigation—the first, the defendant’s criminal
conduct neither caused nor threatened serious physical harm to another, and second,
the defendant did not contemplate that his criminal conduct would cause or threaten
serious physical harm to another. I cannot consider them in lieu of the fact it’s an
element of the offense in this case, when death is an element of the offense and
serious bodily harm, Court cannot consider that at sentencing, a sentence is not
aggravated or mitigated in this case.
Number three, the defendant acted under a strong provocation. From what
evidence Court has heard throughout this entire trial, the facts, even at Torres’ trial,
it’s clear this was an unprovoked assault by two young teenagers out beyond hours
that they should be out on the street, up in Chicago, travelling around unsupervised,
they should not be travelling in Chicago, should be home, but in any event on the
night in question when this—the night this murder occurred, an aggravated assault
occurred, these defendants acted under no provocation. In fact, the statement of
[defendant] himself as he told one of his friends the day afterwards when he is getting
rid of the club, the lower portion of the club, he said they beat up two guys, jumped
two guys because they had nothing else to do. Nothing else to do—so on the night in
question—Court finds absolutely no provocation, no taunting by Van Klavern, no
taunting by Jordan, they were simply walking home.
There were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the defendant’s
criminal conduct though failing to establish a defense. I don’t find any in this case.
The defendant’s criminal conduct was induced or facilitated by someone other
than the defendant. Yes and no. I think it’s clear if you listen to the testimony of
Olvera and Torres, corroborated by friends of the defendant he was prime mover in
this case to go outside and assault the two boys. Now that doesn’t excuse Torres. He
knew exactly what he was doing. He got out of that car with the defendant, they took
parts of that club, crawled by a cement wall waiting to assault two young men in the

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street. I think it’s clear he and Torres were two planners of the fight and prime mover
was [defendant].
Defendant has compensated or will compensate the victim of his criminal conduct
for the damage or injury that he sustained. Inapplicable in this case. No monetary
damage shown here, no monetary damage that would apply.
The defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity or has led a
law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the present
crime. No great criminal record. I want to note [he] had drug problems, very serious
in the [PSI], his mother was attempting to get him help for, had a fighting problem,
but his real record was couple thefts as you point out. I am not basing—if anything is
probably mitigating to the defendant.
The defendant’s criminal conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to
recur. Court cannot come to that conclusion, [defendant], you have tried to alibi for
yourself from day one when the evidence is overwhelming against you. You never
thought your friends would turn on you but they did, they helped convict you in this
case, the people you ran with, not the people the victim ran with, day after the crime
depositing of evidence, lower half of the club with blood on it. It’s clear the day after,
after the day of the crime, you are taking people to the crime scene, almost in a
bragging way this is where we jumped two people, had a fight, pointed it out to your
friends, had this alibi in Court, you weren’t there, all the way—
The imprisonment of the defendant would entail excessive hardship to his
dependents. No evidence of that—he has no dependents at this point.
The imprisonment of the defendant would endanger his or her medical condition.
No evidence of this and not mentally retarded as defined in the Code, I don’t find
factors in mitigation there.
Factors in aggravation, actually the flip side. I think when you turn to this,
sentence necessary to deter others from committing the same crime.
Court is considering [defendant’s] rehabilitation potential which you, you are a
young man, you have committed a horrible crime. The Court must balance this, all
parties argue before the Court, what is the appropriate sentence, the Court finds
clearly you have a rehabilitation potential, it appears to me you improved your life in
terms of academics. It appears you have had some athletic talent. On the other hand
Court must consider this crime, what you have done, the degree of participation, you
were the prime mover, and a degree of participation between you and Torres, you
were on the crime scene beating not only Van Klavern but Jordan, testimony clearly
supported that, as [the State] pointed out, the only reason this assault stopped is
because those neighbors came out, you were there beating, flailing away, the match
up of the blood on the lower half of the club, on the coat that you were wearing,
clearly presents an implication that corroborates the testimony of Torres and Olvera
and Craig Jordan, that you were clearly assaulting Van Klavern much more than
Torres, that doesn’t excuse anything, however. I do note difference in
participation—the fatal assault of Van Klavern—there’s also testimony you were
beating on Jordan. He says two people assaulted him at one point—it appears from
the testimony—his testimony somewhat self-serving—it’s clear he was assaulting
Jordan at the time although he did go over, assault with the upper portion of the club,

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 also on Van Klavern, this case is about protection of people walking the streets, and
people should be free to walk the street whether it be at night, daytime, they shouldn’t
have to worry about assault from young teenagers; young teenagers ought not to be
contemplating with nothing else to do to decide we are going to assault two people on
the street in Rock Island County or any County in the State of Illinois. You are
dangerous to the public even though you have rehabilitation potential. You are still
very dangerous, [defendant]. I don’t think you to this day realize what you have done
in this case. But Courts have a duty to protect the citizens and Courts have a duty to
punish severely defendants who without provocation assault people on the street,
irrespective of their age.”
The court sentenced defendant to 50 years’ imprisonment on the murder conviction to run
concurrent with a sentence of 5 years’ imprisonment on the aggravated battery conviction.
We affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Lopez, No. 3-95-0421.
¶ 10 In 1997, defendant filed a petition for postconviction relief, presenting various ineffective
assistance of counsel arguments. The circuit court denied the petition after an evidentiary
hearing. This court affirmed the denial on appeal. People v. Lopez, No. 3-98-0395 (1999)
(unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶ 11 In 2000, defendant filed a motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition,
stating that his initial petition was deficient and alleging unreasonableness of postconviction
counsel. The circuit court denied the motion, and this court allowed counsel’s motion to
withdraw and affirmed the denial of the motion pursuant to Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S.
551 (1987). People v. Lopez, No. 3-02-0298 (2004) (unpublished order under Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶ 12 In 2015, defendant filed a second motion to file a successive postconviction petition,
which is the subject of the instant appeal. In his motion, defendant alleged that the sentencing
court failed to take sufficient consideration of his youth under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S.
460 (2012). The circuit court denied the motion, stating that defendant failed to aver facts
that would change the verdict or offer new evidence. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider
and for leave to file an amended postconviction petition, both of which were granted.
¶ 13 On April 25, 2017, a third-stage evidentiary hearing was held on the amended petition.
Dr. Antoinette Kavanaugh testified as a defense expert that she was a forensic clinical
psychologist. She had worked with the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention developing a curriculum to be used in juvenile courts and detention centers. She
had recently published an article entitled, “Prospects for Developing Expert Evidence in
Juvenile Montgomery Resentencing Cases,” which discussed “how psychologists can help,
can present information to the Court that’s individualized and addresses the Miller factors
instead of what we can and can’t do.” She stated that she had testified in court “[h]undreds of
times.” She reviewed the transcript from defendant’s sentencing hearing and the PSI. She
discussed how juvenile brains operate differently than adult brains. Because of their brains,
juveniles act impulsively, are easily influenced by their peers, have trouble planning ahead,
are not as good at gauging risk, seek sensation, and are less able to delay gratification. After
reading the sentencing transcripts, Kavanaugh made some observations, stating:
“So one is the idea that sentence he was given that he, the judge, said in the
sentencing hearing transcript, sentence that he was imposing a sentence necessary to
deter others from committing the same crime.

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 Empirically, we have a strong body of research to show that a strict sentence does
not deter other adolescents from committing the same act, so—so that’s wrong from a
psychological perspective.
And he also said I don’t think you, to this day, realize what you have done in this
case.
I think from a developmental perspective it’s not unusual for an adolescent not to
appreciate the gravity of their act at the time and until they have matured, so that, I
don’t think, reflects some of the things that the courts have said to be considered in
sentencing.
I don’t—this is a typo because there should be a quote there, but courts have a
duty to protect the citizens and courts have a duty to punish severely the defendant,
who, without provocation, assault people on the streets, irrespective of their age and
the idea certainly from Miller and Montgomery is that age and the features of, that a
characteristic of that age, in fact, should be something that’s considered.”
Kavanaugh stated that the PSI noted that defendant’s relationship with his parents changed
when he became a teenager, he began drinking at 14 years of age, and began using cannabis
at 15 years of age. Kavanaugh stated:
“It’s my clinical opinion that there’s nothing in the transcript of the sentencing
hearing that clarifies how the judge considered these things despite the fact that they
are in the PSI, which was known at the time or the clinical or how the adolescent
brain is structured and functions different than an adult brain. I saw nothing in there
in the record that noted that.”
¶ 14 Ultimately, the court denied defendant’s amended postconviction petition, finding that
the Miller factors did not apply to defendant’s sentence as the sentence did not amount to a
de facto life sentence or an actual life sentence where he was sentenced to 50 years’
imprisonment, with day-for-day credit, and would thus be released when he was
approximately 41 years old. The court further found that the sentencing court “did look at
[defendant’s] youthful status, [it] looked at all the factors, and exercised discretion within the
sentencing range.”
¶ 15 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider, which was denied. In doing so, the court stated:
“I think the Court made the appropriate ruling when it denied the petition.
I do want to comment on one thing. The defense did argue regarding [the
sentencing court’s] comment, and specifically that comment in paragraph 6 of the
supplemental brief filed by the defense. The record of [defendant’s] sentencing
hearing, including the PSI reports reviewed by the Court, do contain information
applicable to the Miller factors. [Defendant’s] case is distinguished from Holman in
at least one significant fact. The Court stated specifically that it was sentencing
[defendant] to 50 years irrespective of his age. And I don’t read that part of the
transcript as saying what the defense argue it says.
[The sentencing court] was giving [its] ruling, and [it] says: [‘]You are dangerous
to the public. Even though you have rehabilitation potential, you are still very
dangerous, [defendant]. I don’t think you to this day realize what you have done in
this case.[’]

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 And then the applicable language, which defense is citing: [‘]But courts have a
duty to protect citizens and the courts have a duty to punish severely defendants who
without provocation assault people on the street irrespective of their age.[’]
I don’t read that as saying [the sentencing court] is sentencing [defendant]
irrespective of his age. I read that as a general statement, a general principle of law or
concept that [the sentencing court] has that courts have a duty to punish defendants
severely who without provocation assault people on the street, and that that duty is
present regardless of their age.
And I think when you read [the sentencing court’s] comments in their entirety
and, in fact, as stated in the brief, the record of [defendant’s] sentencing hearing,
including the PSI reports reviewed by the court do contain information applicable to
Miller factors.”

¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 17 On appeal, defendant argues that the court erred in denying defendant’s postconviction
petition because the sentencing court, when sentencing defendant to 50 years’ imprisonment,
did not consider defendant’s “youth and its attendant circumstances.” Upon review, we find
that defendant’s sentence is not a de facto life sentence and does not fall within the category
of cases considered by Miller and its progeny. Moreover, even if defendant’s sentence was a
de facto life sentence, the circuit court adequately considered defendant’s youth and its
attendant circumstances.
¶ 18 “The Post-Conviction Hearing Act offers a procedural device through which a criminal
defendant may assert that ‘in the proceedings which resulted in his or her conviction there
was a substantial denial of his or her rights under the Constitution of the United States or of
the State of Illinois or both.’ ” People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 25 (quoting 725 ILCS
5/122-1(a)(1) (West 2010)). Here, defendant argued that his sentence of 50 years’
imprisonment was unconstitutional under the eighth amendment.
¶ 19 “The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the special characteristics
of juvenile offenders.” People v. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451, ¶ 52.
“When the offender is a juvenile and the offense is serious, there is a genuine risk of
disproportionate punishment. In Roper [v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 511 (2005)], Graham
[v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010)], and Miller, the United States Supreme Court
addressed that risk and unmistakably instructed that youth matters in sentencing.
Roper held that the eighth amendment prohibited capital sentences for juveniles who
commit murder. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578-79. Graham held that the eighth amendment
prohibited mandatory life sentences for juveniles who commit nonhomicide offenses.
Graham, 560 U.S. at 82. And Miller held that the eighth amendment prohibited
mandatory life sentences for juveniles who commit murder. Miller, 567 U.S. at 489,
132 S. Ct. at 2475.” Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 33.
Subsequently, our supreme court has held that Miller and its progeny stand for the
proposition that “[l]ife sentences, whether mandatory or discretionary, for juvenile
defendants are disproportionate and violate the eighth amendment, unless the trial court
considers youth and its attendant characteristics.” Id. ¶ 40. De facto life sentences also fall
into this category, as

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 “[a] mandatory term-of-years sentence that cannot be served in one lifetime has
the same practical effect on a juvenile defendant’s life as would an actual mandatory
sentence of life without parole—in either situation, the juvenile will die in prison.
Miller makes clear that a juvenile may not be sentenced to a mandatory, unsurvivable
prison term without first considering in mitigation his youth, immaturity, and
potential for rehabilitation.” People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 9.
In sum, if sentencing a juvenile defendant to life imprisonment or an unsurvivable prison
term, it must first consider defendant’s youth and attendant circumstances. Thus, in analyzing
a juvenile defendant’s sentence under the Miller cases, we first determine whether
defendant’s sentence amounted to life imprisonment or a de facto life sentence. If so, then we
determine whether the court considered defendant’s youth and its attendant circumstances.
¶ 20 Here, defendant was sentenced to 50 years’ imprisonment, with day-for-day sentencing
credit. According to the Illinois Department of Corrections inmate database, which we take
judicial notice of (People v. Smith, 2014 IL App (4th) 121118, ¶ 34), defendant is scheduled
to be paroled on May 15, 2019, when he is almost 41 years old. Defendant’s sentence does
not amount to a de facto life sentence and does not fall into the category of cases considered
by Miller and its progeny. Defendant’s sentence is similar to a myriad of cases in which the
court held that the sentence imposed did not amount to a de facto life sentence. See, e.g.,
People v. Rodriguez, 2018 IL App (1st) 141379-B, ¶ 73 (50-year sentence, allowing release
at age 65); Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451, ¶¶ 65-67 (52-year sentence, allowing release
at age 60); People v. Pearson, 2018 IL App (1st) 142819, ¶ 49 (50-year sentence, allowing
release at age 55); People v. Evans, 2017 IL App (1st) 143562, ¶ 14 (90-year sentences, with
day-for-day credit, allowing release at age 62). In fact, when released on parole defendant
will be significantly younger than many similarly situated defendants.
¶ 21 In coming to this conclusion, we reject defendant’s request to extend the Miller line of
cases to every case in which juvenile defendants are convicted of “Adult Crimes.” As stated
above (supra ¶ 19), Miller and its progeny apply to some sort of life sentence for juveniles,
whether mandatory, discretionary, or de facto, not to all juveniles convicted as an adult.
¶ 22 Significantly, even if the sentence here was a de facto life sentence, the record is clear
that the court considered defendant’s youth and circumstances when sentencing defendant.
Under Miller and subsequent case law, a defendant may be sentenced to life imprisonment or
a de facto life sentence but only after the court has considered “the defendant’s youth and its
attendant characteristics.” Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 46. Such characteristics include, but
are not limited to:
“(1) the juvenile defendant’s chronological age at the time of the offense and any
evidence of his particular immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and
consequences; (2) the juvenile defendant’s family and home environment; (3) the
juvenile defendant’s degree of participation in the homicide and any evidence of
familial or peer pressures that may have affected him; (4) the juvenile defendant’s
incompetence, including his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors and
his incapacity to assist his own attorneys; and (5) the juvenile defendant’s prospects
for rehabilitation.” Id.
“The inquiry into whether a sentencing court complied with Miller is backwards-looking.”
Rodriguez, 2018 IL App (1st) 141379-B, ¶ 76.

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 “[T]he only evidence that matters is evidence of the defendant’s youth and its
attendant characteristics at the time of sentencing. *** A court revisiting a
discretionary sentence of life without parole must look at the cold record to determine
if the trial court considered such evidence at the defendant’s original sentencing
hearing.” Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 47.
¶ 23 Here, the sentencing court stated that it had considered the PSI, the evidence presented by
the parties, and the evidence from trial. The PSI stated that defendant was 16 years old, and
the court noted more than once that defendant was young. Defendant’s parents both testified
at the sentencing hearing about defendant’s home life, and ample information regarding it
was included in the PSI. “Where relevant mitigating evidence is before the court, it is
presumed that the court considered it absent some indication in the record to the contrary
other than the sentence itself.” People v. Dominguez, 255 Ill. App. 3d 995, 1004 (1994). The
PSI included information about defendant’s drug and alcohol use. In the PSI, defendant
stated that Torres and Olvera “had been pressuring him to become involved in activities that
he did not wish to become involved in.” The court noted that defendant was the “prime
mover” behind the incident, but noted the peer involvement. The PSI showed that defendant
had only completed tenth grade and had a low grade point average, but there was no evidence
presented that defendant was incompetent or could not communicate with police officers or
prosecutors. Further, the court specifically noted that defendant had rehabilitative potential
and the PSI showed his marked improvement while at the Mary Davis Detention Home.
Therefore, the court adequately considered the Miller factors.
¶ 24 In coming to this conclusion, we note that defendant says, “the court specifically stated
that it was sentencing [defendant] to 50 years ‘irrespective of [his] age.’ ” He then provides
five definitions of the word “irrespective” and argues that such statement means that the
court did not consider defendant’s age. At the motion to reconsider the denial of the
postconviction petition, the circuit court responded to the same argument, stating:
“[The sentencing court said, ‘]But courts have a duty to protect citizens and the courts
have a duty to punish severely defendants who without provocation assault people on
the street irrespective of their age.[’]
I don’t read that as saying [the sentencing court] is sentencing [defendant]
irrespective of his age. I read that as a general statement, a general principle of law or
concept that [the sentencing court] has that courts have a duty to punish defendants
severely who without provocation assault people on the street, and that that duty is
present regardless of their age.”
We agree with the circuit court’s assessment.
¶ 25 We further reject defendant’s statement that “Dr. Kavanaugh’s learned conclusion that
the transcript of the sentencing hearing failed to support a finding that the sentencing judge
thoughtfully considered and applied the ‘transient characteristics of youth’ must be given
great weight in evaluating whether [defendant’s] sentence is in compliance with our
constitution.” Kavanaugh specifically stated:
“It’s my clinical opinion that there’s nothing in the transcript of the sentencing
hearing that clarifies how the judge considered these things despite the fact that they
are in the PSI, which was known at the time or the clinical or how the adolescent
brain is structured and functions different than an adult brain. I saw nothing in there
in the record that noted that.”

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 First, as stated above, when mitigating evidence is presented, it is presumed that the court
considered it, unless there is some indication to the contrary. Supra ¶ 23 (citing Dominguez,
255 Ill. App. 3d at 1004). Here, there was no indication to the contrary. There is no
requirement that the court explicitly state on the record everything it considered when
sentencing the defendant or the weight it gave. People v. Burgess, 2015 IL App (1st) 130657,
¶ 227. Second, Kavanaugh’s clinical opinion has no bearing on our legal review of the facts
of defendant’s sentencing hearing. Kavanaugh did not interview defendant when he was 16
years old and did not have any opinion on defendant’s specific mental development and
characteristics at that time.

¶ 26 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 27 The judgment of the circuit court of Rock Island County is affirmed.

¶ 28 Affirmed.

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